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What motivated big changes in constitutional law doctrine during
the twentieth century? Rarely did important constitutional doctrine or
theory change because of formal amendments to the document's text,'
and rarer still because scholars or judges "discovered" new informa-
tion about the Constitution's original meaning.2 Precedent and com-
mon law reasoning were the mechanisms by which changes occurred
rather than their driving force. My thesis is that most twentieth cen-
tury changes in the constitutional protection of individual rights were
driven by or in response to the great identity-based social movements
("IBSMs") of the twentieth century.3
Race, sex, and sexual orientation were markers of social inferiority
and legal exclusion throughout the twentieth century. People of color,
women, and gay4 people all came to resist their social and legal dis-
abilities in the civil rights movement seeking to end apartheid; various
feminist movements seeking women's control over their own bodies
and equal rights with men; and the gay rights movement, seeking
equal rights for lesbigay and transgendered people. All these social
1. See David A. Strauss, The Irrelevance of Constitutional Amendments, 114 HARV. L.
REV. 1457 (2001).
2. Although scholars and judges are "discovering" new constitutional meanings all the
time, most (maybe almost all) of the "discoveries" rest upon thin historiography. See gener-
ally Martin Flaherty, History "Lite" in Modern American Constitutionalism, 95 COLUM. L.
REV. 523 (1995); Mark Tushnet, Interdisciplinary Legal Scholarship: The Case of History-in-
Law. 71 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 909 (1996).
3. Social movements have driven most of the big changes in American constitutional
law. The American Revolution and the founding period were the products of a generation-
based social movement. The Reconstruction amendments were the ultimate fruition of the
abolitionist movement. The union movement and reactions against it drove much of consti-
tutional law during the Lochner era and overlapped with the civil rights movement that
commences the story I am telling in this Article.
4. 1 use the term "gay people" to refer to lesbians, bisexuals, and gay men. Sometimes, I
shall use the term "lesbigay."
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movements sought to change positive law and social norms. In both
endeavors, constitutional litigation was critically important. Specifi-
cally, these IBSMs became involved in constitutional litigation as part
of three different kinds of politics in which they were engaged: their
own politics of protection against state-sponsored threats to the life,
liberty, and property of its members; their politics of recognition,
seeking to end legal discriminations and exclusions of group members
and to establish legal protections against private discrimination; and a
politics of remediation, to rectify material as well as stigmatic legacies
of previous state discrimination. At every stage, but particularly the
last, these IBSMs were confronted with a politics of preservation,
whereby countermovements sought to limit or roll back legal protec-
tions won or sought by the social movement.5 Each kind of politics of-
fered opportunities for different kinds of constitutional arguments.
The politics of protection most successfully invoked the First Amend-
ment and the Due Process Clauses of the U.S. Constitution; the poli-
tics of recognition and remediation were most closely associated with
the Equal Protection Clause; and the politics of preservation invoked
arguments based upon constitutional federalism, separation of powers,
and various libertarian doctrines.
The first part of this Article will survey the deployment of constitu-
tional doctrine by each IBSM as it engaged in these politics of protec-
tion, recognition, and preservation. Its perspective will be that of the
constitutional litigators acting on behalf of those social movements.6
Accordingly, I shall rely heavily on their own words and ideas, as ex-
pressed in appellate briefs and oral arguments, especially those in U.S.
Supreme Court cases. What interests me most is how movement law-
yers translated the problems and aspirations of women and minorities
into constitutional discourse, and how their arguments fared.
The perspective of the second part will be that of the Justices of
the Supreme Court, to whom these arguments were ultimately ad-
dressed. There, I shall explore the ways in which these social move-
ments affected the evolution of constitutional doctrine. IBSMs and
their countermovements brought constitutional litigation that required
the Court to apply old constitutional texts and precedents to new cir-
cumstances, not just in a single case, but in a string of cases that ran
like a chain novel whose audience shifted in the course of narration.
Moreover, IBSMs transformed the normative context in which these
5. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Channeling: Identity-Based Social Movements and Pub-
lic Law, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 419, 468-91 (2001) [hereinafter Eskridge, Channeling] (giving a
detailed development of this typology).
6. I make no claim that these lawyers or the institutions with which they were associated
were "representative" of the people who constituted or benefited from their respective
tBSMs. For my discussion of ideological debates among social movement lawyers, see Sec-
tion III.C.
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cases were decided, either by linking the new cases with established
norms or by persuading society and its judges to change the normative
context in which social traits were evaluated. As to the latter, IBSMs
have moved public norms away from understanding race, sex, and
sexual orientation as malign variations toward understanding them as
tolerable and (for race and sex) benign variations. Finally, as these so-
cial movements and countermovements have become institutionalized
players in American constitutional litigation and politics, they have
become ongoing constituencies for particular ways of thinking about
certain provisions of the Constitution. Thus, the oxymoronic notion of
"substantive" due process has become an established part of constitu-
tional jurisprudence because of the importance of the privacy right to
women and sexual minorities; waves of minority groups' politics of
recognition have transformed the Equal Protection Clause from the
last resort to the cutting edge of individual rights claims; and the First
Amendment's imperialism in constitutional law owes much to its abil-
ity to protect speech and expressive activities most dear to tradition-
alists as well as gay people, pro-life protesters as well as pro-choice
advocates, and racial segregationists as well as people of color. IBSMs
and their allies did not single-handedly work these transformations,
but they have provided impetus and then support for judges when they
have moved in the direction of those stances.
The story of doctrinal transformation has occurred just as dramati-
cally at less general levels as well. In the course of their litigation cam-
paigns, social movement lawyers came up with a variety of innovative
constitutional arguments for advancing their groups' goals. Some of
them were accepted by the judiciary as a basis for new doctrinal rules
or exceptions. Many of the Supreme Court's most radical doctrinal in-
novations in the last century were originally developed and pressed
(often for decades) by social movement or countermovement lawyers:
0 selective incorporation of criminal procedure rules in the Bill of
Rights into the Due Process Clause, especially Fifth, Sixth, and Eighth
Amendment rights (Section II.A.1-2);
* dialectical federalism, whereby federal courts not only monitor
state courts in criminal cases, but also engage in a constitutional dia-
logue (Section II.A.3);
* the due process right of sexual privacy, protecting Americans
against state direction of their intimate lives and feelings (Section
II.B);
0 the equal protection idea of presumptively suspect classifica-
tions that will trigger heightened judicial scrutiny of statutory distinc-
tions (Section II.C.1), as well as a sliding scale for heightened scrutiny
that also considers the importance (including the constitutional impor-
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tance) of the interests of groups disadvantaged by legislative distinc-
tions (Section II.C.3);
0 the relevance of legislative motivations in constitutional cases,
especially equal protection ones (Section II.C.2);
* the notion that the death penalty constitutes cruel and unusual
punishment (Section II.D);
0 the erosion and displacement of the political question doctrine,
and its demise in voting cases (Section II.E.1);
* the expansion of congressional authority to enforce the
Reconstruction amendments (Section II.E.2);
* the creation of a liberalized state action doctrine, including at-
tribution of responsibility to the state for some actions by private par-
ties and corporations (Section II.E.3);
* the extension of the First Amendment speech and assembly
protection to expressive conduct and expressive association (Section
II.F.1), and to sexual speech (Section II.F.2); and
a the anti-subordination principle as a way to ameliorate free
speech/equal protection clashes (Section II.F.3).
Judges adopting these constitutional transformations have usually
not accepted the IBSM perspective uncritically or without amend-
ment, however. Judges have rejected the most radical proposals, such
as a bar to the death penalty, and have diluted other proposals, such as
a robust de novo review of state criminal convictions by federal
judges, an anti-subordination reading of the Equal Protection Clause,
and strong First Amendment protection for sexual speech. Even when
judges have accepted IBSM constitutional visions and doctrines, the
constitutional transformations movement lawyers argued for have had
limited utility for actual minority group members. Some IBSM-
inspired doctrines have been turned to the advantage of counter-
movements. Examples include heightened scrutiny for suspect classifi-
cations, which has discouraged open affirmative action measures, and
the First Amendment rights of expressive conduct and association,
which now protect enclaves of exclusion against state antidiscrimina-
tion laws.
The fate of particular proposals and doctrines has depended on
context, but one rule stands out: judges are rarely willing to insist on
massive transfers of social or economic entitlements in American soci-
ety, and when they have - as with school desegregation and abortion
- they have been incompletely successful. This rule owes much to the
institutional limits of the federal judiciary. Judges do not have the re-
sources to undertake initiatives requiring administrative capacity, nor
do they have the political legitimacy to engage in much activism not
otherwise acceptable to the political system. When, by historical acci-
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dent, the Supreme Court was willing to press for redistribution of
status and state resources in a number of arenas (1962-69), the politi-
cal system responded with the elections of Richard Nixon and Ronald
Reagan, who appointed Justices who were more institutionally cau-
tious or even hostile to IBSM claims. Nonetheless, it is remarkable
that the Burger Court - constituted to go slowly on race matters -
engaged in significant activism responding to the women's movements
and that the Rehnquist Court - constituted to roll back affirmative
action and abortion - has opened up the U.S. Constitution to lesbigay
people.
In the third part of this Article, I maintain that IBSMs have also
contributed to meta-developments in constitutional theory and dis-
course. Social movement lawyers, by and large, were not legal phi-
losophers, but their work from the field has been fodder for three dif-
ferent stories about American constitutionalism in the last century;
each story illustrates the continuing insights of legal realist, legal proc-
ess, and critical theories of jurisprudence. Thus, consistent with legal
realists' predictions, none of the foregoing areas of law developed in
ways that would have been predictable from the original intent ani-
mating the constitutional provisions or from the precedents existing in
1900. The Supreme Court interpreted all of these constitutional provi-
sions highly dynamically during the twentieth century. IBSMs pio-
neered the idea of a Living Constitution and inspired and drove the
Court's dynamic interpretations by bringing cases that required judges
to consider new circumstances for the application of old principles, by
motivating judges to reconsider old principles in light of new norms,
and by changing the face of the judiciary itself. Dynamic constitutional
interpretation has been the death of serious originalism and of Article
V as a means for making fundamental changes to the Constitution.
In addition, IBSMs were the key impulse supporting a global shift
in the way the Supreme Court applied the Constitution in the twenti-
eth century. The shift was away from the structural Constitution of the
founding generation and the vested property/contract rights
Constitution of the Lochner era and toward the Carolene
Constitution, which justified judicial activism along legal process lines.
Under the Carolene Constitution, the role of the Court is to protect
the integrity of the pluralist political process, and especially to check
the political process' tendency toward self-perpetuation and persecu-
tion or suppression of minorities. This entails protecting despised
minority groups against state Kulturkampfs, assuring groups that are
able to organize themselves into mass movements that they will be
integrated into the political process, and protecting traditionalists from
excessive state burdens once a formerly subordinated minority has
become part of the political mainstream.
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Finally, the inevitable disappointments of IBSMs in constitutional
litigation has fueled a constitutional skepticism.7 Any viable IBSM ul-
timately demands full equality from the state (normative recognition
that its defining trait is a benign variation) - but any substantial suc-
cess will generate a countermovement seeking to preserve old forms
or new enclaves of segregation (normative recognition that the minor-
ity's trait is malign or, at best, tolerable). Through most of the twenti-
eth century, various movements and countermovements were evenly
enough balanced, politically, to motivate judges to seek compromises.
The typical compromise would recognize only some of the minority's
rights or would decline to implement their rights as soon as the mi-
nority desired, or both. Although social movement moderates em-
braced these compromises on pragmatic grounds and even heralded
them as "victories," the partiality and, sometimes, the emptiness of the
victories has soured many women, people of color, and lesbigay peo-
ple on constitutionalism as an enterprise or, more interestingly, on
constitutionalism as defined by Supreme Court decisions. This has
given rise to constitutional law drop-out as well as popular constitu-
tionalism approaches. The mix of constitutional pragmatism, skepti-
cism, and nihilism is the most ambiguous legacy of identity-based so-
cial movements for constitutional law in the twentieth century. Among
other things, it is headed toward a possible showdown with a Supreme
Court that is more aggrandizing today - partly as a result of its past
glory in civil rights cases - than at any previous point in our history.
I. CONSTITUTIONAL ARGUMENTS AND STRATEGIES DEPLOYED BY
THREE TWENTIETH CENTURY IDENTITY-BASED SOCIAL
MOVEMENTS
By 1900, American statutory and common law not only pervasively
discriminated against people of color, women, and sexual and gender
minorities, but also guaranteed a social and legal structure that com-
mitted violence against these citizens. American constitutional law
provided little protection against discrimination or violence. Because
most of the discrimination and much of the violence was by state and
local governments, the checks provided by federalism, national sepa-
ration of powers, and the Bill of Rights (then considered applicable
only to the federal government) did women and minorities no good.
Surprisingly, the Reconstruction amendments, protecting people of
color against state government oppression, had shown few teeth for
these groups. Although the Supreme Court construed the Thirteenth
Amendment to protect people of color against state peonage ar-
7. See Robin West, Constitutional Skepticism, 72 B.U. L. REV. 765 (1992) [hereinafter
West, Constitutional Skepticism].
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rangements8 and the Fourteenth Amendment to protect them against
blatantly discriminatory "class legislation,"9 the Court also ruled that
these amendments permitted the state to require racial segregation in
railroad cars and public schools" and to impose voting rules that effec-
tively barred almost all people of color from the franchise. 1 Laws ex-
cluding women from professions and the franchise had from the be-
ginning been upheld against Fourteenth Amendment attack.12 People
of color and feminists in the late nineteenth century did resist their
second-class citizenship, but the Supreme Court rejected their consti-
tutional claims and vision. 3 Laws criminalizing sodomy or the "crime
against nature," lewd behavior, the promulgation of indecent books or
plays or movies, the depiction of sexual inversion, public indecency,
and cross-dressing were not even subject to serious constitutional
challenge at the turn of the twentieth century. 4
As I have argued elsewhere, the existence of pervasive state exclu-
sion, discrimination, and violence was a necessary factor in the forma-
tion of the civil rights, women's, and gay peoples' mass social move-
ments. For each movement, the law was critical in creating a social
identity as "colored," female, or "homosexual"; the subordinate social
role reinforced by law was uncongenial to increasing numbers of
women, gay people, and people of color as the nation urbanized, and
courts were a natural forum for politically marginalized minorities to
resist their subordination; legal actors and institutions were the scenes
for traumatic encounters whose publicity transformed elite social
movements into mass ones."5
8. Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U.S. 219 (1911).
9. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 368 (1886); see also Strauder v. West Virginia, 100
U.S. 303, 308 (1879).
10. See Cumming v. Richmond County Bd. of Educ., 175 U.S. 528 (1899) (arguendo,
public schools); Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896) (railroad cars).
11. See Giles v. Harris, 189 U.S. 475 (1903).
12. See Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. (21 Wall) 162 (1874) (holding that women have no
right to vote); Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall) 130 (1873) (holding that women have no
right to practice law).
13. For a striking analysis of the background to Plessy, that is, the political struggle by
communities of color in post-Reconstruction Louisiana, see Rebecca J. Scott, Fault Lines,
Color Lines, and Party Lines. Race, Labor, and Collective Action in Louisiana and Cuba,
1862-1912, in BEYOND SLAVERY: EXPLORATIONS OF RACE, LABOR, AND CITIZENSHIP IN
POSTEMANCIPATION SOCIETIES 61, 65-83 (Frederick Cooper et al. eds., 2000).
14. On the emergence of visible communities of "inverts,". "fairies," "prostitutes," and
other gender-benders in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, and their constitu-
tional helplessness, see WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., GAYLAW: CHALLENGING THE
APARTHEID OF THE CLOSET ch. 1 (1999) [hereinafter ESKRIDGE, GAYLAW].
15. See Eskridge, Channeling, supra note 5, at 423-59 (2001).
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With African Americans leading the way, each group formed insti-
tutions of resistance, critique, and normative aspiration.16 Initially, and
before there was mass mobilization, the dominant (but not the only)
public goal of those institutions was a politics of protection, urging that
governmental authorities ought not be able to deploy the apparatus of
the state to control the bodies and lives of women and minority peo-
ples. The normative goal of such a politics was to persuade the main-
stream that the group-defining trait (color, sex, sexual or gender orien-
tation) was a tolerable variation from the norm and that stigmatized
persons ought to have minimal rights. Generally, minority leaders in
this phase did not contest the propositions that whiteness, maleness,
and heterosexuality were the norm and that color, femininity, and
homosexuality merited less social esteem. If the social group was able
to show political strength, however, its organizational leaders would
move toward a public stance which denied the inferiority of the
group's defining trait: there is no material difference between blacks
and whites, except those created by society and law; women can per-
form any social role that men can; gay is as good as straight.
Once this step was taken, the ISBM was engaged in a politics of
recognition, demanding full respect and equal rights within the polity.
To the extent this politics was successful in changing traditional laws
and social attitudes, it was succeeded by a politics of remediation,
whereby the group would seek state correction and even restructuring
to "cure" the effects of past discrimination. IBSMs' politics of recogni-
tion and remediation inevitably triggered a politics of preservation.
There, a countermovement would reassert traditional normative and
legal baselines and the inferiority of the minority group. Such a poli-
tics might ease up if the minority gained acceptance within the nation's
social and political pluralist system; although extremists would still in-
sist on traditional baselines and the minority's inferiority, moderates
in the countermovement would concede toleration of the minority, but
with social and legally protected space for traditional ingroup mem-
bers to retain their dominance.
For each kind of politics, the social movement's political argu-
ments were translated into constitutional arguments. Even though the
doctrinal bases for such arguments did not exist in 1900, movement
lawyers ran various doctrinal trial balloons through the century. Many
of them were embraced by judges. Although the doctrinal story could
have evolved in a variety of different ways, it evolved in the following
16. The model in this paragraph is most obviously applicable to the experience of Afri-
can Americans, women, and lesbigay people (the IBSMs which are the focus of this Part),
but is also applicable to other IBSMs that are not my focus here: Asian and Hispanic Ameri-
cans, people with disabilities, and (to a lesser extent) poor people. I shall take up issues
raised by these social movements in the next part of the Article.
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thematically sensible way: IBSMs' libertarian politics of protection
was confirmed and developed under the banner of the Due Process
Clause's protection of "liberty" and the First Amendment's protection
of speech, press, and assembly; their egalitarian politics of recognition
and remediation gravitated to the Equal Protection Clause; their ad-
versaries' arguments grounded on concepts of localism, majoritarian
attachment to tradition, and liberty found voice in constitutional fed-
eralism, separation of powers, and freedom of speech and association.
A. The Civil Rights Movement
The defining experience for IBSMs in the United States has been
that of African Americans, the social group most violently oppressed,
most dramatically resistant, and most tragically unsuccessful. The
normative triumph of the civil rights movement was the greatest yet
most incomplete. Its story is told in riveting detail by a number of
authors. 7 All I wish to accomplish here is to show how the move-
ment's lawyers - Moorfield Storey, William Hastie, Charles Houston,
Thurgood Marshall, Spottswood Robinson, Constance Baker Motley,
Jack Greenberg, Julius Chambers - translated the social, moral, and
political goals of the movement into constitutional discourse.
At the outset, three points bear emphasis. First, my survey focuses
on the dialogue between civil rights lawyers and judges. The more
complex and internally debated normative goals of the social move-
ment itself are secondary to my project, although they are of overrid-
ing importance to the larger history of the civil rights movement. Sec-
ond, the lawyers bringing constitutional cases and arguing
constitutional appeals did not "represent" all people of color in the
United States; they represented particular organizations which re-
flected particular stances within communities of color (NAACP) and
within the larger society (ACLU). To the extent that the NAACP's
lawyers presented an "integrationist" agenda through constitutional
attacks on apartheid, they were advancing a norm that was controver-
sial within the African-American community and were deploying a
strategy that they themselves realized was incomplete. 8 Third, I am
17. The classic accounts are DAVID J. GARROW, BEARING THE CROSS: MARTIN
LUTHER KING, JR., AND THE SOUTHERN CHRISTIAN LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE (1986)
[hereinafter GARROW, BEARING THE CROSS]; RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE: THE
HISTORY OF BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION AND BLACK AMERICA'S STRUGGLE FOR
EQUALITY (1976); ALDON D. MORRIS, THE ORIGINS OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT:
BLACK COMMUNITIES ORGANIZING FOR CHANGE (1984). For a briefer and more popular
account, see ADAM FAIRCLOUGH, BETTER DAY COMING: BLACKS AND EQUALITY 1890-
2000 (2001).
18. Contrast the NAACP's integrationist and pragmatic philosophy with the more con-
frontationalist philosophy of organizations such as the International Labor Defense, a radi-
cal class-based organization in the 1930s, the Civil Rights Congress in the 1940s, and the
2072 [Vol. 100:2062
HeinOnline  -- 100 Mich. L. Rev. 2072 2001-2002
Identity-Based Social Movements
presenting their constitutional politics as a progression of what was the
primary - but not necessarily the only - goal of the social movement
at different points in time: so long as black people were politically im-
potent in this country, the lawyers mainly sought protection for those
in their group most brutalized by the state. Once blacks became more
politically and socially significant, the lawyers made recognition and
then remediation the overriding item on their agenda, which triggered
overt counter-organization by traditionalists insisting on preservation.19
1. The Politics of Protection, 1913-40
Notwithstanding the regime of apartheid that settled over much of
the nation between 1890 and 1910, many people of color rejected the
notion that their race was "inferior" (as apartheid claimed) - and al-
most all people of color rejected the violence African Americans suf-
fered at the hands of private and public actors. Founded in 1909 by a
biracial collection of persons, the National Association for the
Advancement of Colored People ("NAACP") sought to refute erro-
neous stereotypes about black people and to protect blacks against
public and private violence (especially lynching), loss of their rights to
vote, and denial of housing where they could flourish.2" From its be-
ginning, the NAACP involved itself in cases where black people's lib-
erties were threatened by the state (or by private actors usurping state
roles). The first case in which the Association became involved arose
out of the capital conviction of a black man, Pink Franklin, for killing
a police officer while resisting arrest for violating the state peonage
law. The NAACP arranged for counsel to take Franklin's case to the
Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee of the 1960s; with the economic boycott and
protest strategy for reform by grass-roots mobilization reflected in the Southern Christian
Leadership Conference of the 1950s and 1960s; and with the black nationalist (separatist)
philosophy of the Nation of Islam in the 1960s. All of these groups spoke for many blacks in
America, and all sought to change attitudes and laws, but only the NAACP and like-
oriented groups (the ACLU, the Committee for Civil Rights Under the Law) regularly
spoke for blacks to the Supreme Court in constitutional cases.
19. That there was this kind of rough progression in the lawyers' presentation and, per-
haps, in the priorities of the social movement does not mean that recognition was not impor-
tant to many minorities during the early stages; that protection did not remain critically im-
portant even after the politics of recognition became predominant; or that preservation was
not strongly favored by most people in the majority throughout the whole period. That the
various politics I describe are overlapping should not obscure my central point, which is that
the public debate stimulated by the civil rights movement went through discernible stages of
political and constitutional presentation.
20. On the founding of the NAACP, see 1 CHARLES FLINT KELLOGG, NAACP: A
HISTORY OF THE NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF COLORED PEOPLE 9-45 (1967); DAVID
LEVERING LEWIS, W.E.B. DUBOIS: BIOGRAPHY OF A RACE 1868-1919 (1993) (biography of
an important founding member); JAMES M. MCPHERSON, THE ABOLITIONIST LEGACY:
FROM RECONSTRUCTION TO THE FOUNDING OF THE NAACP (1975); MARY WARE
OVINGTON, THE WALLS CAME TUMBLING DOWN (1947) (giving a first-person account).
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Supreme Court. Although the peonage statute was a blatant violation
of the Thirteenth Amendment, the Court denied Franklin's poorly ar-
ticulated constitutional appeal that this should have affected his mur-
der conviction.21 After this disappointing debut, the NAACP estab-
lished a formal legal committee that regularly handled or coordinated
cases where the liberties - and typically the lives - of African
Americans were threatened.
Thus, most of the NAACP's early cases involved criminal prosecu-
tions against black men.2 2 Some of these were little more than mob-
inspired lynchings railroaded through the legal process.3 Moore v.
Dempsey,24 an early and important example, involved a habeas appeal
of the death sentences meted out to six of the black men convicted in
Phillips County, Arkansas for the asserted murder of a white man. His
death occurred in the wake of a spree of murders of black men by a
hysterical white mob during the Red Summer of 1919. The NAACP
presented the Supreme Court with a detailed factual record which
showed the outrageous setting of the case: more than 200 blacks were
slaughtered without a single indictment, while the death of one white
man called forth seventy-nine black scapegoats without credible evi-
dence of their guilt; once arrested, the black men were beaten and tor-
tured by the authorities until some agreed to testify against others;
twelve of the remaining defendants were railroaded through a "trial"
in which they were perfunctorily represented by an appointed counsel
who did not consult them and were convicted by an all-white jury
which deliberated for two to three minutes before reaching the verdict
of guilty and a penalty of death.25 The only evidence against the de-
fendants was that extracted by torture, and the whole climate was
tainted by news reports that they were leaders of an insurrection and
by mobs of white men surrounding the courtroom and poised to lynch
21. Franklin v. South Carolina, 218 U.S. 161, 170-72 (1910). Eight months later, the
Court invalidated an Alabama peonage law similar to the one that indirectly brought the
death penalty (later commuted to life in prison) to Pink Franklin. See Bailey v. Alabama, 219
U.S. 219 (1911). See generally Benno C. Schmidt, Jr., Principle and Prejudice: The Supreme
Court and Race in the Progressive Era, Part 2: The Peonage Cases, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 646
(1982).
22. See KELLOGG, supra note 20, at 64.
23. An NAACP study documented 3,224 lynchings between 1889 and 1918. See id. at
210. See generally id. at 209-46 (detailing anti-black violence in the 1910s and the NAACP's
legislative and publicity campaign against lynching).
24. 261 U.S. 86 (1923); see also infra Section II.A infra (discussing Moore).
25. See Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, reprinted in Record on Appeal at 1-11,
Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86 (1923) (1922 Term, No. 199); Brief for Appellants at 1-33,
Moore (1922 Term, No. 199) (Moorfield Storey, counsel for appellants); RICHARD C.
CORTNER, A MOB INTENT ON DEATH: THE NAACP AND THE ARKANSAS RIOT CASES 5-
105 (1988) (providing a detailed account of the riots, the arrests and trials, and the early in-
volvement of the NAACP in defending the men).
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them if the verdict had been otherwise than death. Defendants' claim
was that because of the outside "mob domination," the "entire trial,
verdict, and judgment against them was but an empty ceremony," its
resulting death penalty nothing but "judicial murder. '2 6 Given such a
damning factual record, the Court agreed, holding that such a trial,
"hurried to conviction under the pressure of a mob without any regard
for... [the defendants'] rights and without according to them due
process of law [was void]. 27
The Phillips County case was one of the NAACP's greatest tri-
umphs. It was the first of a series of cases where the NAACP not only
sought to protect innocent black defendants, but also sought judicial
recognition of due process rules that would inure to the benefit of all
black defendants. In Brown v. Mississippi,28 for example, the Supreme
Court overturned three convictions based on confessions obtained by
whipping and physical torture. The Court's opinion established as an
enduring principle of its due process jurisprudence that compelled
confessions cannot be the basis for state court convictions and held
that federal courts will enforce this rule even when not timely raised in
the state courts.29 Moore was also a harbinger of the famous
Scottsboro cases, where the NAACP's role was only a supporting
one.3" The cases arose in 1931 out of alleged rapes of two white women
by nine black youths hitching rides on railway cars in Jackson County,
Alabama. Mindful that a proceeding as openly mob-driven as that in
Moore would trigger federal intervention, the newspapers and the
authorities discouraged mobs from forming. Nor was there indication
that the accused were tortured, as there would be in other cases. There
was still plenty of evidence that the defendants were railroaded to
guilty verdicts, with death sentences. As Samuel Liebowitz's Supreme
26. Record on Appeal at 6-7, Moore (1922 Term, No. 199); Brief for Appellants at 33,
Moore (1922 Term, No. 199).
27. Moore, 261 U.S. at 87. The actual disposition of the case was a remand to the federal
trial court to hold a hearing to determine whether the asserted facts were correct; if so, ha-
beas would be granted. Before the trial court decided the matter, the Governor commuted
the six men's death sentences to short prison terms. By 1925, all of the sixty-seven men who
had been sentenced to prison for unproven roles in the single white man's death had been
released. KELLOGG, supra note 20, at 244.
28. 297 U.S. 278 (1936); see also Section II.A.1 (discussing Brown); RICHARD C.
CORTNER, A "SCOTTSBORO" CASE IN MISSISSIPPI: THE SUPREME COURT AND BROWN V.
Mississippi (1986) [hereinafter CORTNER, A "SCOTTSBORO" CASE IN MISSISSIPPI].
29. Brown, 297 U.S. at 285-87.
30. Although the NAACP procured lawyers for the "Scottsboro boys," the Communist-
affiliated International Labor Defense won their Supreme Court cases with the excellent
representation of Samuel Leibowitz. See generally Hugh T. Murray, Jr., The NAACP versus
the Communist Party: The Scottsboro Rape Cases, 1931-32, in THE NEGRO IN THE
DEPRESSION AND WAR: PRELUDE TO REVOLUTION, 1930-1945, at 276 (Bernard Sternsher
ed., 1969).
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Court brief for the Scottsboro defendants maintained, the cases were
like Moore in that the evidence of guilt was slim and suspect; the de-
fendants were not afforded their choice of counsel and were essen-
tially unrepresented; and people of color were excluded from serving
on the jury.3' In Powell v. Alabama,32 the Court reversed the defen-
dants' convictions on the ground that they were denied due process,
which the Court interpreted to require effective representation by
counsel before defendants could be sentenced to death for conviction
of a capital crime. The defendants were retried and re-convicted, but
the trial judge (remarkably) overturned their convictions on the
ground that the testimony of their accuser was incredible. Some of
them were tried and convicted yet again.
In Norris v. Alabama,33 the Supreme Court reversed these third
capital convictions, on the ground that the state had violated the
Equal Protection Clause by effectively excluding people of color from
the juries. Norris was the first case in which the Supreme Court over-
turned a criminal conviction on grounds of exclusion of blacks from
the juries without any admission to that effect by state officials or
judges.34 Chief Justice Hughes' opinion for a unanimous Court care-
fully examined the evidence presented (and probably fabricated) by
the local officials, and found that it did not rebut the prima facie case
of discrimination made out by the utter absence of black people on ju-
ries in Jackson County, Alabama "within the memory of witnesses
who had lived there all their lives."35 This precedent proved fruitful for
the NAACP as a weapon to challenge death sentences for people of
color convicted in southern jurisdictions where blacks had long been
excluded de facto from jury service. Not only did the Supreme Court
overturn convictions of a number of black defendants on this ground,36
but the Fifth Circuit enforced Norris in the 1940s and 1950s, sending
31. See Brief for Petitioners at 36-62, Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932) (1931 Term,
Nos. 98-100). See generally DAN T. CARTER, SCOTTSBORO: A TRAGEDY OF THE AMERICAN
SOUTH (rev. ed. 1969); JAMES GOODMAN, STORIES OF SCOTTSBORO (1994).
32. 287 U.S. 45 (1932); see also infra Section II.A.l.b (discussing Powell).
33. 294 U.S. 587 (1935); see also infra Section II.A.l.c (discussing Norris).
34. See Benno C. Schmidt, Jr., Juries, Jurisdiction, and Race Discrimination: The Lost
Promise of Strauder v. West Virginia, 61 TEXAS L. REV. 1401 (1983) [hereinafter Schmidt,
Juries]. Compare Neal v. Delaware, 103 U.S. 370 (1881) (holding that state cannot exclude
people of color from juries as a matter of law; admission of race discrimination by officials
meets this test), with Thomas v. Texas, 212 U.S. 278 (1909) (rejecting race discrimination
claim because state courts had found insufficient proof of such discrimination).
35. Norris, 294 U.S. at 591.
36. See Hill v. Texas, 316 U.S. 400 (1942); Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128 (1940); Pierre v.
Louisiana, 306 U.S. 354 (1939); Hale v. Kentucky, 303 U.S. 613 (1938); Hollins v. Oklahoma,
295 U.S. 394 (1935). See generally Douglas L. Colbert, Challenging the Challenge: Thirteenth
Amendment as a Prohibition Against the Racial Use of Peremptory Challenges, 76 CORNELL
L. REV. 1, 83 (1990).
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an important message to southern jurisdictions that whites-only jury
policies were costly.3 7 Norris also saved the remainder of the
Scottsboro defendants from death sentences - except (ironically)
Clarence Norris, who was convicted in a fourth trial. His death sen-
tence was later commuted, and he emerged from prison in 1950, hav-
ing lost almost twenty years of his life for what is now considered "the
most notorious racial hoax case in our history."38
The jury cases reflected a broader challenge: knowing that open
exclusion of black people by law might be held to violate the Equal
Protection Clause, southern officials devised subterfuges that weeded
out blacks from jury lists de facto.39 They did the same thing with vot-
ing: knowing that open exclusion of black people by law might be held
to violate the Fifteenth Amendment, southern officials found ways to
discourage or exclude blacks from voting lists indirectly. As in the jury
cases, the NAACP's strategy was to document the dearth of black
people on voting lists and to show how white officials accomplished
their exclusion. Indeed, the NAACP's first Supreme Court amicus
brief was in a voting case, Guinn v. United States.4" Oklahoma required
that citizens pass a literacy test in order to vote; exempted from the
test were people who or whose ancestors were entitled to vote in 1866,
just before the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments were adopted.
The NAACP's Moorfield Storey argued that this law effectively de-
barred most people of color from voting because they could not read,
without imposing the same disability on illiterate whites, whose ances-
tors were voters in 1866. The Supreme Court ruled that a literacy test
standing alone was permissible, but its joinder with a grandfather
clause violated the Fifteenth Amendment's requirement that the right
to vote not be "denied or abridged.., on account of race, color, or
previous condition of servitude."41 Guinn would seem like an easy case
- but only to today's eyes. During the "progressive" era, it was a
rather bold decision because it analyzed the state law in terms of its
37. See John Andrew Martin, The Fifth Circuit and Jury Selection Cases: The Negro De-
fendant and His Peerless Jury, 4 HOUSTON L. REV. 448 (1966).
38. Katherine K. Russell, The Racial Hoax as Crime: The Law as Affirmation, 71 IND.
L.J. 593,598 (1996).
39. In Norris, for example, the local officials testified that no people of color were quali-
fied to serve on juries; the NAACP produced black men who were obviously well-qualified,
and the Supreme Court refused to credit the officials' "sweeping characterization of the lack
of qualifications." 294 U.S. at 599. Additionally, Norris's lawyers demonstrated to the Court
that officials had tried to cover up their discrimination by adding black names to the rolls
after the lawsuit was brought. See Schmidt, Juries, supra note 34, at 1479.
40. 238 U.S. 347 (1915); see also infra Section II.E.1 (discussing Guinn). See generally
Benno C. Schmidt, Jr., Principle and Prejudice: The Supreme Court and Race in the Progres-
sive Era, Part 3: Black Disenfranchisement from the KKK to the Grandfather Clause, 82
COLUM. L. REV. 835 (1982) [hereinafter Schmidt, Principle and Prejudice].
41. Guinn, 238 U.S. at 362.
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practical application. The decision was only "rather" bold, because
Oklahoma's scheme was more transparent than that followed in any
other state, because the Court approved the use of literacy tests gen-
erally, and because even Oklahoma evaded the Court's mandate with
a new grandfather clause for two decades. 42 Guinn did not assure that
people of color would be able to vote in the South. There were as
many subterfuges as there were voters of color.
Deterred by Guinn from directly barring people of color from
voting in general elections, several southern states barred them from
participating in the Democratic Party primary, where electoral deci-
sions were effectively made. The NAACP challenged the Texas stat-
ute instantiating a whites-only primary. Although the Supreme Court
had ruled that primaries were not "elections" that Congress could
regulate under Article I, section 4 and had suggested that voting prac-
tices might be political questions, Storey urged the Court to recognize
the Texas statute as a "flagrant, unjust discrimination against a citizen
solely on account of race and color., 43 Following Guinn and essentially
ignoring the earlier precedents, the Supreme Court ruled in Nixon v.
Herndon" that the Fourteenth Amendment prevented Texas from ex-
cluding blacks in primary elections. Texas responded by ceding
authority over primaries to the State Democratic Convention of
Texas, which maintained that it was not a state actor accountable un-
der the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments. The NAACP chal-
lenged this scheme as an unconstitutional subterfuge, 45 but the
Supreme Court permitted the practice in 1935.46
The NAACP got a second shot at the issue after the reconstituted
New Deal Court ruled in United States v. Classic47 that interference
with the right to vote in a primary involves a right "secured or pro-
tected by the Constitution and laws of the United States." Arguing
42. See Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.S. 268 (1939) (invalidating Oklahoma's next voting law,
which gave people of color eleven days in May 1916 to register or suffer permanent loss of
their franchise).
43. Brief for Plaintiff-in-Error at 31, Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536 (1927) (1926 Term,
No. 117) (distinguishing Newberry v. United States, 256 U.S. 232 (1921), stating that
Congress's power to prescribe the manner for holding "Elections" for its members does not
include authority over primaries); Reply Brief for Plaintiff-in-Error at 19-23, Nixon (1926
Term, No. 117) (distinguishing Giles v. Harris, 189 U.S. 475 (1903) and refusing to entertain
claim for injunction in voting rights case).
44. 273 U.S. 536 (1927); see also infra Sections II.C.1 and II.E.1 (discussing Nixon).
45. Brief on the Merits [for the Petitioner] at 12-19, Grovey v. Townsend, 295 U.S. 45
(1935) (1934 Term, No. 563).
46. The Supreme Court initially declined to accept the state's claim that the Democratic
Party rather than the state was responsible for the exclusion, Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73
(1932), but once that matter was clarified the Court ruled that the state was no longer re-
sponsible. Grovey v. Townsend, 295 U.S. 45 (1935).
47. 313 U.S. 299 (1941).
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that the Texas white primary set-up was a patent effort to disenfran-
chise people of color and that Classic required the state to be held re-
sponsible, the NAACP, joined now by the ACLU, persuaded the
Court to overrule the earlier precedent in Smith v. Allwright.48 This
decision, handed down in 1943, had more tangible consequences than
the Court's earlier decisions. Only three percent of southern blacks
were registered to vote in 1940, but twenty percent were registered by
1952 - in part due to the NAACP's post-Allwright litigation cam-
paign against white primaries and the willingness of judges to enforce
Allwright broadly.4 9 The voting cases, even more than the mob pres-
sure and the jury cases, pressed the Court to look beneath the formally
neutral rules and find the underlying exclusionary project for which
the state bore responsibility.
By the time the NAACP was founded, apartheid was well-
established in the South, and it probably would have been futile to
challenge it in the period before World War II, especially given the
Association's limited resources. But the NAACP was alert to local ef-
forts expanding the reach of legal segregation of the races. It was not
until 1910 that a major city (Baltimore) legally restricted black people
to residing in designated ghettoes.5° The Baltimore branch of the
NAACP thrice challenged the 1910 ordinance and its two successors
as a violation of the Due Process Clause. Twice the Maryland Court of
Appeals invalidated the ordinance; it held the third appeal pending
the NAACP's challenge to a similar Louisville ordinance before the
Supreme Court.5' Moorfield Storey's brief in the Louisville case main-
tained that the ordinance invaded vested property rights in violation
of the due process, equal protection, and privileges and immunities
clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. He distinguished Plessy and
the public school cases, where:
it is possible to say that no harm is suffered through the separation of the
races, if the facilities enjoyed by either race are the same as those en-
joyed by the other. In the case at bar, no such argument can be made, be-
cause every parcel of land has qualities peculiar to itself .... One of the
48. 321 U.S. 649 (1943) (overruling the Court's unanimous opinion in Grovey). The
Court followed and extended Allwright in Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953) (the Jaybird
case, where the Court invalidated yet another elaborate subterfuge to disenfranchise black
voters). See also Section II.E.3 (discussing Terry).
49. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Wright, 154 F.2d 924 (5th Cir. 1946); Dean v. Thomas, 93 F.
Supp. 129 (E.D. La. 1950); Adams v. Whittaker, 195 S.W.2d 634 (Ark. 1946). See generally J.
MORGAN KoUSSER, COLORBLIND INJUSTICE: MINORITY VOTING RIGHTS AND THE
UNDOING OF THE SECOND RECONSTRUCTION (1999).
50. See Garrett Power, Apartheid Baltimore Style: The Residential Segregation Ordi-
nances of 1910-1913, 42 MD. L. REV. 289 (1983); R.L. Rice, Residential Segregation by Law,
1910-1917, 34 J. So. HIST. 179 (1968).
51. See KELLOGG, supra note 20, at 184; George C. Wright, The NAACP and Residen-
tial Segregation in Louisville, Kentucky, 1914-1917,78 REG. KY. HIST. SOc. 39 (1980).
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first essentials of a free government is the right of every citizen to estab-
lish his residence where he sees fit and to move from place to place at
pleasure. Such an ordinance as that now in question does not affect sim-
ply the convenience and comfort of those citizens to whom it applies, but
strikes at their right to live at all.
52
Storey closed his brief with a bold echo of Justice Harlan's dissenting
opinion in Plessy, charging that the innovative ordinance would "pro-
voke conflict between the races and [could] reduce negro citizens to a
position of inferiority."53 Also far-sighted and a bit radical was an ami-
cus brief filed by Wells H. Blodgett and Frederick Lehmann,
American Bar Association moguls who insisted "strenuously... upon
a single and undivided American citizenship - no hyphens."54 Innova-
tions such as the Louisville ordinance would generate a spiral of race
animosity, for "[t]he prejudice of race grows by what it feeds upon. Its
appetite is insatiable."55
Deciding Buchanan v. Warley,5 the Supreme Court agreed, refus-
ing to extend Plessy to permit legally required residential segregation.
Because the ordinance destroyed the right of the individual to acquire,
enjoy, and dispose of his property, it violated the Due Process Clause.
Justice Day's opinion for the Court did not follow the radical rhetoric
of the NAACP briefs, nor did it actually protect people of color
against housing discrimination. After Buchanan, segregationists relied
on discriminatory zoning ordinances and racially restrictive covenants
in leases to preserve racially segregated housing patterns. Defending a
white homeowner wanting to sell to a black purchaser in the District
of Columbia, the NAACP challenged racially restrictive covenants as
inconsistent with Buchanan. The District's court of appeals upheld an
injunction against the sale. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal
in Corrigan v. Buckley,57 with a written opinion ruling that the Equal
Protection Clause is applicable to public but not private discrimina-
tion; hence, the discriminatory terms of the owner's lease were not
constitutionally reviewable. The Court did not address the NAACP's
argument that a judicial decree enforcing the racially restrictive cove-
52. Brief for Plaintiff in Error at 35-36, Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917) (1915
Term, No. 33).
53. Id. at 44.
54. Brief of Amici Curiae Wells H. Blodgett and Frederick W. Lehmann at 7, Buchanan
v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917) (1915 Term, No. 33).
55. Id. at 8.
56. 245 U.S. 60 (1917); see also infra Section II.C.1 (discussing Buchanan).
57. 271 U.S. 323 (1926). Even after Corrigan, the Court continued to apply Buchanan's
rule against ordinances requiring housing segregation. E.g., Harmon v. Tyler, 273 U.S. 668
(1927) (affirming lower court decision invalidating ordinance requiring consent of a majority
of community homeowners before a black person could establish a home there); Richmond
v. Deans, 281 U.S. 704 (1930) (similar).
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nant was state action, on the ground that the issue was not properly
presented on appeal. Although the Supreme Court would later revisit
the constitutional status of racially restrictive covenants, state and fed-
eral courts read Corrigan as placing racially restrictive covenants be-
58yond the scope of the Fourteenth Amendment. Such covenants were
widely deployed, and residential segregation was the practical result
almost everywhere in the United States.
From the NAACP's point of view, the greatest price of Plessy was
segregated education. The Association believed that opportunities for
black people could not be realized without education and literacy.
Most of its early efforts focused on publicizing the poor quality of
education for blacks in the South and lobbying for funds to remedy
that,59 but in the early 1930s the NAACP challenged the inadequate
resources through constitutional litigation. Between 1933 and 1950,
the Association brought or supported litigation to desegregate gradu-
ate and professional schools and to equalize the salaries and facilities
in white and black primary and secondary schools.6" As to the latter,
litigation was most successful when a strong attorney was in charge of
the cases and had the support of a well-organized black community
and a potentially receptive community of white moderates. The classic
success story was Thurgood Marshall's work with the community in
Maryland, a moderate state in racial politics.6 As to the former, the
NAACP maintained that states offering black citizens no graduate
school opportunities - not even meaningful separate ones - was
open discrimination that even Plessy did not justify." Charles Houston
litigated a number of these cases, and won a significant victory in
Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada.6 The NAACP's brief objected to
the state's complete exclusion of blacks from its professional schools
and documented their under-representation as a systematic problem
in the South. The Supreme Court agreed. After this victory, the
NAACP established a separate NAACP Legal Defense and Educa-
58. See CLEMENT E. VOSE, CAUCASIANS ONLY: THE SUPREME COURT, THE NAACP,
AND THE RESTRICTIVE COVENANT CASES 19 (1959); id. at 22-24 (Corrigan was consistent
with the liberty of contract ideology of the era).
59. See KELLOGG, supra note 20, at 187-99.
60. MARK V. TUSHNET, THE NAACP'S LEGAL STRATEGY AGAINST SEGREGATED
EDUCATION, 1925-1950, at 34 (1987). Tushnet's account of the education litigation is a less
triumphalist interpretation than that in what is still the main authority, KLUGER, supra note
17.
61. See TUSHNET, supra note 60, at 34-69.
62. See McCabe v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry., 235 U.S. 151 (1914) (invalidating
an Oklahoma law excluding blacks from dining and sleeping cars, without providing compa-
rable accommodations of any sort).
63. 305 U.S. 337 (1938); see TUSHNET, supra note 60, at 70-81 (providing an account of
this litigation).
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tional Fund, Inc. ("Inc. Fund"), which pressed the Association to a
new level of constitutional discourse.
2. The Politics of Recognition and Some Remediation, 1940-72
Although the NAACP's agenda in its early years was dominated
by efforts to protect the lives, liberties, and property rights of African
Americans against state-sanctioned violence and discrimination, the
Association was also committed to "complete equality before the law"
for people of color.64 This aspiration reflected a nascent, albeit little-
fulfilled, politics of recognition. I view the 1930s as a transitional dec-
ade, during which that politics began to overtake the still-necessary
politics of protection. The Texas primary cases, culminating in the tri-
umph in Allwright, reflected this transition: the right to vote was im-
portant to assure that local politics would be even somewhat protec-
tive of black people's safety and needs, but was also symbolically
important to both people of color and the judiciary. The full citizen-
ship promised by the Reconstruction amendments was an empty
promise without the franchise, and a democracy that formally ex-
cluded people because of their race looked more than a little like Nazi
Germany.
The civil rights movement's shift from a politics of protection to a
politics of recognition was formally made when the NAACP changed
its constitutional stance toward apartheid. During the period described
above, its lawyers pressed constitutional arguments from within the
Plessy framework, whereby the state had no obligation to correct so-
cial prejudice or force unwilling whites to associate with blacks, but
did have an obligation not to be a conduit through which prejudiced
whites could deprive blacks of their lives (Moore, Powell), fundamen-
tal liberties (Norris), or property rights (Buchanan). Tangible even if
limited gains accompanied and may have resulted in part from this
litigation: new apartheid laws had been stopped in their tracks even as
old ones remained in place; black literacy had soared to eighty percent
and the black-white ratio of teachers' salaries had risen to sixty-five
percent (the teacher salary cases); lynching and state execution of
black people for crimes had fallen off significantly; blacks for the first
time in the century were able to register and vote in primary and gen-
eral elections.65 All of these gains were affected and generally acceler-
ated by the nation's experiences in and around World War II. At this
point, Plessy itself came under siege on all fronts.
64. Brief for Petitioner at 3, NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958) (1957 Term, No.
91) (quoting the NAACP's articles of incorporation).
65. See TUSHNET, supra note 60, at 103 (teachers' salaries).
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In 1941, A. Philip Randolph and other prominent black leaders or-
ganized a March on Washington Movement ("MOWM") insisting that
the federal government desegregate: if people of color were going to
be asked to die for their country, their country was obliged to afford
them equal dignity and respect.' Gunnar Myrdal's An American
Dilemma, published in 1944, rubbed America's public face in the hy-
pocrisy of demonizing the Nazis as racist while practicing racial segre-
gation at home. In the Japanese curfew and evacuation cases decided
in 1943-44, the Supreme Court announced that race-based classifica-
tions were odious to a free people, even as the Justices upheld race-
based liberty deprivations against Japanese-American citizens (to vig-
orous critique after the war).67 At the urging of the Solicitor General,
the Supreme Court interpreted the Railway Labor Act to bar race-
based employment discrimination by railroad unions.'
World War II cemented the case against racist policies. Not only
did Asian as well as African Americans serve valorously during the
war, but whites as well as people of color noticed the incongruity of
their returning to an apartheid society after fighting a war against "the
apostles of racism." This was the term the NAACP used in its brief
successfully urging the Supreme Court to strike down a state law re-
quiring race segregation in interstate bus trips.69 The war also acceler-
ated the demographic shift of blacks from the rural south to urban ar-
eas in the north. The NAACP's membership soared tenfold,7" giving
its leaders greater political credibility in national politics. To Secure
These Rights, the 1947 report of President Truman's Committee on
Civil Rights, called for "the elimination of segregation.., from
American life. '71 In 1948, Truman issued an executive order requiring
66. In response to the movement, President Roosevelt issued Executive Order 8802,
which prohibited race-based discrimination in federal government employment (but not in
the armed services) as well as in defense industries doing business with the government. Af-
ter the order, which was tepidly carried out, the MOWM fizzled. See FAIRCLOUGH, supra
note 17, at 152-59.
67. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944); Hirabayashi v. United
States, 320 U.S. 81, 100 (1943); see also infra Section II.C.1 (discussing Korematsu).
68. Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 323 U.S. 192 (1944).
69. Brief for Appellant at 28, Morgan v. Virginia, 328 U.S. 373 (1946) (1945 Term, No.
704); see [ACLU's] Motion for Leave to File Brief as Amicus Curiae and Brief in Support
Thereof at 14-15, Morgan (1945 Term, No. 704) (arguing that race-based categories are in-
herently stigmatic in our society). The Supreme Court struck down the state law in Morgan
v. Virginia. 328 U.S. 373 (1946). See also Mitchell v. United States, 313 U.S. 80, 97 (1941)
(holding that forcing a black customer with a first-class ticket to ride second-class violates
the Interstate Commerce Act).
70. FAIRCLOUGH, supra note 17, at 182 (NAACP membership went from 50,000 in 1940
to 500,000 in 1946).
71. To SECURE THESE RIGHTS: THE REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON
CIVIL RIGHTS 166 (1947) (urging the elimination of racial segregation from the armed
forces, public transport, housing, health care, and education).
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desegregation in the armed forces. Public norms had changed; support
for state-imposed segregation outside the South was waning. In the
same year as Truman's order, the NAACP's Board of Directors offi-
cially endorsed Thurgood Marshall's position that the Association
"not undertake any case or cooperate in any case which recognizes or
purports to recognize the validity of segregation statutes or ordi-
nances .... 72
During the 1947 Term, Marshall pressed the NAACP's new posi-
tion in Sipuel v. Board of Regents, 73 another graduate school case. The
Inc. Fund, for the first time, urged the Court to re-examine the sepa-
rate but equal doctrine and overrule Plessy.74 Although the Court
invalidated the state's program on the narrower ground that it was
grossly unequal, the Justices were moving toward a renunciation of
apartheid, albeit sensitive that they not be perceived as moving too
precipitously or writing their opinions provocatively.75 Both the
NAACP and the Court got a push from private litigants that same
Term, when Shelley v. Kraemer76 presented the Court with the consti-
tutionality of judicial enforcement of racially restrictive covenants in
property contracts. At the urging of the NAACP, the Solicitor
General filed an amicus brief invoking the report of the President's
Committee on Civil Rights to support forceful judicial anti-
discrimination rules and to criticize the destructiveness of housing seg-
regation in particular.77 Abrogating the broad reading of Corrigan by
most lower courts, the Supreme Court unanimously held that judicial
enforcement of the covenants was state action violating the Equal
Protection Clause. 78 That the Court was willing to fill the doctrinal
loophole left open in Buchanan was cheering to civil rights lawyers,
encouraging them to press ahead with an anti-apartheid campaign that
72. TUSHNET, supra note 60, at 115 (quoting resolution).
73. 332 U.S. 631 (1948).
74. Brief for Petitioner at 18-51, Sipuel v. Bd. of Regents, 332 U.S. 631 (1948) (1947
Term, No. 369).
75. See Dennis J. Hutchinson, Unanimity and Desegregation: Decisionmaking in the Su-
preme Court, 1948-1958, 68 GEO. L.J. 1, 4-13 (1979) (discussing Sipuel and several other race
cases of the 1947 Term).
76. 334 U.S. 1 (1948); see also Section II.E.1 (discussing Shelley). See generally VOSE,
supra note 58, at 158-96 (providing a detailed examination of NAACP's and amici's argu-
ments in Shelley); Louis Henkin, Shelley v. Kraemer: Notes for a Revised Opinion, 110 U.
PA. L. REV. 473 (1962).
77. Brief of Amicus Curiae United States at 1-25, Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948)
(1947 Term, Nos. 72, 87, 290 & 291) (arguing that the interest of the United States is in pre-
venting racial ghettoes and an international image of apartheid); see also id. at 92-103 (ar-
guing that the enforcement of racially restrictive covenants is contrary to the public policy of
the United States).
78. Shelley, 334 U.S. at 14-18 (state action); id. at 18-23 (equal protection violation).
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clearly had the support of both the Solicitor General's Office79 and a
growing number of amici. Fifteen amicus briefs supported the Inc.
Fund in Shelley - many more than had ever been filed in any civil
rights case before 1948."o Virtually sealing the case against apartheid,
the Court in 1948 struck down two state laws discriminating on the ba-
sis of Asian race or ethnicity.
81
Within the Court, the Justices were struggling to find the right
strategy and the best pace for leading the country away from the race-
based policies of apartheid. 82 During the 1949 Term, the Court heard
three NAACP challenges to state segregation. In two graduate school
cases, the NAACP and supporting amici urged the Court either to
overrule Plessy or to hold its principle inapplicable to public educa-
tion.83 The United States filed amicus briefs in both cases questioning
Plessy and insisting that it not be extended to public graduate educa-
tion."4 In the NAACP's third case of the Term, Henderson v. United
States,85 Solicitor General Philip Perlman (representing the respon-
dent) confessed error, and for the first time the United States directly
urged the Court to overrule Plessy.86 "Segregation of Negroes, as prac-
79. See Philip Elman, The Solicitor General's Office, Justice Frankfurter, and Civil Rights
Litigation, 1946-1960: An Oral History, 100 HARV. L. REV. 817 (1987) (reporting that the
Solicitor General's Office informally cooperated with NAACP and with Justice Frankfurter
within the Court during this period).
80. In addition to the United States, other supportive amici included the ACLU, the
AFL, the CIO, the American Jewish Committee, and the National Bar Association. Shelley,
334 U.S. at 3-4. Three amici supported the restrictive covenants. Id. at 4.
81. See Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633 (1948) (invalidating law barring Japanese ali-
ens from holding land through their minor children who were American citizens); Takahashi
v. Fish & Game Comm'n, 334 U.S. 410 (1948) (striking down law barring the issuance of
fishing licenses to aliens ineligible for citizenship (a category limited to Asians)); see also
Section II.C.1 (discussing Oyama). In both cases, Justice Murphy wrote pointed concurring
opinions linking the challenged statutes to western prejudice against Japanese immigrants.
Oyama, 332 U.S. at 650; Takahashi, 334 U.S. at 422-27.
82. Justices Murphy and Rutledge favored sharp anti-racism rhetoric and swift doctrinal
action; Chief Justice Vinson and Justices Frankfurter, Reed, and Jackson favored a slow but
sure approach; Justices Black, Douglas, and Burton were between these warring groups. See
Hutchinson, supra note 75, at 8-13.
83. Brief for Petitioner at 44-52, McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents, 339 U.S. 637
(1950) (1949 Term, No. 34) (urging the Court to overrule Plessy); id. at 36 (differentiating
public transportation in Plessy from public education in McLaurin); Brief for Appellant at 5,
Sweat v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950) (1949 Term, No. 44) (similar); see also Brief for Amici
Curiae [Committee of Law Teachers Against Segregation in Legal Education] in Support of
Petition for Certiorari at 4, Sweat (1949 Term, No. 44) (arguing that Plessy is flatly inconsis-
tent with the Equal Protection Clause and should be overruled). There was significant sup-
port within the Court for the NAACP's point. See Hutchinson, supra note 75, at 15-17, 19-21.
84. Memorandum of Amicus Curiae United States at 14, McLaurin (1949 Term, No.
34); Memorandum of Amicus Curiae United States at 4-5, Sweat (1949 Term, No. 44).
85. 339 U.S. 816 (1950).
86. Brief for the United States at 40, Henderson v. United States, 339 U.S. 816 (1950)
(1949 Term, No. 25) ("[Tihe legal and factual assumptions" of Plessy "have been under-
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ticed in this country, is universally understood as imposing on them a
badge of inferiority.... Forbidding this group of American citizens 'to
associate with other citizens in the ordinary course of daily living cre-
ates inequality by imposing a caste status on the minority group.' "87
The government's argument in Henderson stirred up discussion within
the Court as to how broadly to decide the graduate school cases. Ac-
cording to Dennis Hutchinson's careful reconstruction, the Justices
were almost unanimous in their determination to overrule segregation
in all three cases but were fearful that a broad rationale might trigger a
firestorm of protest in the South.88 Under these circumstances, the
Court found equal protection violations in the graduate school cases,
based upon intangible differences marking the black graduate school
as insufficient.89 In Henderson, the Court did not reach the constitu-
tional issue and simply ruled that the Interstate Commerce Act barred
racial discrimination in railroad dining cars.9" Although Plessy had sur-
vived, its days were numbered - a prospect that filled the Justices
with anxiety.
Marshall and the Inc. Fund persuaded the Court to take five public
school cases in 1952 that, they hoped, would repudiate Plessy. Brown
v. Board of Education and its associated cases were both the
Austerlitz and the Waterloo of the NAACP's strategy of deploying
constitutional law to advance the status and condition of black peo-
ple.91 On the one hand, the school segregation cases represented the
apotheosis of blacks' politics of recognition. Supported by the Solicitor
General, the ACLU, and four other hefty amici, the NAACP carefully
developed the constitutional case for full and unequivocal equality.
The Inc. Fund's briefs in the cases made three kinds of arguments
for overruling Plessy, at least insofar as public education was con-
cerned. First, they maintained that the purpose of the Fourteenth
mined and refuted" and the " 'separate but equal' doctrine should now be overruled and
discarded.").
87. Id. at 27-28. Attorney General J. Howard McGrath argued the case along the same
lines: "Segregation signifies and is intended to signify that a member of the colored race is
not equal to a member of the white race."
88. See Hutchinson, supra note 75, at 19-30 (providing a detailed account of the Justices'
deliberations in the 1949 Term Cases).
89. Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950); McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents, 339
U.S. 637 (1950).
90. 339 U.S. at 826.
91. On the Austerlitz (triumphal) part, see KLUGER, supra note 17; TUSHNET, supra
note 60 (less triumphalist). On the Waterloo part, see JACQUELINE IRVINE, BLACK
STUDENTS AND SCHOOL FAILURE: POLICIES, PRACTICES, AND PRESCRIPTIONS (1990);
GERALD ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL
CHANGE? (1991) (no); Sonia Jarvis, Brown and the Afrocentric Curriculum, 101 YALE L.J.
1285 (1992). For something of both, see DERRICK BELL, JR., RACE, RACISM, AND
AMERICAN LAW (3d ed. 1992).
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Amendment was "to eliminate race distinctions from American law,"
specifically including race-based segregation of public schools.92 The
early cases had enforced this understanding, but later cases like Plessy
confused the Equal Protection Clause's reasonable distinction ap-
proach, applicable to the general run of statutes, with its intended
"prohibition of color differentiation."93 Second, the civil rights lawyers
argued that the more recent cases had returned to the Fourteenth
Amendment's original goal and its intended bar to race-based classifi-
cations. Justice Holmes' opinion in Herndon had it right when he
found it "too clear for extended argument that color cannot be made
the basis of a statutory classification affecting the right set up in this
case."94 The brief carefully laid out for the Court the steps it had al-
ready taken to limit and trim back Plessy and argued that it was only a
short step to overruling the precedent altogether.95
Third, and most important for my purposes, the Inc. Fund briefs
emphasized normative arguments for the moral, social, and political
evils of apartheid. This was most explicit in the appendix to its opening
brief, "The Effects of Segregation and the Consequences of
Desegregation: A Social Science Statement."96 The central point of the
statement was the pervasive and harmful psychological effects of law-
endorsed segregation on its objects, namely, people of color, especially
schoolchildren. Such laws signal their inferiority because of race and
92. See Brief for Appellants at 79-120, Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (1953
Term, Nos. 1, 2, 4, 5, 10) (general purpose); id. at 120-89 (specific intent of Congress and
ratifying states to bar racially segregated schools). These materials were developed in re-
sponse to the Court's order for reargument of the cases.
93. Id. at 45-46.
94. Id. at 46 (quoting Nixon v. Hemdon, 273 U.S. 536, 541 (1927)). It is odd that the
NAACP did not emphasize dicta in the Japanese war cases, where the Court said that race-
based classifications of all sorts were presumptively unconstitutional. See supra note 67 and
accompanying text. That the Court in both cases upheld race-based directives in time of war
perhaps made these authorities particularly unsavory for the NAACP, which had not par-
ticipated in them. In any event, other briefs in the case did rely on those earlier precedents
to argue that race-based discrimination is all but prohibited by the Equal Protection Clause.
See Brief of Amici Curiae American Veterans Comm. at 4-5, 12-13, Brown (1953 Term, No.
8).
95. Brief for Appellants at 47-50, Brown (1953 Term, Nos. 1, 2, 4, 5, 10). The Inc. Fund
argued that Buchanan refused to extend Plessy to property and housing segregation, a re-
fusal dramatically extended in Shelley. Even in the arena of transportation, subsequent cases
- McCabe, Henderson - trimmed back Plessy's ambit, and Morgan v. Virginia overruled its
application to interstate transportation. In the education arena, the Court had never thor-
oughly considered the application of Plessy, and the intangible benefits rationale of the
graduate school cases - Gaines, Sipuel, Sweatt, McLaurin - provided a sound reason to
reject Plessy in elementary and secondary schools as well,
96. The Statement was appended to the first set of Appellants' Briefs, Brown (1953
Term, Nos. 8, 101, 191) [hereinafter Social Science Statement]. It was signed by thirty-two
eminent scientists, including Gordon Allport, Kenneth and Mamie Clark, Robert Merton,
and Samuel Stouffer.
HeinOnline  -- 100 Mich. L. Rev. 2087 2001-2002
Michigan Law Review
undermine their ability to see "their own dignity as human beings."97
Racial segregation also contributes to rigid and authoritarian person-
alities among white schoolchildren and gives them a "distorted sense
of social reality,""98 perpetuates absurd stereotypes and "leads to a
blockage in the communications and interaction between the two
groups,"99 and contributes to interracial violence and discord. This part
of the statement supported the NAACP's longstanding position that
segregation denied black people the respect they deserved as human
beings and the full rights of citizenship guaranteed by the Fourteenth
Amendment. In this stance, the Inc. Fund was powerfully backed up
by the amicus brief for the United States, which asserted that
apartheid was profoundly undemocratic."° The latter half of the
NAACP's supplemental statement maintained that racial variation is
benign from a scientific point of view." 1 From a policy perspective, not
only does segregation contribute to psychological and social turmoil,
but "[u]nder certain circumstances desegregation not only proceeds
without major difficulties, but has been observed to lead to the emer-
gence of more favorable attitudes and friendlier relations between
races."1
0 2
Most of the Justices accepted the NAACP's normative arguments,
but several were uncertain that they were decisive as to the constitu-
tional issues, and all were fearful of the political turmoil they believed
would follow any decision requiring desegregation of public schools." 3
After reargument, and much soul-searching, a surprisingly unanimous
Court in Brown v. Board of Education ("Brown I")14 accepted the Inc.
Fund's invitation to declare that race-based segregation in public
schools violated the Equal Protection Clause. In Bolling v. Sharpe,"
the Court reached the same result for schools in the District of
Columbia, under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.
Chief Justice Warren's Brown opinion invoked the importance of edu-
97. Id. at 4.
98. Id. at 6-7.
99. Id. at 8.
100. Brief of Amicus Curiae United States at 2-8, Brown (1952 Term, Nos. 8, 101, 191,
412,448).
101. Social Science Statement, supra note 96, at 12.
102. Id. at 15.
103. The Court's internal deliberations, including several conferences, two rearguments,
and the deft work of Chief Justice Warren (who joined the Court between the first argument
(1952 Term) and the second (1953 Term)), are comprehensively set forth in KLUGER, supra
note 17, at 543-747; Hutchinson, supra note 75, at 34-44; Mark Tushnet & Katya Lezin, What
Really Happened in Brown v. Board of Education, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1867 (1991).
104. 347 U.S. 483 (1954); see infra Sections II.C.1 and III.A. (discussing Brown 1).
105. 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
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cation to citizenship, the demonstrated harms that segregated educa-
tion visited on minority schoolchildren, and the intangible as well as
tangible ways that a segregated school system could not deliver equal
education. °6 The opinion did not exactly overrule Plessy and only dis-
avowed its reasoning to the extent inconsistent with its own ration-
ale.1 7 Nonetheless, lower courts immediately agreed with the NAACP
that Brown's disapproval of racial segregation extended beyond edu-
cation. In a series of per curiam opinions, the Supreme Court silently
affirmed those decisions."8 Brown I was a great victory for the
NAACP.
One year later, the Court decided Brown v. Board of Education
("Brown IT ),19 where the Court announced its remedy for the viola-
tions found in Brown L This was not a victory for the NAACP. The
Inc. Fund argued for "immediate" relief once the Court invalidated
apartheid and for decrees requiring desegregation "as quickly as pre-
requisite administrative and mechanical procedures can be com-
pleted.""' The Eisenhower Administration argued for remands to the
various local courts where the cases originated, "with directions to
carry out this Court's decision as rapidly as the particular circum-
stances permit[.]""' Most of the states of the South submitted amicus
briefs to the Court arguing for "a gradual adjustment" away from seg-
regated schools, so as to accommodate the needs of school administra-
tors and of those people unwilling to send their children to integrated
public schools."2 The Supreme Court took the middle road, following
the Eisenhower Administration and not the NAACP. Brown II re-
manded the cases to their originating courts to fashion injunctive relief
106. Brown I, 347 U.S. at 493-94.
107. Id. at 495.
108. See New Orleans City Park Improvement Ass'n v. Detiege, 358 U.S. 54 (1958) (per
curiam) (invalidating segregation in municipal parks and golf course); Gayle v. Browder, 352
U.S. 903 (1956) (per curiam) (city buses); Mayor & City Council of Baltimore City v. Daw-
son, 350 U.S. 877 (1955) (per curiam) (public bathhouses and beaches); Holmes v. Atlanta,
350 U.S. 879 (1955) (per curiam) (municipal golf course).
109. Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
110. Brief for Appellants in Nos. 1, 2, and 3 and for Respondents in No. 5 on Further
Reargument at 10-24, Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955) (1954 Term, No. 1).
111. Brief for the United States on the Further Argument of the Questions of Relief at
27-29, Brown H (1954 Term, No. 1).
112. See, e.g., Brief of Amicus Curiae John Ben Shepperd Attorney General of Texas at
3-4, Brown (1954 Term, Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4); Brief of Amicus Curiae Harry McMullan Attorney
General of North Carolina at 13-18, Brown 11 (1954 Term, Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4); Brief of Amicus
Curiae Attorney General of Florida Richard W. Ervin at 3-56, Brown I1 (1954 Term, Nos. 1,
2, 3, 5) (justifying the "gradual adjustment" criterion by reference to an empirical survey by
the state); Brief of Amicus Curiae Attorney General of Arkansas Tom Gentry at 13-21,
Brown II (1954 Term, Nos. 1, 2, 3, 5), (arguing that the remedy in the case should be left to
Congress, legislating pursuant to its authority under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment).
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through "such orders and decrees ... as are necessary and proper to
admit to public schools on a racially nondiscriminatory basis and with
all deliberate speed the parties to these cases." '113 What I am calling a
politics of remediation got off to an exceedingly slow start with Brown
IL As discussed below, the NAACP's petition that the Equal
Protection Clause required an integrated restructuring of American
public education had a very uneven reception by judges in the half
century since Brown.
At the same time the NAACP was closing in on its ambiguous vic-
tory in Brown, other grass-roots groups of African Americans were
pursuing other kinds of campaigns against apartheid. The most famous
were boycotts and sit-ins seeking to pressure private as well as public
institutions to desegregate. The Montgomery bus boycott of 1955-56
was a grass-roots movement of black citizens who organized them-
selves to overturn racially segregated bus service. The boycott cam-
paign not only revealed the power of grass-roots organizing (a fact
well-appreciated by the NAACP as key features of its equal
pay/facilities and desegregation litigations), but brought regional and
then national publicity to the struggle of African Americans and to
their leaders, Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. and the new Southern
Christian Leadership Conference ("SCLC").114 The civil rights move-
ment became a truly mass social movement. Although the SCLC and
NAACP enjoyed a rivalrous relationship, they were both dedicated to
a politics of recognition similar to that articulated in the NAACP's
constitutional briefs. The Inc. Fund's victory in Brown I not only gave
people of color tangible hope and inspiration that their normative vi-
sion was both right and achievable, but also gave them valuable white
allies in their specific activities.'15 For example, the boycotters in
Montgomery were able to snatch victory from the jaws of defeat when
the Supreme Court affirmed a lower court order declaring segregated
municipal bus service unconstitutional under Brown 116
Triumph in Brown I and Montgomery not only fueled a mass so-
cial movement of African Americans and their allies, but also trig-
gered a politically intense "states rights" countermovement of whites
113. Brown H, 349 U.S. at 301.
114. See generally TAYLOR BRANCH, PARTING THE WATERS: AMERICA IN THE KING
YEARS 1954-63 (1988); GARROw, BEARING THE CROSS, supra note 17; ALDON D. MORRIS,
THE ORIGINS OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT: BLACK COMMUNITIES ORGANIZING FOR
CHANGE (1984).
115. See David J. Garrow, Hopelessly Hollow History: Revisionist Devaluing of Brown
v. Board of Education, 80 VA. L. REV. 151, 152-57 (1994) (responding to Michael J. Klar-
man, Brown, Racial Change, and the Civil Rights Movement, 80 VA. L. REV. 7 (1994), and
ROSENBERG, supra note 91).
116. See Gayle v. Browder, 352 U.S. 903 (1956) (per curiam); MORRIS, supra note 114,
at 63.
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opposed to racial integration."7 The negative political reaction antici-
pated by the NAACP and the Supreme Court slowly but inexorably
grew into a regional revolt. Southern whites not only denounced
Brown I with increasing fervor, but many of them openly argued for
nullifying it, and not a few resorted to violence."8 The result was a se-
ries of confrontations between black people's politics of recognition
and southern white people's politics of preservation. The confronta-
tions took the form of official defiance or refusal to desegregate public
schools, state laws barring or harassing the NAACP and other groups,
and (in the early 1960s) mass arrests of peaceful black protesters by
sometimes violent white police."9
The most apparent manifestation of southern resistance was the
almost complete refusal of southern school districts to desegregate in
compliance with Brown I and Brown I. Most of this resistance was
passive, whereby school districts ignored Brown II or made minimal
gestures toward token compliance, but much resistance was open and
aggressive.20 For a famous example of the latter, the governor and
legislature of Arkansas directed the Little Rock school district to defy
Brown, but the federal appeals court rejected this as a basis for delay-
ing desegregation. In Cooper v. Aaron,2' the Supreme Court not only
held the district to the terms of the lawful court decree, as the
NAACP and Solicitor General urged, but went beyond the briefs to
say that state officials had an obligation to obey the Constitution as it
was construed by the Court.'22 The Eisenhower Administration reluc-
tantly supported the Court in Little Rock, and Congress in 1957 gave
the Court further support by authorizing, in the first civil rights legisla-
tion since 1875, the Department of Justice to initiate litigation to sup-
port voting and other civil rights against recalcitrant localities. In
Griffin v. County School Board,"3 the Court held that Prince Edward
117. See generally NUMAN V. BARTLEY, THE RISE OF MASSIVE RESISTANCE (1969);
BENJAMIN MUSE, VIRGINIA'S MASSIVE RESISTANCE (1961); FRANCIS M. WILHOIT, THE
POLITICS OF MASSIVE RESISTANCE (1973).
118. NEIL R. MCMILLEN, THE CITIZENS' COUNCIL: ORGANIZED RESISTANCE TO THE
SECOND RECONSTRUCTION, 1954-64 (1971).
119. For detailed accounts of these and other means of segregationist resistance, see
BARTLEY, supra note 117; ROSENBERG, supra note 91, at 107-56.
120. J. HARVIE WILKINSON III, FROM BROWN TO BAKKE: THE SUPREME COURT AND
SCHOOL INTEGRATION, 1954-1978, at 79-102 (1979); cf Mary Dudziak, The Limits of Good
Faith: Desegregation in Topeka, Kansas: 1950-1956, 5 LAW & HIST. REV. 351 (1987) (noting
that there was little integration even in Topeka).
121. 358 U.S. 1 (1958) (signed by all nine Justices); see also Daniel A. Farber, The Su-
preme Court and the Rule of Law: Cooper v. Aaron Revisited, 1982 U. ILL. L. REV. 387; Sec-
tion II.E.1 (discussing Cooper).
122. Cooper, 358 U.S. at 18-19.
123. 377 U.S. 218 (1964).
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County could not close down its public schools in an effort to evade
Brown's mandate.
Southern states also lashed out at the persons and groups sup-
porting civil rights for people of color. A number of states adopted
laws aimed at the NAACP.124 For example, Alabama adopted a law
requiring the NAACP to register and reveal its membership lists, and
then prosecuted and fined the Association for failing to comply. The
NAACP challenged the state action as inconsistent with the "free
speech and free association" rights guaranteed by the First
Amendment.12 This freedom, the NAACP maintained, was essential
to the peaceful political "[s]olution of the American race problem.'
1 26
The Supreme Court unanimously agreed in NAACP v. Alabama,'27
holding that the state could not interfere with the NAACP's politics of
recognition. Crippled by local penalties, the NAACP was able to sur-
vive in the South only because of these constitutional protections.
128
Starting in 1960, civil rights activism took the form of peaceful sit-
ins at segregated lunch counters and protest marches objecting to
apartheid. Although the protesters were uniformly peaceful, they were
often arrested for violating ordinances prohibiting breaches of the
peace, disorderly conduct, obstruction of sidewalks, or parading with-
out licenses. One after another, convictions of civil rights protesters
rolled through southern state courts - only to be reversed by the U.S.
Supreme Court. 129 The constitutional policy animating the reversals
was that local authorities were treating civil rights dissenters differ-
ently than they would have treated any other group. Doctrinally, the
reversals depended upon the facts of the different cases. Some went
off on the due process ground that there was not sufficient evidence to
124. See Walter Murphy, The South Counterattacks: The Anti-NAACP Laws, 12 W.
POL. Q. 371 (1959).
125. See Brief for Petitioner at 21-25, NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958) (1957
Term, No. 91).
126. Id. at 21.
127. 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
128. The NAACP successfully relied on the Alabama precedent to challenge other indi-
rect harassments in Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516 (1960), NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415
(1963), and Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigation Committee, 372 U.S. 539 (1963). See
also Section II.F.1 (discussing these precedents).
129. See William J. Brennan Papers, Library of Congress, Container 1: 77, Folder 6
[hereinafter Brennan Papers]. About two dozen appeals or petitions for certiorari by sit-in
defendants, convicted by courts in seven southern states, came to the Court during the 1962
Term. In a series of memoranda to the Conference, the Chief Justice summarized each of
the cases and presented a preliminary constitutional analysis. The Court reversed six convic-
tions in opinions issued on May 23, 1963, and the remainder were subsequently reversed, for
the most part summarily.
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meet the statutory criteria for punishment,3 ° others on the equal pro-
tection ground that protesters were discriminated against because of
their race,13' and a good many on the First Amendment ground that
the state was unreasonably regulating expressive activity.
132
Even without constitutional protections, the protests and marches
of the early 1960s would have transformed America, for the interna-
tional news coverage displayed images of idealistic black bodies pom-
meled by bigoted white clubs and firehoses.1 33 Dr. King's pivotal
Birmingham campaign energized the civil rights movement. 34 Within
ten weeks of the city's capitulation to the SCLC's demands in May
1963, as many as 758 demonstrations occurred in 186 cities throughout
the South.'35 Within six months, the movement had triumphed in its
bold March on Washington, where Dr. King's "I Have a Dream"
speech (a classic articulation of the politics of recognition) inspired a
generation. 36 Less than a year after the march, President Johnson
signed the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which provided federal enforce-
ment mechanisms, including the withholding of funds from discrimina-
tory programs, as a means for finally making actual progress against
public segregation and further established rules against discrimination
by private employers and accommodations as well. 37 A year after that,
Johnson signed the Voting Rights Act of 1965, which gave teeth to the
NAACP's arguments in Guinn and Allwright by establishing strong
130. E.g., Garner v. Louisiana, 368 U.S. 157 (1961) (relying on the principle of Thomp-
son v. City of Louisville, 362 U.S. 199 (1960)).
131. E.g., Peterson v. City of Greenville, 373 U.S. 244 (1963); see also Section II.E.3
(discussing Peterson).
132. E.g., Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147 (1969); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S.
559 (1965); Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1963). But see Walker v. City of Bir-
mingham, 388 U.S. 307 (1969) (upholding conviction of protesters for violating state court
injunction, even though based upon ordinance invalidated in Shuttlesworth). See also Section
II.F.1 (discussing Shuttlesworth, Cox, and Edwards).
133. See Michael J. Klarman, Civil Rights Law: Who Made It and How Much Did It
Matter?, 83 GEO. L.J. 433 (1994) (arguing that Brown I contributed indirectly to public rejec-
tion of apartheid, by galvanizing a series of confrontations between heroic blacks and idiotic
whites which provoked international shock) [hereinafter Klarman, Civil Rights Law].
134. See GLENN ESKEW, BUT FOR BIRMINGHAM: THE LOCAL AND NATIONAL
MOVEMENTS IN THE CIVIL RIGHTS STRUGGLE (1997).
135. THOMAS R. BROOKS, WALLS COME TUMBLING DOWN: A HISTORY OF THE CIVIL
RIGHTS MOVEMENT 1940-1970 at 210 (1974).
136. See TAYLOR BRANCH, PILLAR OF FIRE: AMERICA IN THE KING YEARS, 1963-65
(1998); GARROW, BEARING THE CROSS, supra note 17, at 277-86.
137. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-h (2000). On the background of the CRA and the critical impor-
tance of civil rights activism, see HUGH DAVIS GRAHAM, THE CIVIL RIGHTS ERA: ORIGINS
AND DEVELOPMENT OF NATIONAL POLICY, 1960-1972 (1990).
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direct as well as prophylactic protections against efforts to deny peo-
ple of color their right to vote."a
The political energy released by these developments pressed the
civil rights agenda in many different directions. One was the comple-
tion of the NAACP's politics of recognition: invalidation of laws bar-
ring or criminalizing different-race marriages and cohabitation. The
Supreme Court had ducked the issue in the 1950s,'39 presumably be-
cause white hysteria about interracial sexuality would have explosively
mobilized further hostility to Brown 1.140 The NAACP renewed its
objections in 1964, when it challenged the Court to strike down a
Florida law criminalizing different-race cohabitation. Invoking the
Japanese curfew and evacuation cases as well as Brown I, the Inc.
Fund maintained that the statute was per se invidious; race must
henceforth be "irrelevant" to statutory policies.141 The civil rights law-
yers also directly challenged the normative coherence of the state's
''racial purity" justification for the policy: scientists have debunked the
idea of pure races and have shown that there are no relevant differ-
ences among the races, except perhaps for some superficial physical
features; racial variation is not only benign, but Florida's treatment of
it as a matter of consequence is a legacy of slavery that the
Reconstruction amendments were centrally aimed at eradicating. 142 A
unanimous Court agreed with the NAACP in McLaughlin v.
Florida,'43 and at the Inc. Fund's further petition the Court declared
unconstitutional laws barring different-race marriages in Loving v.
Virginia.144 Part I of Chief Justice Warren's opinion for the unanimous
138. 42 U.S.C. § 1973a-p (2000). On the background of the VRA and the critical impor-
tance of civil rights activism, see DAVID J. GARROW, PROTEST AT SELMA: MARTIN LUTHER
KING, JR. AND THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT OF 1965 (1978). The best compilation of primary
source material appears in 1 RACE, VOTING, REDISTRICTING AND THE CONSTITUTION:
SOURCES AND EXPLORATIONS ON THE FIFTEENTH AMENDMENT 73-248 (Marsha J. Tyson
Darling ed., 2001).
139. Naim v. Naim, 350 U.S. 985 (mem) (1956) (declining to review the Virginia Su-
preme Court decision, 87 S.E.2d 749 (Va. 1955), which upheld Virginia's racist anti-
miscegenation law).
140. ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME
COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 174 (1962) [hereinafter BICKEL, LEAST DANGEROUS
BRANCH]; cf Herbert Hovenkamp, Social Science and Segregation Before Brown, 1985
DUKE L.J. 624 (arguing that hysteria about interracial sexuality was at the heart of southern
devotion to racial segregation generally).
141. Brief for Appellants at 12-13, McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964) (1964
Term, No. 11).
142. See id. at 20-26.
143. 379 U.S. 184 (1964) (overruling Pace v. Alabama, 106 U.S. 583 (1883)); see also
Anderson v. Martin, 375 U.S. 399 (1964) (striking down Louisiana law requiring that elec-
tion ballots signify race of candidates).
144. 388 U.S. 1 (1967); see Brief for Appellants, Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967)
(1966 Term, No. 395) (making same arguments as the Inc. Fund's brief in McLaughlin).
2094 [Vol. 100:2062
HeinOnline  -- 100 Mich. L. Rev. 2094 2001-2002
Identity-Based Social Movements
Loving Court reasoned that racial classifications resting upon policies
of white purity or, even worse, white supremacy were per se invalid
under the Equal Protection Clause. 45
A second consequence of the new political support for civil rights
was that there was finally progress toward the post-Brown politics of
remediation for public school segregation. After enactment of the
Civil Rights Act, the nation seemed publicly committed to the norm of
desegregation, and the financial and legal resources of the federal
government provided critical pressure on school districts to desegre-
gate with more speed than deliberateness.146 The new political climate
emboldened the Inc. Fund to argue more insistently for transitions
from dual systems of black and white schools to unitary systems of
fully integrated schools. Judge John Minor Wisdom of the Fifth
Circuit accepted the NAACP's understanding of Brown in a series of
decisions culminating in United States v. Jefferson County Board of
Education.'47 "[T]he only adequate redress for a previously overt sys-
tem-wide policy of segregation directed against Negroes as a collective
entity is a system-wide policy of integration." '148 Systemic injury re-
quired a systemic remedy. Wisdom directed that a strong remedial de-
cree be entered, setting forth in detail how the school districts were to
proceed in order to make the transition to a unitary system.'49
The Inc. Fund and the Johnson Administration's Solicitor General
Erwin Griswold pressed Jefferson and the idea of immediate systemic
remediation onto the Supreme Court in Green v. County School
Board.5° After leaving district courts with virtually no guidance as to
what steps Brown II required segregated school districts to take, the
Court interpreted Brown II to impose an "affirmative duty to take
whatever steps might be necessary to convert to a unitary system in
145. Loving, 388 U.S. at 9-12; see also Section II.C.1 (discussing Loving).
146. Frank Read, Judicial Evolution and the Law of School Integration Since Brown v.
Board of Education, 39 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 7 (Winter 1975). The Act authorized the
Justice Department to bring school desegregation lawsuits, which relieved the Inc. Fund of
the full burden of litigating the cases. Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 407(a), codified at 42 U.S.C. §
2000c-6(a). The same law also barred federal monies from going to programs discriminating
on the basis of race, under which HEW in 1965-66 promulgated tough guidelines requiring
segregated school districts to improve their numbers if they wanted to receive federal funds.
Id.; see also James Dunn, Title VI, the Guidelines and School Desegregation in the South, 53
VA. L. REV. 42 (1967).
147. 372 F.2d. 836 (5th Cir. 1966).
148. Id. at 869.
149. Id. at 897-900.
150. 391 U.S. 430 (1968) (striking down a freedom-of-choice plan). See Brief for Peti-
tioners at 28, Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968) (1967 Term, No. 695); Memo-
randum of Amicus Curiae United States at 4-5, Green (1967 Term, No. 695).
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which racial discrimination would be eliminated root and branch." '151
The duty of root and branch reform would, the Court suggested, be
measured by results: if most black students were left in segregated
schools by a plan, that was probably not a unitary system.
A third feature of the invigorated civil rights agenda was a more
ambitious version of the old politics of protection that included some
lessons from the newer politics of remediation. The NAACP and a
growing array of allied groups continued to challenge state efforts to
deprive people of color of their liberties, especially their electoral and
criminal procedural rights.I52 But the Association and its allies (like the
ACLU) now conceptualized their objections more broadly and posed
structural solutions to repeated rights violations. Thus, various civil
rights groups pressed for elimination of poll taxes and other facially
race-neutral means of black disenfranchisement.'53 They worked with
the Department of Justice to craft the Voting Rights Act, which not
only protected against discrimination, but also established tough pro-
phylactic measures to assure federal monitoring of southern voting
practices and rules. Lawsuits challenged a whole array of structures
that assertedly undermined equal service of blacks on juries, and in
1964 the NAACP persuaded the Supreme Court to allow weak judi-
cial monitoring of prosecutors' use of peremptory challenges that ex-
cluded blacks from juries.' In 1963, the NAACP initiated a campaign
against the death penalty, which had long been applied in a racially
discriminatory manner. (Section II.D discusses this campaign in some
detail.)
3. The Politics of Remediation and the New Politics of Preservation,
1972-Present
Before World War II, most white opposition to desegregation or
racial equality was driven by open commitments to a natural law phi-
losophy in which racial differences were viewed as profound and ma-
151. Green, 391 U.S. at 437-38. This was a burden on the school board "to come forward
with a plan that promises realistically to work, and promises realistically to work now." Id. at
439.
152. See, e.g., United States v. Mississippi, 380 U.S. 128 (1965) (striking down literacy
tests applied in a racially discriminatory manner); Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339
(1960) (invalidating a gerrymander designed to minimize black voting); see infra Section
II.E.1 (discussing Gomillion).
153. See U.S. CONST. amend. XXIV, § 1 (barring poll taxes); Carter v. Jury Comm'n,
396 U.S. 320 (1970) (challenging a structure for jury selection that yielded discriminatory
patterns).
154. See Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (1965).
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lignant and the white race's purity was threatened by racial mixing. 55
Such natural law attitudes were the primary engine for southern white
"massive resistance" to Brown I and any form of racial integration in
the 1950s.156 As the civil rights movement gained political support out-
side the South, a more moderate oppositionist stance developed: de-
nying that they viewed racial differences as malignant and sometimes
conceding that change must come to the South, moderates opposed
legal or constitutional requirements on pragmatic grounds - they
were not needed, they would not work, they would be counterproduc-
tive, and so forth.157 Whereas natural law conservatives sought to pre-
serve as much of an enclave for racial segregation as they could, prag-
matic conservatives did not publicly claim segregation as a goal, but
instead argued against remedial responses that were "excessive" from
the community's perspective.
Although driven by different substantive commitments and pres-
entation, both natural law and pragmatic preservationists invoked the
Constitution. For them, desegregation imposed by judges in
Washington, D.C. was at war with (1) the federalist structure, where
states were entitled to set local policy, without interference from the
national government; (2) the constitutional separation of powers,
whereby the popularly elected legislature is both the most legitimate
and the most institutionally competent state organ to handle complex,
polycentric issues of educational policy; and (3) the liberties of white
people, such as their right not to associate with black people (and vice
versa) and their right not to be subject to "reverse discrimination." '58
However expressed, the politics of preservation was a losing reac-
tionary cause in the 1950s and early 1960s, when its "massive resis-
tance" was dominated by natural law extremists who stubbornly in-
sisted on formal apartheid. Once the civil rights agenda shifted in the
155. See Hovenkamp, supra note 140, at 627-37. This kind of thinking remained popular
in the South after the war. See, e.g., DAN T. CARTER, THE POLITICS OF RAGE: GEORGE
WALLACE, THE ORIGINS OF THE NEW CONSERVATISM, AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF
AMERICAN POLITICS (1995) [hereinafter CARTER, POLITICS OF RAGE].
156. See BARTLEY, supra note 117, at 237-39, 320-22, 326-32 (providing detailed re-
porting of stated opposition to integration grounded in natural law); MCMILLEN, supra note
118, at 161-88 (giving a complicated description of the "scientific," religious, historical, and
sociological strands of local oppositionists' natural law attitudes).
157. See BARTLEY, supra note 117, at 338-39 (documenting the decline of massive resis-
tance and ascendance of pragmatic opposition); ROBERT A. CARO, THE YEARS OF LYNDON
JOHNSON: MASTER OF THE SENATE 182-201 (2002) (contrasting old-style segregationists
like Theodore Bilbo with pragmatic segregationist Richard Russell, but icily demonstrating
that Russell was privately just as racist as Bilbo).
158. For examples of these constitutionalized arguments against integration "forced" by
federal judges upon unwilling states, see CARTER, POLITICS OF RAGE, supra note 155, at
136-38, 157-58 (Governor George Wallace); WILKINSON, supra note 120, at 80-84 (southern
state court judges, mainly hysterical opponents).
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late 1960s, from the virtually completed recognition phase (Loving v.
Virginia) to a serious process of remediation, the politics of preserva-
tion shifted its focus to pragmatic arguments and gained support from
moderates and nonracists. Once people of color could no longer claim
that the state was openly disrespecting their equal citizenship, moder-
ate whites were less impressed with the urgency of their claims. And
when their constitutional demands shifted from formal equality to ac-
tual equality, preservationists could emphasize practical rather than
dignitary arguments. The white audience was particularly receptive to
pragmatic claims that black people's remedial demands would impose
significant costs on the white community - not just the monetary
costs of implementation, but more fundamentally (and speculatively)
degradation in public schooling, reallocation of economic entitle-
ments, and intrusions of federal bureaucrats and judges into local mat-
ters.159 Elected President in 1968, Richard Nixon appealed to the new
centrist politics of preservation: his campaign reaffirmed the anti-
apartheid norm but aligned Nixon with southern and blue-collar
whites by endorsing localism and equality of opportunity, shibboleths
for the new opposition to civil rights.16' Nixon's four Supreme Court
appointments (1969-71) echoed his civil rights pragmatism. Always re-
asserting formal equality for Americans of all races and ethnicities, the
Burger Court between 1970 and 1978 set forth limits to the Warren
Court's potentially expansive constitutional protections for people of
color.'61 A moderate politics of preservation won an even bigger vic-
tory when Ronald Reagan was elected president in 1980. Prodded by
post-civil rights federalists, the Reagan Court has more vigorously
protected the racial status quo against civil rights perturbation, under
the same doctrinal flags (localism, institutional competence, and white
people's rights), but more aggressively waved.
The dialectic between a civil rights politics of remediation and
159. See generally Jonathan Rieder, The Rise of the Silent Majority, in THE RISE AND
FALL OF THE NEW DEAL ORDER, 1930-1980, at 243-66 (Steve Fraser & Gary Gerstle eds.,
1989). On the changing white opposition to the civil rights movement after the 1950s, see
HOWARD SCHUMAN ET AL., RACIAL ATTITUDES IN AMERICA: TRENDS AND
INTERPRETATIONS 99-170 (1997); ROBERT C. SMITH, RACISM IN THE POST-CIVIL RIGHTS
ERA: NOW YOU SEE IT, NOW You DON'T (1995); DAVID T. WELLMAN, PORTRAITS OF
WHITE RACISM 27-62, 223-47 (1993).
160. See CARTER, POLITICS OF RAGE, supra note 155, at 326-31, 349-51, 386-99; DEAN
J. KOTLOWSKI, NIXON'S CIVIL RIGHTS (2001); STEVEN F. LAWSON, IN PURSUIT OF POWER:
SOUTHERN BLACKS AND ELECTORAL POLITICS, 1965-1982 at 121-57 (1985) (describing
Nixon's "southern strategy" in 1968).
161. The relationship of the Burger Court to the Warren Court is complicated. The
Burger Court expanded many Warren Court initiatives (criminal procedure, see Section
II.A.1; the death penalty, see Section II.D), but on matters touching racial justice the Burger
Court typically drew the line at issues settled by the Warren Court and refused to proceed
further (see this Section, Section II.C, and Section ILE).
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preservationist objections played out most dramatically in the Brown
II cases. As public schools were actually integrated, often through fed-
eral busing orders, white communities often accepted pragmatic ar-
guments that the civil rights remedy was undermining public education
and that their own children were being harmed. Because moderates
were unwilling to retreat from Brown I, the open battleground was
what Brown II and Green required. Similar debates resulted from the
civil rights movement's demands that the state revisit allocational poli-
cies that were racially neutral on their face but had racially discrimina-
tory effects and that governments engage in affirmative action to inte-
grate state workforces and public works projects. Although the
doctrinal playing out of the constitutional arguments differed, the
school desegregation, discriminatory effects, and affirmative action
cases all illustrated the normative debate between the civil rights vi-
sion of an actually integrated America and the preservationist vision
of a formally colorblind America.
a. Busing and the School Desegregation Decrees. As suggested
above, the NAACP's politics of remediation insisted on more than
formal desegregation of public schools, and the Supreme Court
seemed to accept that vision in Green. After Green, district judges de-
veloped detailed decrees for actual school integration, usually in con-
sultation with education experts and the school districts. For rural dis-
tricts such as the one in Green, remediation was fairly straightforward,
as there were few schools and students could be shifted around with-
out much physical difficulty. Larger urban districts presented harder
remedial trade-offs, for segregated housing patterns meant that more
ambitious changes would have to occur - and the plans yielding the
most integration were those requiring busing of students away from
their neighborhood schools. The most famous effort was that of Judge
James McMillan, whose decree reconfigured the Charlotte-
Mecklenburg (North Carolina) school system, pervasively reassigned
teachers and students with an eye toward achieving racial balance, and
required that thousands of students be bused to school every day. The
Fourth Circuit reversed this ambitious decree as overenforcing Brown
II. The Supreme Court reinstated Judge McMillan's decree in Swann
v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education.162
The briefs in the case reflected the shift in preservationist constitu-
tionalism toward pragmatic arguments for going slowly, and away
from abrasive claims of absolute entitlement. In Green, the state had
argued that integration such as that pressed by the Inc. Fund was at
war with the "fundamental right of parents to direct the education of
162. 402 U.S. 1 (1971). For a detailed account of the Justices' deliberation, see
BERNARD SCHWARTZ, SWANN'S WAY: THE SCHOOL BUSING CASE AND THE SUPREME
COURT (1986) [hereinafter SCHWARTZ, SWANN'S WAY].
2099August 2002)
HeinOnline  -- 100 Mich. L. Rev. 2099 2001-2002
Michigan Law Review
their children" and with the deference courts should show to local
educators. 63 The briefs in Swann hardly neglected these themes, but
the most sophisticated brief, authored by Richmond attorney Lewis
Powell, emphasized pragmatic reasons why Judge McMillan should
not have required massive busing. On the one hand, Powell empha-
sized the enormous costs of busing - the psychic harms to children
removed from familiar environments and the loss of the huge advan-
tages of neighborhood schools. 164 On the other hand, he argued that
the apparent advantage of busing - actual school integration - was
unrealistic, because in the longer term busing would accelerate the
flight of white parents and their children toward private schools or
schools in areas without busing orders.1
65
Powell's argument appealed to Chief Justice Burger, who sought to
impose federalism and cost-benefit limits on trial judges crafting
Green remedial decrees. But Burger's colleagues insisted on revisions
to his draft opinions that were so extensive that the final, unanimous
opinion in Swann was a complete triumph for the Inc. Fund.166 Its cen-
tral holding was that once a Brown I violation had been shown, the
federal district court has broad equitable powers to remedy the viola-
tion. The opinion in Swann praised Judge McMillan and affirmed his
decree, including his goal of achieving a 71/29 white/black balance in
as many schools as possible. Although this remedy was explicitly race-
based, the Court construed it as not imposing a rigid quota onto the
school system and justified it as a flexible goal.167 As a warning to
judges in other cases, the Court admonished that Brown violations
warranted "a presumption against schools that are substantially dis-
proportionate in their racial composition."'68 Finally, the Court upheld
the busing requirement, based upon the trial judge's finding that it was
necessary to remedy the Brown violations and notwithstanding the
163. Brief for Respondents at 26, Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968)
(1967 Term, No. 695). This brief, in turn, was much more moderate than the fervent appeal
to states rights and freedom of association in Brief for the Board of Supervisors of Prince
Edward County, Griffin v. County School Bd., 377 U.S. 218 (1964) (1963 Term, No. 592).
164. Brief of Amicus Curiae Commonwealth of Virginia at 22-25, Swann v. Charlotte-
Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971) (1970 Term, Nos. 281, 349).
165. Id. at 16.
166. Although Burger assigned the opinion for the Court to himself, Justices Brennan
and Stewart engineered a palace coup that essentially took over the opinion-drafting proc-
ess. See SCHWARTZ, SWANN'S WAY, supra note 162, at 100-84.
167. Swann, 402 U.S. at 22-25.
168. Id. at 26.
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cost-benefit, federalism, and separation of powers objections raised by
the various briefs. 69
As had earlier cases, Swann came from a southern or border state,
but segregated schools were a national phenomenon. Keyes v. School
District No. 117° was the first post-Brown Supreme Court desegrega-
tion case outside the South. Part of the Denver school system had
been manipulated to achieve racially segregated schools in violation of
Brown I, and the issue presented was whether that justified a city-wide
remedy under Green. The Court was narrowly divided but inclined to
follow Justice Brennan's proposal of a remand with instructions to
consider city-wide busing. There was a complication. Lewis Powell,
the pragmatic advocate in Swann but a Justice in Keyes, proposed that
the Court extend Green's broad remedial obligations beyond districts
that had been segregated de jure to those that were segregated de
facto. Powell's biographer maintains that there was a Court majority
for his position, but because Powell parted company with these col-
leagues on the busing issue he was unwilling to join forces with
Brennan to write his de facto segregation views into law.'7' Because
the Court never revisited the issue, the de jure/de facto distinction
serendipitously became a controlling principle of law in the school
desegregation cases.
In Milliken v. Bradley,' Justice Powell's pragmatic preservation-
ism placed an important limit on the Green-Swann remedial jugger-
naut. The issue was whether a finding of de jure school segregation in
one school district (Detroit) justified a remedial order extending to
other districts (the suburbs) if the district court found that racial inte-
gration was not possible otherwise. The state objected that this broad
a remedy not only violated the due process rights of the non-culpable
districts, but was at war with the principle of local control of public
education.173 The Nixon Justices, joined by Stewart, rested on a legal-
169. Id. at 29-31; cf id. at 17-18 (noting that Title IV precluded the Justice Department
from seeking busing as a remedy for school segregation but disclaiming that as a limitation
on judicial orders).
170. 413 U.S. 189 (1973).
171. According to JOHN C. JEFFRIES, JR., JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL, JR. 302-05 (1994)
[hereinafter JEFFRIES, JUSTICE POWELL], Brennan offered to redraft his opinion to discard
the de facto-de jure distinction, but not at the cost of diluting Swann's approval of busing.
Because he was so opposed to busing for pragmatic reasons, Keyes, 413 U.S. at 237-52 (Pow-
ell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), Powell went his own way, and his attack on
the distinction, id. at 223-36, drew the support only of Justice Douglas in the end. Id. at 214-
17 (Douglas, J.).
172. 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
173. See Brief for Petitioners at 82-85, Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974) (No. 73-
434) (citing Wright v. Council of the City of Emporia, 407 U.S. 451, 469 (1972), and San An-
tonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 49-50, 54 (1973) (Powell, J.)); see also Sec-
tion II.C (discussing Rodriguez).
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ism (the remedy should match the violation) but also endorsed
Powell's pragmatic concerns with busing. "No single tradition in public
education is more deeply rooted than local control over the operation
of schools," wrote the Chief Justice; "local autonomy has long been
thought essential both to the maintenance of community concern and
support for public schools and to quality of the educational process."'74
Although the Supreme Court, often over the dissents of Powell and
Rehnquist, sometimes approved broad remedial orders sought by the
Inc. Fund and other civil rights lawyers,'75 the tide turned with
Milliken: for reasons of both federalism and pragmatism, local control
of schools was a value that had to be considered alongside the rights of
black schoolchildren.'76
Milliken can be viewed as a self-fulfilling prophecy: once white
parents could count on the Supreme Court to respect district lines,
they could predictably avoid integration by moving across those lines.
And they did, in large numbers.'77 The complex interaction between
private choice and public policy that generated white flight posed a
dilemma for both the civil rights movement and the Supreme Court.
The former pressed for ever-expanding (and expensive) remedial or-
ders, which federal judges often issued, and which the Court some-
times affirmed, but only after soul-searching as to whether the orders
struck the right balance between the goal of integration and the costs
accompanying movement away from neighborhood schools.'78 Experi-
ence with this process has moved public debate beyond Brennan's
faith in the efficacy of remedial injunctions (Green) and Powell's nos-
talgia for the neighborhood school (Milliken).
In the last decades of the millennium, the Inc. Fund maintained
that white flight and ongoing school (re)segregation were in part a
consequence of a multitude of public policies (especially housing) that
174. Milliken, 418 U.S. at 741-42 (citing the same cases as the state).
175. See, e.g., Hills v. Gautreaux, 425 U.S. 284 (1976).
176. See, e.g., Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 433 U.S. 406, 410 (1977); Pasadena Bd.
of Educ. v. Spangler, 427 U.S. 424 (1976).
177. See JAMES COLEMAN ET AL., TRENDS IN SCHOOL SEGREGATION, 1968-73 (1975)
(laying out and supporting white flight thesis); RAYMOND WOLTERS, THE BURDEN OF
BROWN: THIRTY YEARS OF DESEGREGATION (1984) (documenting the effects of white
flight to resegregate the school districts involved in the Brown litigation). But see GARY
ORFIELD, THE GROWTH OF SEGREGATION IN AMERICAN SCHOOLS: CHANGING PATTERNS
OF SEPARATION AND POVERTY SINCE 1968, at 6 (1994) (disputing "white flight" thesis).
178. Divided Courts upheld broad and expensive remedial orders in Missouri v. Jenkins,
495 U.S. 33 (1990), and Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267 (1977) ("Milliken 11"), but even
great expenditures of money toward magnet schools and other integrative measures have
generated disappointing levels of actual integration.
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influenced private choices.179 Hence, civil rights attorneys defended
not only extensive remedial decrees embodying attractive and com-
prehensive educational reform, but also housing desegregation, as
people's preferences changed in response to new government pro-
grams.8 In the same period, neo-federalists opposing further judicial
remediation of a resegregated status quo denied the relevance of such
a complex chain of causation or the capacity of remedial decrees to
break that chain. Moreover, they questioned whether school districts
in the 1990s had any continuing accountability for segregationist poli-
cies that ended in the 1960s."8' They insisted that, because primary ac-
countability for educational policy must rest with state and local gov-
ernments, district courts must tailor their remedial orders so as to
protect the "local autonomy" of the school district.'82 Populated by
Reagan-Bush Justices, the Supreme Court has cautiously moved in the
neo-federalist direction.'83 As Justice Kennedy put it, "[r]eturning
schools to the control of local authorities at the earliest practicable
date is essential to restore their true accountability in our governmen-
tal system."" 4 The Rehnquist Court's message is that once local gov-
ernments resume full control of school systems, they will be responsive
to their obligation to preserve a unitary school system. That remains
to be seen.
b. The Disparate Impact Cases. Well before Loving, the NAACP
recognized that, even as apartheid was dying as a formal matter, its
legacy remained strong as a functional matter. Especially in the South,
many policies that did not deploy race as a classification still had
strong race-based effects, either because they were devised or en-
179. See "School Segregation and Residential Segregation: A Social Science Statement,"
appendix to Brief for Respondents at app. la-28a, Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443
U.S. 449 (1979) (No. 78-610).
180. See "School Desegregation: A Social Science Statement," appendix to Brief of
Amici Curiae NAACP et al. in Support of Respondents, Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467
(1992) (No. 89-1290) (signed by fifty-two eminent social scientists).
181. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 28-29, Board of Educ. v. Dowell,
498 U.S. 237 (1991) (No. 89-1080) [hereinafter U.S. Amicus Brief in Dowell] (signed by Bush
Administration Solicitor General Kenneth Starr); accord Brief of the DeKalb County
Board of Education as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 24-28, Bd. of Educ. v.
Dowell, 498 U.S. 237 (1991) (No. 89-1080) (signed by former Reagan Administration Solici-
tor General Rex Lee).
182. U.S. Amicus Brief in Dowell, supra note 181, at 21-24.
183. See Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467 (1992) (holding that the district court has Swann-
based discretion to order partial withdrawal of its jurisdiction once it finds local authorities
have remedied the de jure violations, even though de facto segregation may persist); Board
of Educ. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237, 238 (1991) (holding that the principle of local control re-
quires dissolution of a Green remedial decree "after the local authorities have operated in
compliance with it for a reasonable period [of time]").
184. Freeman, 503 U.S. at 490; see id. at 506-07 (Scalia, J., concurring) (ridiculing the
notion that school districts have responsibility for continuing segregation).
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forced in a race-based way or because they impacted people of color
disproportionately for some other reason, such as poverty or jobless-
ness, that could be understood as a legacy of apartheid."8 5 In the early
1960s, the NAACP initiated constitutional litigation against the death
penalty and the poll tax because they systematically disadvantaged
people of color as a class.186 These campaigns were relatively success-
ful because they spoke to important deprivations that were historically
tied to the policy of white supremacy and because remediation was not
considered costly.
In the late 1960s, the Inc. Fund and other groups turned their at-
tention to state and local policies allocating resources to government
services and social welfare. Allocative policies that were formally race-
neutral often operated in racially discriminatory ways, and civil rights
attorneys argued that state and local governments were constitution-
ally obliged to revamp their policies to erase or ameliorate the race-
based effects. Note the parallel with Keyes' de jure/de facto distinc-
tion. As in the school desegregation cases, preservationists and their
allies were able to refocus the debate. When the state was not de-
ploying a race-based classification, it was harder to understand its ac-
tion as a violation of Brown and easier to worry about the costs of re-
mediation. Because any remedy would explicitly redistribute resources
away from white people to people of color, the former were especially
open to objections. Supported by a cost-conscious Nixon
Administration, state and local governments strongly resisted civil
rights challenges to their allocative policies. As with school desegrega-
tion cases, state and local governments invoked principles of federal-
ism and their own superior competence to make allocational choices.
These arguments first showed up in constitutional challenges to
policies by which states apportioned welfare benefits.'87 In Dandridge
v. Williams,'88 the Supreme Court rejected an equal protection attack
on Maryland's policy of capping family grants irregardless of the size
of the family. Justice Stewart's opinion for the Court found the policy
indistinguishable from other social and economic regulations routinely
afforded lenient judicial scrutiny but recognized that welfare laws "in-
fected with a racially discriminatory purpose or effect" would be "in-
185. See Charles Lawrence, Il1, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with
Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317 (1987).
186. Brief for Appellants at 19-22, Harper v. Virginia State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S.
663 (1966) (1965 Term, No. 48) (poll tax); Section I1.D (death penalty).
187. On the welfare rights movement, see MARTHA F. DAVIS, BRUTAL NEED:
LAWYERS AND THE WELFARE RIGHTS MOVEMENT, 1960-1973 (1993).
188. 397 U.S. 471 (1970).
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herently suspect" and therefore subject to heightened scrutiny."9 This
dictum triggered a challenge to Texas's welfare program, which in-
cluded a computation procedure which funded recipients of Aid for
Families with Dependent Children ("AFDC") benefits at 75% of their
recognized need, whereas recipients of other, adult-only programs
were funded at 95-100% of their recognized need. Professor Ed
Sparer's brief for the challengers demonstrated in painful detail that
the three advantaged programs had largely white beneficiaries, while
the disadvantaged program (AFDC) was 85% minority (45% black,
40% latino).'9° The state claimed that governments could not reasona-
bly be held liable for racially disparate consequences of their policies,
unless there was evidence of discriminatory motives (none in the
Texas case). Sparer responded that legislative motive was irrelevant: it
was hard to prove, especially after Loving exposed any kind of race-
based preference to lethal review; the reason for discrimination had
little bearing on its effect on racial minorities deprived of needed state
benefits and confronted with legislative indifference to their plight; if
legislative motive were key, then the legislature could easily fix old
discriminatory policies by reenacting them under a clean record."'
The four Nixon Justices were unreceptive to Sparer's arguments;
they and Justice White lined up behind Chief Justice Burger's view
that "Texas' allocation among the groups is beyond our reach absent
invidious discrimination," namely, a showing of discriminatory in-
tent.19 Justice Rehnquist's opinion for the Court in Jefferson v.
Hackney 93 ruled that, notwithstanding the significantly different racial
impact, Texas's allocation scheme was legitimate under the Equal
Protection Clause, so long as it was "lacking in racial motivation" and
was otherwise rational. Rehnquist's reasoning was institutional: any
allocative state program is going to affect different racial groups dif-
ferently, and so heightened scrutiny for disparate racial impacts, as
Sparer was arguing, would inject the Court into " 'intractable eco-
nomic, social, and even philosophical problems presented by public
189. Id. at 485 n.17; see also Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971) (interpreting
Title VII to regulate employment policies having racially disparate impacts unless they can
be justified by business necessity).
190. Brief for Appellants at 29, Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535 (1972) (No. 70-5064).
191. Id. at 49-51 (elaborating on the Court's holding and reasoning in Palmer v. Thomp-
son, 403 U.S. 217 (1971) (holding legislative intent irrelevant to show city closed down
swimming pools rather than integrate them)).
192. Douglas Conference Notes for Jefferson v. Hackney (Feb. 25, 1972), in William O.
Douglas Papers, Library of Congress, Container 1559 (O.T. 1971, Opinions, Misc. Mems.
No. 70-5064) [hereinafter Douglas Papers].
193. 406 U.S. 535, 548 (1972).
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welfare assistance programs [which] are not the business of this
Court.' "194
Following immediately on the heels of Hackney was a challenge to
Texas's system for financing public schools, San Antonio Independent
School District v. Rodriguez.'95 Plaintiffs' main argument was that the
neediest districts were shortchanged by the Texas system because of
their poverty, but they and their amici (including the Inc. Fund and
the ACLU) more broadly argued that the Texas system was subject to
heightened scrutiny because it was grounded upon wealth-based clas-
sifications or had strong race-based effects; the education deficit as-
sured by the financing inequities fell mostly on latino and black
schoolchildren.'96 Justice Powell's opinion for the Court (the Nixon
Justices plus Stewart) ignored the racial impact argument but, tell-
ingly, responded to the wealth argument with the admonition, citing
Hackney, that the challengers had failed to show that "the financing
system is designed to operate to the peculiar disadvantage of the com-
paratively poor."' 97 At the same time the Court was embracing a re-
strictive view of judicial review of policies having race-based effects in
Rodriguez, it was accepting the importance of the de jure/de facto dis-
tinction for school segregation in Keyes. The die was cast against vigi-
lant judicial scrutiny of public policies with disproportionate effects on
people of color by the end of 1973.
Before the Inc. Fund could engineer a better test case for its view
that state policies bearing disproportionately on people of color
should be subjected to heightened scrutiny, the Court seized upon a
statutory case to settle the issue. Washington v. Davis9' involved
claims that the District of Columbia's reading test for police officers
excluded a disproportionate number of black applicants. Plaintiffs'
original complaint alleged a constitutional violation, but the lower
court granted relief under Title VII, which went into effect after the
complaint had been filed. On appeal to the Supreme Court, the parties
treated this as a Title VII case. Even after constant (almost comical)
194. Id. at 551 (quoting Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 487). Three Justices dis-
sented from this constitutional analysis. Id. at 551 (Douglas, Brennan, J.J. dissenting); id. at
558 (Marshall, Brennan, J.J., dissenting).
195. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
196. This was an ancillary point in the Brief for Appellees at 16-17, San Antonio Inde-
pendent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973) (No. 71-1332), but was the lead argu-
ment in Brief [Amici Curiae] of ACLU [et al.] at 14-23, Rodriguez (No. 71-1332), and Brief
of Amicus Curiae NAACP Legal Defense Fund and Educational Fund, Inc. at 3-9, Rodri-
guez (No. 71-1332).
197. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 26 (emphasis added); see also id. at 27 n.62 (citing Jefferson
v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535 547-49 (1972), and John Hart Ely, Legislative and Administrative
Motivation in Constitutional Law, 79 YALE L.J. 1205, 1258-59 (1970)).
198. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
2106 [Vol. 100:2062
HeinOnline  -- 100 Mich. L. Rev. 2106 2001-2002
Identity-Based Social Movements
prompting from the Nixon Justices to take a harder line, both federal
and D.C. respondents repeatedly conceded at oral argument that Title
VII applied and that its disparate impact approach was the same as the
equal protection approach.19  Undeterred by lack of support from the
government, the Court ruled that it would not apply heightened scru-
tiny to a state policy having a racially discriminatory impact unless the
policy was also racially motivated. 200 The reasons were the same insti-
tutional process ones given in Hackney.
Although they did not litigate any of these cases (and participated
only in Rodriguez, as an amicus), the Inc. Fund and its allies found its
subsequent disparate impact challenges doomed by the difficulties in
proving racial motivation. Precisely as Sparer had predicted in
Hackney, racial motivation has been all but impossible to prove in
most cases, because everyone now knows not to make public racist
statements and most government decisions are complicated enough
that they can be plausibly defended along non-racial lines. Accord-
ingly, serious challenges, backed up by impressive statistics, have
failed against racially disparate public housing policies, °1 sentencing
for drug crimes,"' and impositions of the death penalty.2"3 Moreover,
neo-federalists have deployed Washington v. Davis to support their re-
strictive understanding of state responsibility for continuing school
segregation: once the local government has taken steps to end de jure
segregation, courts should not impose further responsibility on it un-
less there is evidence of discriminatory intent.2 4
c. The Affirmative Action Cases. Even under the regime of
Washington v. Davis, public as well as private institutions had incen-
tives to integrate and to do so in a non-token manner.25 These incen-
199. See Oral Argument in Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976), in 88 LANDMARK
BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES:
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 355, 362, 366-67, 380-81 (Philip B. Kurland & Gerhard Casper eds.,
1977) [hereinafter LANDMARK BRIEFS]. After Mark Evans, representing the federal re-
spondents, made this concession, id. at 369, Justice Rehnquist tossed Jefferson v. Hackney in
his face - and Evans still backed away from the argument that won him the case! Id. at 370-
71.
200. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. at 239-45.
201. Village of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Co., 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
202. United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456 (1996). The equal protection issue is ex-
haustively discussed in RANDALL KENNEDY, RACE, CRIME, AND THE LAW 357-59, 364-86
(1997) [hereinafter KENNEDY, RACE, CRIME]; David Sklansky, Cocaine, Race, and Equal
Protection, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1283 (1995).
203. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987); see also KENNEDY, supra note 202, at
328-50 (exhaustively discussing McCleskey); Section II.D (discussing McCleskey).
204. See U.S. Amicus Brief in Dowell, supra note 181, at 19-20, 27-29 (submitted by
Bush Administration Solicitor General Kenneth Starr).
205. (1) Many of the institutions had a history of racial discrimination and so were vul-
nerable to challenges under Washington v. Davis. (2) After 1972, Title VII applied to fed-
eral, state, and local employers, which risked Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971),
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tives generated a variety of policies using race as a basis for preference
or even a quota for allocating jobs, college spots, and government con-
tracts. Although there was some diversity of opinion, most civil rights
leaders favored affirmative state action as a swift, and perhaps neces-
sary, mechanism to integrate state colleges, workforces, and public
programs. Were these policies constitutional? The Court in Swann had
approved remedial uses of race-based classifications by trial judges
crafting Green decrees.2 °6 But the "benign" use of race in allocating
scarce benefits posed more intense political and constitutional
issues.2"7 "Affirmative action" was an object of a civil rights politics of
remediation - but "reverse discrimination" became an intense focus
of a new post-apartheid politics of preservation, because it was an
issue that infuriated extremists who hated the idea of integration,
irked pragmatists who supported integration only so long as it was
costless, and disturbed liberals who believed in the "colorblind
constitution."
20 8
The multifaceted opposition to affirmative action showed up in the
first major Supreme Court case, DeFunis v. Odegaard.°9 Marco
DeFunis, a Sephardic Jew, was denied admission to the University of
Washington School of Law, while people of color with lower test
scores were admitted under an affirmative action plan. DeFunis's law-
yers argued that affirmative action violated the colorblindness re-
quirement of Loving and created "special privileges" for blacks while
it denied whites "fundamental" rights.210 Writing for amicus B'nai
B'rith, Professors Alexander Bickel of Yale and Philip Kurland of
Chicago took a broader oppositionist view. Linking quotas for blacks
with the numerus clausus that has traditionally been deployed to ex-
lawsuits if their workforces were racially imbalanced. (3) Most important, social norms had
changed in many locales: diversity within the institution was increasingly considered a posi-
tive goal, not just something the institution "had" to do.
206. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 16 (1971) (holding that
it is allowable for school officials to aim at a racial balance in assigning students and teachers
to various schools, "in order to prepare students to live in a pluralistic society[,]" and that
trial judges have "broad power to fashion a remedy that will assure a unitary school sys-
tem").
207. Note that the use of race in redistricting also raises identity politics as well as con-
stitutional issues. The Supreme Court upheld state decisions challenged on race grounds, see
United Jewish Orgs. v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144 (1977), until Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993),
and its progeny. See also Section II.E.I (discussing gerrymandering cases).
208. For intense opposition from legal liberals, see Lino A. Graglia, Special Admission
of the "Culturally Deprived" to Law School, 119 U. PA. L. REV. 351 (1970); John Kaplan,
Equal Justice in an Unequal World: Equality for the Negro - The Problem of Special Treat-
ment, 61 Nw. U. L. REV. 363 (1966).
209. 416 U.S. 312 (1974).
210. Petitioners' Opening Brief at 12, 14, DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312 (1974)
(No. 73-235) (emphasis in original).
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clude Jews, they objected that affirmative action was inconsistent with
the fundamental values of a liberal society: "For a quota is not merely
a racial classification. It is an attribution of status - of caste - fixed
by race. A quota necessarily legislates not equality, but a governmen-
tal rule of racial differences without regard to an individual's attrib-
utes or merits. '211 The state's position was that affirmative action in
service of racial integration was "benign" and therefore not unconsti-
tutional under Loving; considering race was a means to undermine ra-
cism, not support it. Civil rights amici argued that race-based prefer-
ences were not "invidious" when they were deployed for remedial
purposes, to implement long-overdue integration and overcome his-
torical racial disadvantages. 212 Bickel and Kurland responded that a
"quota system is admittedly not 'benign' so far as the excluded [white]
majority applicants are concerned" - nor was there any basis for de-
nying that it is " 'invidious' and 'stigmatizing' for the category of ap-
plicant labeled by race as incapable of meeting the standards applied
to others. ' 213 Quotas would tar all people of color, as a symbolic
statement that " 'black people just don't have it' " and need special
government help.214 In short, race-based preferences are unconstitu-
tional for two interrelated reasons: preferring a black person because
of her race deprives the white person of his right to be treated fairly
and promotes rather than undermines racist stereotypes and preju-
dices.
Reflecting their collective uncertainty, the Court dismissed the ap-
peal as moot. 215 Only Justice Douglas reached the merits; he agreed
with Bickel and Kurland that the race-based preference should be
subjected to strict scrutiny and invalidated.2 16 The issue returned to the
Court when Allan Bakke challenged the racial quota program for ad-
mission to the University of California (Davis) School of Medicine. By
1978, people's views on affirmative action had hardened, and it had
211. Brief of Amicus Curiae Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith at 19, DeFunis v.
Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312 (1974) (No. 73-235) [hereinafter Brief of Anti-Defamation League
in DeFunis].
212. Brief of The Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law as Amicus Curiae in
Support of the Decision Below at 9-20, DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312 (1974) (No. 73-
235); accord Brief of NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc., as Amicus Curiae,
DeFunis (No. 73-235); Motion of the EEOC for Leave to File a Memorandum as Amicus
Curiae and Memorandum, DeFunis (No. 73-235).
213. Brief of Anti-Defamation League in DeFunis, supra note 211, at 24 (citing Lino A.
Graglia, Special Admission of the "Culturally Deprived" to Law School, 119 U. PA. L. REV.
351, 353-59 (1970)).
214. Id. at 25 (quoting THOMAS SOWELL, BLACK EDUCATION, MYTHS AND
TRAGEDIES 292 (1972)).
215. DeFunis, 416 U.S. at 319-20; cf. id. at 348 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (finding, with
three other Justices, the case not moot).
216. Id. at 333-44 (Douglas, J. dissenting).
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become a highly polarizing issue: liberals were for it, whatever mis-
givings they had previously; conservatives were against it, as a viola-
tion of white people's rights and as a promotion of race divisions; and
ambivalent moderates searched for mediating solutions that accom-
modated different interests and did not exacerbate racial divisions.
Accordingly, Regents of the University of California v. Bakke21. at-
tracted more amicus briefs than any previous civil rights case, and the
briefs were more apocalyptic than in DeFunis. The state and the ami-
cus briefs for the ABA, ACLU, the NAACP, and various college and
university groups emphasized the discretion universities needed to
admit racial minorities for either remedial or diversity purposes. In an
ironic twist, the Inc. Fund emphasized that judicial activism against af-
firmative action was inconsistent with the original intent of the
Fourteenth Amendment's framers.218 The challenger and his amici
(including Professor Kurland's brief for B'nai B'rith) argued that the
quota system violated white men's equality rights and promoted race
divisions.
A highly polarized Court agonized all term over Bakke (Section
II.C.3). Its Solomonic resolution was delivered by Justice Powell, who
subjected the race-based quota to strict scrutiny and invalidated it -
but with a roadmap that the government could use to craft policies
that would pass muster.219 Powell accepted the preservationist argu-
ments for strict scrutiny, namely, that race-based quotas not only vio-
lated white people's rights, but also promoted race animosity.22 But he
also accepted the civil rights argument that remediation of past dis-
crimination or the attainment of a diverse student body could justify
race-based affirmative action, albeit (for Powell) only if the program
were narrowly tailored.2 ' Although Powell's solo opinion did not for-
217. 438 U.S. 265 (1978); see also Section II.C.3 (discussing Bakke). The leading account
is BERNARD SCHWARTZ, BEHIND BAKKE: AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AND THE SUPREME
COURT (1988). See also HOWARD BALL, THE BAKKE CASE: RACE, EDUCATION, AND
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION (2000); JEFFRIES, JUSTICE POWELL, supra note 171, at 455-501.
218. Brief of Amicus Curiae NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc. at 10-
53, Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978) (No. 76-811). This is ironic be-
cause the Inc. Fund believed in a dynamic Equal Protection Clause and because the Justices
most interested in original intent (Burger and Rehnquist) were least open to the Inc. Fund's
position.
219. Technically, Powell delivered the judgment of the Court, but he spoke only for
himself on the constitutional issue. Four Justices (Burger, Stewart, Rehnquist, Stevens) be-
lieved the preference program violated Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act; four other Jus-
tices (Brennan, White, Marshall, Blackmun) believed the program consistent with both Title
VI and the Constitution.
220. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 294-95 n.34 (Powell, J.).
221. Id. at 307-10 (accepting the remediation goal); id. at 311-15 (accepting the diverse
student body goal). But see id. at 315-19 (finding that this odd quota program was not nar-
rowly tailored to the diversity goal in Bakke's case). Procedurally, Powell made a point not
suggested by the parties, that it ought to make a difference which governmental body
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mally resolve the affirmative action issue, it held out that possibility. A
divided Court more or less followed Powell's roadmap in Fullilove v.
Klutznick,22 which upheld a set-aside program for federal contracts to
racial minorities. The Chief Justice's plurality opinion found the racial
quotas defensible because they were adopted by Congress after full
debate and persuasive findings that the program was needed to rem-
edy past discrimination against minority contractors.223
An emboldened politics of preservation in the 1980s challenged
Powell's pragmatic compromise. Although traditionalist and civil
rights groups generated few new arguments beyond those already de-
veloped in DeFunis and Bakke, 4 the former gained ground politically
and, as a result, judicially. The Reagan Administration's Solicitor
General Charles Fried powerfully supported the critics of affirmative
action in Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education2 2 5 and City of
Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co.12 6 The Wygant brief is a preservationist
classic. It led with the idea that affirmative action is an unfortunate re-
treat from the NAACP's correct argument in Brown that the
Constitution " 'prohibits a state from making racial distinctions in the
exercise of governmental power.' ,22' The NAACP's Inc. Fund, of
adopted the affirmative action program. Thus, an unelected group of administrators is not
the most legitimate body to decide this important issue; the considered judgment, with fac-
tual findings, of a state or (better yet) national legislature is entitled to greater constitutional
leeway. Id. at 308-10.
222. 448 U.S. 448 (1980).
223. Id. at 475-77 (Burger, C.J., joined by White & Powell, JJ.) (holding that Congress
has authority to adopt set-aside legislation and its findings support the remediation of past
discrimination goal); id. at 480-92 (finding that set-aside law's means are reasonably related
to the remediation goal); id. at 496-517 (Powell, J., concurring) (explaining why the congres-
sional set-aside program met all the procedural findings by a legitimate policy organ and
substantive remediation requirements of his Bakke roadmap); see also id. at 517-21 (Mar-
shall, J., joined by Brennan & Blackmun, JJ, concurring) (federal program satisfies the in-
termediate scrutiny standard followed by these Justices in Bakke).
224. The briefs for all sides in Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education, 476 U.S. 267
(1989), City of Richmond v. Croson, 488 U.S. 469 (1989), and Adarand Constructors, Inc. v.
Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995), were more voluminous, less original, and more repetitious than
the briefs in the earlier cases. By the 1990s, there were a number of talented empiricists
working on affirmative action issues, but their work cut in several different directions and
conclusions were mired in controversy. See, e.g., Symposium: The Law and Economics of
Racial Discrimination in Employment, 79 GEO. L.J. 1619 (1991) (providing an excellent sur-
vey of, and contributing to, the empirical literature).
225. 476 U.S. 267 (1986).
226. 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
227. Brief for Amicus Curiae United States in Support of Petitioners at 4, Wygant v.
Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267 (1986) (No. 84-1340) (quoting Brief for Appellants in
Nos. 1, 2, and 4 and Respondent in No. 10 at 21, Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S 483 (1954))
[hereinafter U.S. Wygant Brief]. To the same effect was Brief for the United States as Ami-
cus Curiae Supporting Appellee, City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989)
(No. 87-998).
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course, did not believe its argument in Brown supported the same
level of scrutiny for remedial racial preferences, to which Fried re-
sponded that a neutral-as-to-beneficiary approach was required by the
original intent of the Fourteenth Amendment's framers, by the
Court's precedents (starting with Hirabayashi and including the
Court's sex discrimination precedents), and by the nation's political
experience, which revealed that racial minorities were no longer po-
litically powerless. 28 In closing, Fried set the prestige of the
Department of Justice behind Bickel and Kurland's "promotion of ra-
cism" argument - remedial preferences just as easily reinforce stereo-
types and deepen hostility as reduce the same. 29 The punch line: the
state cannot use race-based preferences.
The Court struck down the racial preference in Wygant, but again,
as in Bakke and Fullilove, without a majority opinion. Once four
Reagan Justices were in place (Rehnquist [elevated to Chief Justice,
1986], O'Connor [1981], Scalia [1986], and Kennedy [1988]), there was
a Court. Croson ruled that any race-based classification - whatever
its motivation - would be subject to strict scrutiny and that the state
can justify some race-based preference with nothing less than a show-
ing that the underrepresentation of minorities is a product of past dis-
crimination. 3° Writing for the Court, Justice O'Connor concluded that
generalized assertions of past discrimination constitute no sufficient
justification for a race-based preference, and quotas are generally not
reasonable remedies even when there has been a showing of past dis-
crimination.231
The politics of preservation scored a further triumph in Adarand
Constructors, Inc. v. Pena.232 Not only did a majority - the four
Reagan Justices and Bush appointee Clarence Thomas - announce
the same strict scrutiny for federal race-based set-aside programs,
overruling or narrowing Fullilove,233 but Justices Scalia and Thomas
issued statements urging a completely colorblind Constitution. Scalia's
228. See U.S. Wygant Brief, supra note 227, at 8-10 (arguing that precedent requires the
same approach); id. at 11-15 (arguing that original intent requires the same approach); id. at
16-20 (arguing that political theory requires the same approach).
229. Id. at 20-21.
230. Croson, 488 U.S. at 493-98 (O'Connor, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and White &
Kennedy, JJ.); see id. at 520-25 (Scalia, J., concurring) (endorsing strict scrutiny as well, but
stricter than O'Connor).
231. Id. at 498-99 (O'Connor, J., for the Court).
232. 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
233. See id. at 213-27. Justice O'Connor spoke for the Court here, except insofar as her
opinion was inconsistent with Justice Scalia's concurrence. See id. at 239 (Scalia, J., concur-
ring). Justice O'Connor's opinion for the Court, id. at 227, overruled in part Metro Broad-
casting Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547 (1990), which held that intermediate scrutiny is the stan-
dard required for judicial review of federal "benign" racial preferences.
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statement, "[i]n the eyes of the government, we are just one race here.
It is American[,] ' 234 is half schmaltz, half inspiration. Thomas's was a
new voice of color, giving greater authenticity to the promotion of ra-
cism argument: "racial paternalism and its unintended consequences
can be as poisonous and pernicious as any other form of discrimina-
tion .... Inevitably ... [benign discrimination] programs engender at-
titudes of superiority or, alternatively, provoke resentment among
those who believe that they have been wronged by the government's
use of race.
235
B. Women's Rights Movements
White women were disadvantaged differently than African
Americans at the end of the nineteenth century. They were of course
the largest group in the population. Men did not fear and hate them in
the same way they feared and hated people of color; women were dif-
ferently situated by biology in a way black men were not, for they and
they alone bore the promise and the costs of pregnancy. Violence
against white women was within the intimate reserves of the family,
including marital rape and unwanted pregnancies. Where people of
color were subordinated by the white supremacy ideology, enforced
through public segregation and anti-miscegenation laws, women were
subordinated by the ideology of separate spheres, enforced through
their legal exclusion from voting, jury service, military service, and
public and private employment. Black women, of course, suffered
under both kinds of discrimination: they were denigrated by both
apartheid and by women's exclusions.236 Also unlike the cause of civil
rights, which seemed all but crushed in the first decades of the new
century, women's causes were flourishing: the women's temperance
movement won ratification of the Eighteenth Amendment instantiat-
ing Prohibition, and the Nineteenth Amendment gave women the
right to vote in 1920.237 Yet once they had won the franchise, feminist
234. Adarand, 515 U.S. at 239 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and in the judgment).
235. Id. at 240-41 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and in the judgment).
236. See generally ANGELA Y. DAVIS, WOMEN, RACE, AND CLASS (1981); GLENDA
GILMORE, GENDER AND JIM CROW (1996); ROSALYN TERBORG-PENN, AFRICAN
AMERICAN WOMEN IN THE STRUGGLE FOR THE VOTE, 1850-1920 (1998).
237. On these remarkable but different feminist campaigns, see JOSEPH GUSFIELD,
SYMBOLIC CRUSADE: STATUS POLITICS AND THE AMERICAN TEMPERANCE MOVEMENT
(1986) (discussing the Eighteenth Amendment); Reva B. Siegel, She the People: The Nine-
teenth Amendment, Sex Equality, Federalism, and the Family, 115 HARV. L. REV. 947, 960-
1022 (2001) [hereinafter Siegel, She the People] (discussing the Nineteenth Amendment).
2113August 2002]
HeinOnline  -- 100 Mich. L. Rev. 2113 2001-2002
Michigan Law Review
politics went into partial hibernation, at exactly the same time when
blacks were becoming more politically and constitutionally active.238
Notwithstanding these and other differences, women's movements
shared a core similarity with civil rights ones: their politics, including
their constitutional politics, was driven by the traits (race and sex) that
set them apart from "the norm" (white males). Like blacks, women
objected that the state not only failed to protect them against private
violence, but was itself an instrument of violence against them. Just as
the state tolerated violence, including lynching, against black men, so
it tolerated rape, including marital rape, against women. And the state
was a direct instrument of violence against women insofar as it crimi-
nalized medical technologies by which women could control the terms
of their pregnancies, specifically, the promulgation of articles of con-
traception and the practice of abortion. Like increasing numbers of
black people, increasing numbers of women objected that the law un-
fairly disrespected them as well as denied them tangible opportunities.
If apartheid laws effectively excluded people of color from full citizen-
ship because of their race, sex-exclusionary laws did the same for
women. The disrespect and exclusion were normatively indefensible:
just as people of color ought to have all the opportunities and duties as
white people, so women ought to have the same opportunities and du-
ties as men. Sex, like race, is a benign variation, largely irrelevant to
state policy.
Inspired by the successes of the civil rights movement, women en-
gaged in a similar politics of recognition, sweeping away most state
discriminations on the basis of sex in Supreme Court opinions of the
1970s - at the very same time the country was debating and ulti-
mately rejecting the Equal Rights Amendment. Also like the civil
rights movement, the women's rights movement focused on issues of
affirmative state remediation as soon as it had significantly achieved
its equality goals; many of women's remedial measures have been suc-
cessfully blocked by traditionalists, however. The biggest differences
between the constitutional experiences of blacks and women relate to
abortion. Although initially conceived as a matter of protecting
women against health dangers and economic depletion, the politics of
abortion was reconceived as a matter of women's equal citizenship,
followed by the view that the state has an affirmative duty to provide
women with support for their family planning choices. Viewing the fe-
tus as a human person, the politics of preservation saw matters exactly
the other way: its members were protecting fetuses, seeking recogni-
238. See NANCY F. COT'T, THE GROUNDING OF MODERN FEMINISM 96-97 (1987);
ELEANOR FLEXNER, CENTURY OF STRUGGLE: THE WOMAN'S RIGHTS MOVEMENT IN THE
UNITED STATES 222-345 (2d ed. 1975); AILEEN S. KRADITOR, THE IDEAS OF THE WOMAN
SUFFRAGE MOVEMENT, 1890-1920, at 261-64 (1965).
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tion of the value of human life, and opposing any policy that promoted
abortion as a method of family planning.
1. The Politics of Protection: Women's Control of Their Own
Bodies, 1916-72
After ratification of the Nineteenth Amendment, various politics
of protection dominated public discourse about women's rights for the
next half-century. There were three kinds of politics that sought to
protect women against harm; only one of these was to emerge as a
vigorous feminist politics, however. To begin with, there was a modest
sexual politics that sought better enforcement of existing rape laws and
reform of the many loopholes that effectively immunized much sexual
assault from legal prosecution. Although rape reform was a matter of
feminist and legislative attention throughout the twentieth century, 39
it was not notably successful in changing the law to protect women's
interests until the 1970s. 4°
In contrast, a paternalist politics of protection was highly success-
ful, albeit ambiguously feminist. Such politics created special rules for
women's participation in the workplace, protecting them and their
families against dangerous or excessive work. 41 Progressives success-
fully defended these laws against charges that they violated the liberty
of contract judges found in the Due Process Clause. Less than three
years after Lochner struck down a state law setting maximum hours
for bakery employees, Muller v. Oregon242 evaluated a state law setting
maximum hours for female employees. A unanimous Supreme Court
239. See generally SUSAN ESTRICH, REAL RAPE (1992) (tracing the slow evolution of
rape law in the twentieth century); Jill Elaine Hasday, Contest and Consent: A Legal History
of Marital Rape, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1373 (2000) (detailing women's resistance to the criminal
law's exemption for marital rape, starting in the nineteenth century but not successfully nul-
lifying or even modifying such exemptions until the late twentieth).
240. See, e.g., People v. Liberta, 474 N.E.2d 567 (N.Y. 1984) (invalidating marital rape
exemption as constituting an invidious discrimination against women and resting upon "ar-
chaic notions" of the family). See generally William E. Nelson, Criminality and Sexual Mo-
rality in New York, 1920-1980, 5 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 265, 301-11, 318-32 (1993) (providing
a detailed case study of sex laws and women's interests in New York).
241. The classic description is Elizabeth Brandeis, Labor Legislation, in 3 HISTORY OF
LABOR IN THE UNITED STATES, 1896-1932, at 399, 457-66 (John Commons ed., 1935). For
modern feminist analyses critical of such laws, see JUDITH BAER, THE CHAINS OF
PROTECTION: THE JUDICIAL RESPONSE TO WOMEN'S LABOR LEGISLATION (1978), and
ALICE KESSLER-HARRIS, OUT TO WORK: A HISTORY OF WAGE-EARNING WOMEN IN THE
UNITED STATES (1982). Also, compare Brief of Amici Curiae ACLU et al., California Sav-
ing & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272 (1987) (No. 85-494) (critical of women's "protec-
tive" legislation), with Brief of Amici Curiae Coalition for Reproductive Equality in the
Workplace et al., Guerra (No. 85-494) (supporting protective legislation when it remedies
women's disadvantages in the workplace).
242. 208 U.S. 412 (1908).
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upheld the Oregon law, based upon the data presented in an amicus
brief drafted by Louis Brandeis. The original "Brandeis brief" demon-
strated not only that such protective legislation was universal in west-
ern culture, but that its rationale was a happy wedding of modern sci-
ence and traditional mores: " 'The reasons for the reduction of the
working day to ten hours - (a) the physical organization of women,
(b) her maternal functions, (c) the rearing and education of the chil-
dren, (d) the maintenance of the home - are all so important and so
far reaching that the need for such reduction need hardly be dis-
cussed.' ",243 Justice Brewer's opinion for the Court ruled that women,
like minors, should be treated by the courts "as needing especial
care. ,244
Most feminists as well as progressives supported this kind of pro-
tective legislation, but the voices of women were underrepresented
and often absent in legislative debates and legal briefs. They could
more often be found in the printed records of the cases. In Radice v.
New York,245 involving a liberty of contract challenge to a law barring
nightwork by women in urban restaurants, working class women testi-
fied at trial that such work was both congenial and necessary for them.
"It is easier to work in a restaurant than it is to do housework. ' 246 The
Court nevertheless upheld the law. After World War II, during which
women did virtually every kind of work men had done and under
similar circumstances, women spoke for themselves and often objected
to laws cutting off economic opportunities for them. Attorney Anne
Davidow challenged a Michigan law barring women from acting as
bartenders unless they were wives or daughters of male owners in
Goesaert v. Cleary.247 Two dozen women testified at trial that they
were barmaids who needed the job to support families and were with-
243. Id. at 420 n.1 (quoting from the Brandeis brief); see id. at 421 ("[H]istory discloses
the fact that woman has always been dependent upon man.").
244. Id. at 421. The Court later upheld similar statutes. See Radice v. New York, 264
U.S. 292 (1924) (Brandeis filed a brief as a supplement to the state's brief by Carl Sherman
in this case); Miller v. Wilson, 236 U.S. 373 (1915) (Brandeis filed a brief in support of the
state); Bosley v. McLaughlin, 236 U.S. 385 (1915) (same); see also Quong Wing v. Kirken-
dall, 223 U.S. 59 (1912) (upholding law exempting laundries run by women from a tax). The
Court eventually struck down this line of "protective" reasoning in Adkins v. Children's
Hospital, 261 U.S. 525 (1923) (Felix Frankfurter, Brandeis's prot~g6, filed a brief in support
of the restrictive statute).
245. 264 U.S. 292 (1924).
246. Record on Appeal at 39, Radice v. New York, 264 U.S. 292 (1924) (1923 Term, No.
176) (testimony of Anna Schmitt). On redirect examination, Schmitt was asked, "There was
nothing in the work which you did ... which a man could not have done, was there?" Id. at
41.
247. 335 U.S. 464 (1948).
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out other skills.248 Notwithstanding the seriousness of these women's
plight and of Davidow's arguments, the Supreme Court spent only a
few minutes discussing the case at conference. 49 Justice Frankfurter's
opinion for the Court treated the challenge as a lark, playfully recall-
ing "the alewife, sprightly and ribald, in Shakespeare" and dishing off
the women's challenges in three pages of the United States Reports.
Nonetheless, Goesaert reflects the social fact that many women no
longer considered such legislation truly "protective" of their interests.
At the same time some women were turning against the kind of
"protective" legislation illustrated by Muller and Goesaert, a large
number were turning against morals laws that laid much more striking
burdens on women. Between 1850 and 1880, most states adopted laws
criminalizing abortion.2 1 The federal Comstock Act of 1873 made it
an obscenity crime to sell or distribute articles of contraception or
abortion; to send such articles in the federal mail system; or to import
such articles from abroad.12 By 1885, twenty-four states had enacted
their own versions of the Comstock Act, many of which were more
stringent than the federal law.253 These laws bore harshly on women,
who assumed most burdens of unwanted pregnancies. Many of those
women mobilized in a politics of pregnancy that was both feminist
(unlike some of the labor protections) and successful (unlike rape re-
form). The most articulate voices for their concerns were those of
Emma Goldman and her follower Margaret Sanger. Goldman's phi-
losophy was that women should have life opportunities of their own
248. Record on Appeal at 18-39, Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948) (1948 Term,
No. 49).
249. I make the observation in text based upon the perfunctory comments in the confer-
ence notes for both Justices Douglas (who took detailed notes) and Burton.
250. Goesaert, 335 U.S. at 465-67. Davidow did win the votes of three dissenting Jus-
tices. Id. at 467-68 (Rutledge, J., dissenting).
251. See JANET FARRELL BRODIE, CONTRACEPTION AND ABORTION IN NINETEENTH-
CENTURY AMERICA (1994); JAMES C. MOHR, ABORTION IN AMERICA: THE ORIGINS AND
EVOLUTION OF NATIONAL POLICY, 1800-1900 (1978); LESLIE REAGAN, WHEN ABORTION
WAS A CRIME: WOMEN, MEDICINE, AND LAW IN THE UNITED STATES, 1967-1973 (1997).
For nineteenth century documents, see 2 ABORTION LAW IN THE UNITED STATES (Jenni
Parrish ed., 1995).
252. 17 Stat. 598 (1873), codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1461 et seq.; 19 U.S.C. § 1305 et seq.
("An Act for the Suppression of Trade in, and Circulation of, obscene Literature and Arti-
cles of immoral Use"). See generally BRODIE, supra note 251, at 255-56, 263-66, 281-88;
HEYWOOD BROUN & MARGARET LEECH, ANTHONY COMSTOCK: ROUNDSMAN OF THE
LORD (1927); ROBERT W. HANEY, COMSTOCKERY IN AMERICA: PATTERNS OF
CENSORSHIP AND CONTROL (1960).
253. See BRODIE, supra note 251, at 257 (stating that fourteen states barred any speech
providing information on contraception and abortion; eleven states criminalized possession
of such information; seventeen states barred doctors from discussing contraception with
their patients); see also C. THOMAS DIENES, LAW, POLITICS, AND BIRTH CONTROL 33-48
(1972).
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choosing - and not those dictated by their fathers, husbands, chil-
dren, or the state.254
If Goldman was the theorist of a new women's politics of claiming
control over their own bodies, Sanger was the organizer and imple-
menter 5  The government censored both women: Goldman was de-
ported for her antiwar speech in 1917; Sanger left the country after she
was arrested for violating the Comstock Act in August 1914.256 The
trial of her husband William in September 1915 for distributing copies
of Woman Rebel inflamed public opinion sufficiently to impel the U.S.
Attorney to drop all charges against Margaret, who returned trium-
phantly in 1916.257 She then opened the nation's first birth control
clinic, in Brooklyn, New York. The New York police arrested Sanger
and her sister, Ethel Byrne, for violating a pre-Comstock state law
prohibiting circulation of "articles of indecent or immoral use," in-
cluding articles "for the prevention of conception. '28 The sisters were
both convicted in well-publicized trials and went to jail as martyrs for
the new cause.
The New York Court of Appeals affirmed Sanger's conviction,259
and she appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court. Jonah Goldstein's brief,
including a supplement (compiled by Sanger) on the medical and so-
ciological "Case for Birth Control," is a landmark in the history of
women's rights litigation. The brief's central normative point was a
wedding of women's sexual politics of rape and their politics of preg-
nancy: "The State has no more right to compel 'motherhood' than the
254. Emma Goldman, Marriage and Love (1910), reprinted in WOMEN'S RIGHTS IN THE
UNITED STATES: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 207-08 (Winston E. Langley & Vivian C. Fox
eds., 1994) (criticizing marriage because it "makes a parasite of a woman, an absolute de-
pendent"); see BRODIE, supra note 251, at 36 (stating that Goldman advocated contracep-
tion because it would free women to enjoy sex without worrying about pregnancy); Hasday,
supra note 239, at 1413-33 (finding the roots of Goldman's arguments in nineteenth-century
feminism).
255. There are many excellent pieces on Sanger and the birth control movement. See
ELLEN CHESLER, WOMAN OF VALOR: MARGARET SANGER AND THE BIRTH CONTROL
MOVEMENT IN AMERICA (1992); LINDA GORDON, WOMAN'S BODY, WOMAN'S RIGHT: A
SOCIAL HISTORY OF BIRTH CONTROL IN AMERICA (1976); DAVID M. KENNEDY, BIRTH
CONTROL IN AMERICA: THE CAREER OF MARGARET SANGER (1970); JAMES REED, THE
BIRTH CONTROL MOVEMENT AND AMERICAN SOCIETY: FROM PRIVATE VICE TO PUBLIC
VIRTUE (1984). There are outstanding sources on the legal and litigation features of the
birth control movement as well. See CHESLER, supra; DAVID J. GARROW, LIBERTY AND
SEXUALITY: THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY AND THE MAKING OF ROE V. WADE 1-269 (1994)
[hereinafter GARROW, LIBERTY AND SEXUALITY].
256. See CHESLER, supra note 255, at 99. In 1913, the Post Office refused to mail The
Call because of Sanger's feminist libertarian column but relented after Sanger went to court
with a First Amendment claim. See id. at 65-66.
257. See id. at 127-29, 138-40.
258. N.Y. Penal Law § 1142.
259. People v. Sanger, 118 N.E. 637 (N.Y. 1918).
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individual to compel [sexual] relations.''26 The state's suppression of
contraceptive devices and information was a severe and unacceptable
intrusion into a married woman's personal liberty protected by the
Due Process Clause.261 "In this enlightened age, when we are accus-
tomed to listen to the discussion of the rights of women to economic
freedom and independence ... does it not appear most unreasonable
that she be deprived of the freedom of her person? '262 The brief also
powerfully argued that the breadth of the state's prohibition was often
a deprivation of life as well as liberty, because pregnancy for many
women was life-threatening. By barring even dissemination of infor-
mation that could be life-saving to these women, the state was placing
their lives at risk.263 Finally, Goldstein's brief maintained that the stat-
ute was irrational in its effect and, therefore, unconstitutional even if
no fundamental interest were involved. That is, the state's bar served
no legitimate state interest and, indeed, undermined many legitimate
ones, such as the health and safety of women, families, and children.26
Goldstein's and Sanger's massively documented and normatively
charged brief was met by one argument from the state: the social and
economic aspects of the birth control issue are subject to reasonable
debate which should either be left to the legislature or should be re-
solved in favor of regulation, as most states and the federal govern-
ment had precisely the same kind of laws.265 This argument apparently
prevailed with the Supreme Court, which dismissed Sanger's appeal as
raising no substantial federal question.266 The Lochner-era Court was
not receptive to an interpretation of due process protecting sexual as
opposed to family liberty.267 On the constitutional front, Sanger v. New
260. Brief on Behalf of the Plaintiff-in-Error at 31, Sanger v. New York, 251 U.S. 537
(1919) (1919 Term, No. 75) (emphasis in original); see id. at 39 ("[A] married woman has the
fundamental right to determine whether she shall or shall not conceive and when she shall
not conceive."); id. at 43 (stating that men and women have a "natural right to say how many
children they will bring into the world and when").
261. See id. at 43-48 (relying on Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), among other
authorities).
262. Id. at 45.
263. See id. at 50-57; cf. id. at 51-52 (this problem is not solved by the statutory allow-
ance for physicians to prescribe articles for the "cure or prevention of disease"). The brief
argued that a law barring abortions would still violate the Due Process Clause if it did not
include an exception for situations where the mother's life was at stake. Id. at 54-55.
264. See id. at 33-34 (arguing that "too frequent pregnancies" injure women's health and
decrease the "virility of the children"); id. at 35-36 (positing that the statutory bar to useful
information leads many women to resort to celibacy and abortion, harmful to both women
and society) id. at 36-38 (statute contributes to poverty, overcrowding, illegitimacy, high in-
fant mortality, and increased numbers of "unwanted" and "feeble-minded" children).
265. See Brief for Defendant-in-Error at 9-12, Sanger (1919 Term, No. 75).
266. Sanger v. New York, 251 U.S. 537 (1919) (per curiam).
267. See Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927) (upholding state sterilization law).
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York failed in the short term. But the constitutional failure begat a
statutory success, for in Sanger the New York Court of Appeals con-
strued its state law as authorizing physicians to prescribe contracep-
tives for their patients to treat "disease," which the court broadly de-
fined to include any "alteration in the state of body... [which]
caus[ed] or threaten[ed] pain and sickness. '268 As a practical matter,
that decision opened up a strategy by which birth control clinics could
operate in New York, and Sanger created a clinic run by doctors in
New York City and in 1922 founded the American Birth Control
League. Harassment by authorities, and a raid by the police in 1929,
only fueled public support for the birth control movement. By 1935,
local leagues existed in more than half the states, and there were as
many as 300 clinics, typically run by doctors.269
Because birth control advocates were not able to bestir Congress
to repeal the federal Comstock Act,27 ° that law remained a potential
problem, which activists attacked in court as violating the then-anemic
First Amendment. Mary Dennett was prosecuted under the Comstock
Act for mailing sex education materials. Following Morris Ernst's
brief for Dennett, Judge Augustus Hand of the Second Circuit refused
to interpret the statute to apply to "serious instruction regarding sex
matters unless the terms in which the information is conveyed are
clearly indecent."27' Judge Swan applied similar reasoning to rule, in a
trademark case, that contraceptives could be legally imported into the
United States, so long as they might be capable of legitimate use.272
The judicial evisceration of the Act was completed in United States v.
One Package.273 Judge Hand's opinion reasoned that Congress did not
intend to bar importation of diaphragms by Dr. Hannah Stone, who
ran Sanger's clinic in New York City; a doctor's goal of promoting
health and saving lives was surely not "immoral" within the legislative
intendment. 274 The experience of birth control advocates with the
Comstock Act was echoed at the state level: they were able to gain
268. People v. Sanger, 118 N.E. 637, 638 (N.Y. 1918) (quoting Webster's Dictionary).
269. See CHESLER, supra note 255, at 231.
270. On birth control advocates' inability to move Congress to repeal the Comstock
Act, see id. at 232-33 (detailing Dennett's 1923 effort), and id. at 341-48 (detailing Sanger's
1934 effort).
271. United States v. Dennett, 39 F.2d 564, 569 (2d Cir.1930); see Appellant's Brief at
11-13, 32-33, Dennett (No. 238).
272. Youngs Rubber Corp. v. C.I. Lee & Co., 45 F.2d 103 (2d Cir. 1930); see also Davis
v. United States, 62 F.2d 473 (6th Cir. 1933) (following Youngs Rubber).
273. 86 F.2d 737 (2d Cir. 1936).
274. Id. at 739-40; cf id. at 740 (Learned Hand, J., concurring) (remarking on the highly
dynamic reading of the statute by his cousin). Again, the court's judgment carefully tracked
Morris Ernst's Brief for Claimant-Appellee at 7-11, 19-23, 38, One Package (No. 62).
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administrative and judicial acquiescence of advice and distribution of
contraceptives under the auspices of doctors' prescriptions. By the be-
ginning of World War II, thirty-six states had medically-supervised
birth control clinics supported at least in part by public funds, and an-
other ten allowed such clinics to operate privately because of statutory
loopholes allowing contraceptives by prescription.275
Sanger and her allies were not satisfied with this progress, in part
because the medical-exception strategy left many poor and working
class women, as well as single women, without sufficient access to con-
traceptives. Also, this strategy failed in Roman Catholic Connecticut
and Massachusetts, whose judiciaries refused to construe their anti-
contraceptive statutes to allow a broad medical-needs exception.
276
These decisions closed down the flourishing birth control clinics in
those states, and activists resorted to constitutional claims, just as they
had in response to earlier setbacks. In 1941, Dr. Wilder Tileston sued
to nullify Connecticut's anti-contraception law on the ground that it
unconstitutionally barred him from prescribing contraceptives needed
to protect the health and lives of his female patients. The state courts
rejected his claims on the merits, and the U.S. Supreme Court dis-
missed the constitutional appeal in Tileston v. Ullman,277 on the ground
that the doctor had no standing to raise the life and liberty depriva-
tions of his patients.
Planned Parenthood (as Sanger's birth control organization was
renamed in 1942) of Connecticut remained interested in challenges to
Connecticut's law. Director Estelle Griswold worked with Professor
Fowler Harper of the Yale Law School and lawyer Catherine
Roraback to bring a new challenge on behalf of several patients (in-
cluding a married couple) and a doctor in Poe v. Ullman.278 Planned
Parenthood, the ACLU, and several dozen doctors argued that the
married couple enjoyed a right of privacy protecting their intimate
relations.279 A majority of the internally fragmented Court went along
with a per curiam opinion dismissing the appeal. Justices Douglas and
275. See Brief of Appellants app. C at 30, Tileston v. Ullman, 318 U.S. 44 (1943) (1942
Term, No. 420) (map of "States Having Contraceptive Services Under Medical Supervi-
sion").
276. State v. Nelson, 11 A.2d 856 (Conn. 1940); Commonwealth v. Gardner, 15 N.E.2d
222 (Mass. 1938); see also GARROW, LIBERTY AND SEXUALITY, supra note 255, at 44-78
(providing a detailed account of the litigation and strategic context of these cases).
277. 318 U.S. 44 (1943) (per curiam); see also GARROW, LIBERTY AND SEXUALITY, su-
pra note 255, at 94-106 (providing a detailed account of the Tileston litigation).
278. 367 U.S. 497 (1961) (dismissing appeal of Buxton v. Ullman, 156 A.2d 508 (Conn.
1959)); see also GARROW, LIBERTY AND SEXUALITY, supra note 255, at 152-95 (providing
detailed account of the Poe litigation).
279. See Section II.B (discussing the briefs in Poe, Griswold, Eisenstadt, and Roe v.
Wade).
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Harlan wrote impassioned dissenting opinions, arguing that there was
a justiciable case and that the statute was unconstitutional.28 °
Poe's odd disposition was a bit of a fluke, and the Yale professors
and Planned Parenthood pressed one final challenge. In 1965, the
Supreme Court finally struck down the Connecticut contraception law
in Griswold v. Connecticut.28 Five Justices joined Douglas's opinion
for the Court, which carved a "zone of privacy" for married couples
out of the "penumbras" of various guarantees in the Bill of Rights;
282
three of the majority Justices also relied on the Ninth Amendment to
support the recognition of a nontextual right of privacy;283 two Justices
concurred in the judgment on the ground that the law deprived plain-
tiffs of their liberty without due process; 284 and two Justices dis-
sented.285 Notwithstanding the doctrinal diversity, at least six Justices
spoke clearly to this effect: married couples have a fundamental right
to plan their families and enjoy consensual sexual intercourse without
interference from the state.
In spite of its narrow and offbeat reasoning, Griswold was a sensa-
tional vindication of Margaret Sanger's politics of protection.2 86
Massachusetts amended its law to allow married couples (but not sin-
gle persons) to obtain contraceptives with a doctor's prescription. A
divided Supreme Court expanded Griswold to strike down that state's
discrimination between married and unmarried couples in Eisenstadt
v. Baird.287 Justice Brennan's majority opinion for a seven-Justice
Court ruled that, "[i]f the right of privacy means anything, it is the
right of the individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted
governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a per-
son as the decision whether to bear or begat a child. 288 Even more
280. Poe, 367 U.S. at 509 (Douglas, J., dissenting); id. at 522 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
281. 381 U.S. 479 (1965); see also GARROW, LIBERTY AND SEXUALITY, supra note 255,
at 196-269 (providing a detailed account of the Griswold litigation).
282. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484 (Douglas, J., for the Court).
283. Id. at 486-99 (Goldberg, J., joined by Warren, C.J., and Brennan, J., concurring).
284. Id. at 500-02 (Harlan, J., concurring in the judgment); id. at 502-07 (White, J., con-
curring in the judgment).
285. Id. at 507-27 (Black, J., dissenting); id. at 527-31 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
286. On the very positive reception of the Griswold result and its privacy right, see, e.g.,
GARROW, LIBERTY AND SEXUALITY, supra note 255, at 263-67; Lackland H. Bloom, Jr.,
The Legacy of Griswold, 16 OHIO N.U.L. REV. 511, 527 (1989); Symposium on the Griswold
Case and the Right of Privacy, 64 MICH. L. REV. 197 (1965). Between 1963 and 1965, popular
support for the proposition, "Should birth control information be available to anyone that
wants it?," went up from 74% to 81% (from 53% to 78% among Catholics). GEORGE H.
GALLUP, THE GALLUP POLL, 1935-1971, at 1823, 1915-16 (1972).
287. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
288. Id. at 453. Brennan spoke for himself and Justices Douglas, Stewart, and Marshall.
Justices White and Blackmun concurred in the result on narrow grounds, and Chief Justice
Burger dissented. (Newly appointed Justices Rehnquist and Powell did not participate.)
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momentous was Griswold's effect on another dimension of women's
maturing politics of protection: the right not only to prevent preg-
nancy, but also to terminate it.
Many early birth control advocates (including Goldman and
Sanger) had personally favored a woman's freedom to choose abor-
tion, but that issue was purposely downplayed in the campaign to lib-
eralize contraception laws. 9 During the 1950s and 1960s, there was
growing interest in liberalizing nineteenth century abortion laws, and
by the late 1960s large numbers of women and doctors were organized
as a new "pro-choice" movement for repeal rather than just liberaliza-
tion of laws prohibiting abortions." Unlike the birth control move-
ment, the pro-choice movement achieved immediate successes in some
state legislatures, in part because large numbers of women were allied
with the medical establishment (whose members feared prosecution
under the older laws). By 1970, four states - Hawaii, Alaska, New
York, and Washington - had decriminalized abortion, and twelve
others (including California) had liberalized their laws. Buoyed by
Planned Parenthood's success in the courts, the pro-choice movement
immediately sought to constitutionalize its members' claims. Courts all
over the United States read Griswold to protect single women seeking
to abort unwanted pregnancies. Abortion statutes - liberalized laws
as well as archaic ones - fell right and left.291
The Supreme Court granted review in two of the cases, one in-
volving Texas's nineteenth century law, which had no exception for
the mother's health, and one involving Georgia's recent law, allowing
abortions if approved by the mother's doctor and two others on a hos-
pital panel. Sarah Weddington, the lawyer for "Jane Roe" in the Texas
289. See Brief on Behalf of the Plaintiff-in-Error at 35, Sanger v. New York, 251 U.S.
537 (1919) (1919 Term, No. 75) (arguing that anti-contraception laws lead to more "danger-
ous abortions"); Morris Ernst & Harriet Pilpel, Release from the Comstock Era, BIRTH
CONTROL REV., Dec. 1939 at 24 (sharply distinguishing abortion as "the antithesis of con-
traception").
290. There is a formidable literature on the evolving legislative and judicial campaigns
of the early pro-choice movement. See GARROW, LIBERTY AND SEXUALITY, supra note 255,
at 270-334 (providing an account of early voices, from 1933 to 1967); id. at 335-88 (providing
an account from reform to repeal, 1967 to 1969); LAWRENCE LADER, ABORTION II:
MAKING THE REVOLUTION (1973); KRISTIN LUKER, ABORTION AND THE POLITICS OF
MOTHERHOOD (1984); ROSEMARY NOSSIFF, BEFORE ROE: ABORTION POLICY IN THE
STATES 35-37, 65-68 (2001) (examining the different tactics of the ALI, NOW, and radical
feminists); SUZANNE STAGGENBORG, THE PRO-CHOICE MOVEMENT: ORGANIZATION AND
ACTIVISM IN THE ABORTION CONFLICT (1991); REAGAN, supra note 251, at 216-34.
291. See Abele v. Markle, 369 F. Supp. 807 (D. Conn. 1973); Doe v. Scott, 321 F. Supp.
1385 (N.D. Ill. 1971); Roe v. Wade, 314 F. Supp. 1217 (N.D. Tex. 1970), affd, 410 U.S. 113
(1973); Doe v. Bolton, 319 F. Supp. 1048 (N.D. Ga. 1970), affd in part, 410 U.S. 179 (1973);
People v. Belous, 458 P.2d 194 (Cal. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 915 (1970): see also United
States v. Vuitch, 305 F. Supp. 1032 (D.D.C. 1969) (striking down D.C. abortion law as
vague), rev'd, 402 U.S. 62 (1971) (upholding statute based upon liberal construction of al-
lowance for abortion to protect mother's "health").
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case, argued that "pregnancy to a woman is perhaps one of the most
determinative aspects of her life. It disrupts her body. It disrupts her
education. It disrupts her employment." Because of this impact, this is
a "matter which is of such fundamental and basic concern to the
woman.., that she should be allowed to make the choice as to
whether to continue or terminate her pregnancy. 29 2 The state ob-
jected that the controversy was not justiciable and, if justiciable, that
the rights of the human fetus trumped those of the mother.293 After re-
argument, the Supreme Court achieved a surprising consensus. Justice
Blackmun's opinion for a seven-Justice Court ruled in Roe v. Wade
294
that the Texas law unconstitutionally burdened a woman's due process
liberty to control her body and choose an abortion in the first trimes-
ter. In Doe v. Bolton,295 Justice Blackmun's opinion focused on the de-
cision of the mother made in consultation with her doctor and struck
down most of the other procedural and substantive obstacles
Georgia's recent law imposed on the mother. The Court's decisions in
the abortion cases were an international sensation, but for my pur-
poses they are the near-apotheosis of women's politics of protection as
it concerned pregnancy: after 1973, the constitutional baseline was that
a woman is, as a matter of constitutional law, the primary decision-
maker as to issues of conceiving and bearing a child.
2. Feminists' Politics of Recognition, 1961-76
Like people of color, but more successfully, women engaged in a
vigorous politics of recognition during the late nineteenth century. 96
Unlike people of color's, their politics won some notable victories
early in the twentieth. The Nineteenth Amendment was adopted
against traditionalist arguments that women's role should be limited to
the domestic sphere, and it advanced the norm that women's abilities
were on a par with men's. 7 The early birth control movement was
part of such a politics. Emma Goldman maintained that
292. Oral Argument, Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), in 75 LANDMARK BRIEFS, su-
pra note 199, at 787; see Brief for Appellants at 99-115, Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)
(No. 70-18); see also id. at 94-99 (relying on a right to receive medical care for the protection
of the mother's health as well).
293. Brief for Appellee at 9-20, Roe (No. 70-18) (arguing that the issue is nonjusticia-
ble); id. at 26-54 (arguing that the rights of the fetus trump those of the mother).
294. 410 U.S. 113 (1973); see also Sections II.A.3 & I.B (discussing the Court's delibera-
tions in Roe). See generally GARROW, LIBERTY AND SEXUALITY, supra note 255, at 389-599
(providing a detailed account of the Roe litigation and the Court's internal deliberations).
295. 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
296. See Ellen Carol Du Bois, Outgrowing the Compact of the Fathers: Equal Rights,
Woman Suffrage, and the United States Constitution, 1820-1878, 74 J. AM. HIST. 836 (1987).
297. See Siegel, She the People, supra note 237.
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[a woman's] development, her freedom, her independence, must come
from and through herself. First, by asserting herself as a personality, and
not as a sex commodity. Second, by refusing to bear children, unless she
wants them, by refusing to be a servant to God, the State, society, the
husband, the family etc., by making her life simpler, but deeper and
richer.
298
Potentially important for women's politics of recognition was the
proposed Equal Rights Amendment ("ERA"), first introduced in
Congress in 1923. Yet many feminists were appalled by Goldman's call
for sexual liberation and opposed the ERA on the grounds that it
would preempt labor-protective legislation299 or wrongfully denied
women's genuine difference from men.3 O These were among the rea-
sons the feminist politics of recognition stalled or slowed down after
the Nineteenth Amendment. °1 It did not disappear, however. The
ERA continued to be debated among feminists and within Congress in
the 1940s and 1950s .1 2 Most states eased their exclusions of women
from juries, either placing their service on a par with men's or allowing
them to serve unless they opted out. Although masked for the most
part during the 1930s, the birth control movement continued to be
animated, in part, by an insistence that women have the freedom that
Goldman had asserted.
Women's politics of recognition picked up speed after World War
II, and the renewed interest showed up immediately in constitutional
cases such as Goesaert.°3 Women who had proved themselves fully
equal to men during the war were often unwilling to re-assume their
subordinate status after the war. In constitutional law, this attitude
was displayed most clearly in the cases challenging women's exclusion
or exemption from jury service. Women generally did not serve on ju-
298. Emma Goldman, Woman Sufferage, WOMAN REBEL, June 1914, at 4; see also
CANDACE FALK, LOVE, ANARCHY, AND EMMA GOLDMAN (1985); EMMA GOLDMAN, The
Tragedy of Woman's Emancipation, in ANARCHISM AND OTHER ESSAYS 219,237 (1910).
299. The League of Women's Voters and the Women's Bureau opposed the ERA for
this reason. GLADYS HARRISON, NATIONAL LEAGUE OF WOMEN VOTERS, AGAINST
"EQUAL RIGHTS" BY CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT 11-12 (1928); see RUTH ROSEN, THE
WORLD SPLIT OPEN: HOW THE MODERN WOMEN'S MOVEMENT CHANGED AMERICA 27,
66 (2000) [hereinafter ROSEN, THE WORLD SPLIT OPEN].
300. See JOSEPHINE DONOVAN, FEMINIST THEORY: THE INTELLECTUAL TRADITIONS
OF AMERICAN FEMINISM 75-76 (2001); Katherine M. Franke, The Central Mistake of Sex
Discrimination Law: The Disaggregation of Sex From Gender, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 16
(1995).
301. See generally Verta Taylor, Social Movement Continuity: The Women's Movement
in Abeyance, 54 AM. SOC. REV. 761 (1989).
302. See CYNTHIA HARRISON, ON ACCOUNT OF SEX: THE POLITICS OF WOMEN'S
ISSUES, 1945-1968, at 3-38 (1988) [hereinafter HARRISON, ON ACCOUNT OF SEX].
303. Anne Davidow's brief in that case argued that the barmaid law was an "unfair dis-
crimination against women owners of bars" and "women bartenders." Brief of Appellants at
6, Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948) (1947 Term, No. 49).
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ries before World War I. Once women gained the right to vote, some
state courts construed their state jury service laws to include women
because the laws tied jury venires to voting lists. Nonetheless, as the
nation entered World War II, only thirteen states required the same
jury service of women that they required of men; fifteen states allowed
women to opt out of compulsory jury service; twenty states disquali-
fied women as a class.3°
After the war, the situation shifted rapidly, and the Supreme Court
gave it a push in 1946. Relying on a federal statute; the Court over-
turned the conviction of Edna and Donald Ballard for promotion of a
fraudulent religious program, because the federal judge excluded
women from the jury venire in Ballard v. United States."' In response
to the government's argument that the admittedly erroneous discrimi-
nation was not prejudicial to defendants' jury trial rights, Justice
Douglas responded that women and men are "not fungible; a commu-
nity made up exclusively of one is different from a community com-
posed of both." He then posed the question: "[I]f the shoe were on the
other foot, who would claim that a jury was truly representative of the
community if all men were intentionally and systematically excluded
from the panel? ' '3' A Court majority declined to constitutionalize that
principle in Fay v. New York,3"7 but four dissenters in that case main-
tained that a "blue ribbon" jury substantially excluding women and
working class people violated the Equal Protection Clause. °8
After Ballard and Fay, the complete exclusion of women dropped
away. By 1961, only three states retained complete exclusions. Of the
forty-seven states where women were eligible, twenty-one states had
no special gender-based rules, eight states allowed women to be ex-
cused if their service would create hardships for their families, fifteen
states and the District of Columbia allowed women to opt out for any
reason, and three states permitted women to serve only if they opted
in.309 Gwendolyn Hoyt killed her husband in Florida, one of the states
in the last group. A jury of twelve men found her guilty of murder, and
304. REPORT TO THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE COMMITFEE ON SELECTION OF
JURORS 23 (1942), noted in Fay v. New York, 332 U.S. 261, 289 & n.31 (1947).
305. 329 U.S. 187 (1946).
306. Id. at 193. The federal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 411, required that jurors in federal court
should have the same qualifications as those of the state in which the court was sitting (Cali-
fornia, which did allow women to serve on juries). The Court had construed the statute as
reflecting a design to make the jury "a cross-section of the community" and representative of
it. Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 86 (1942).
307. 332 U.S. 261 (1947).
308. Id. at 296-300 (Murphy, J., joined by Black, Douglas & Rutledge, JJ., dissenting).
309. See Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57, 62-63 (1961). For more background, see LINDA K.
KERBER, NO CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO BE LADIES (1998).
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she appealed on the ground that the Equal Protection Clause prohib-
ited the exclusion of women from the jury that convicted her. Her
counsel on appeal argued that Ballard's federal statutory rule should
be extended to the states as a matter of equal protection; the state's
reason for continuing to excuse women - their families' need for
them - was wholly inapplicable to the one-third of Florida women
who worked outside the home. I°
Dorothy Kenyon persuaded the ACLU to befriend Hoyt on the
appeal, the Union's first major feminist Supreme Court filing. 11 Her
remarkable amicus brief argued that representation on juries is an im-
portant civil right, as illustrated by the experience of blacks, who did
not achieve genuine citizenship until the Court required that they be
invited to its burdens such as jury service.312 The same was true of
women. They continued to be excluded, either by law or in practice,
because "the thinking of older times, when women were no part of the
body politic," suggested that jury service would detract from women's
"primary duties" of housekeeping and childrearing. This rationale was
decidedly anachronistic, as "a revolution has taken place in the lives
and status of women." '313 Not only was the discrimination against all
women therefore unreasonable, but it was a discrimination that the
"fully emancipated, fully enfranchised woman citizen" would no
longer tolerate:
It is a belittlement of her accomplishment in overcoming that long time
sex defect of hers to suggest, even by implication, that even in this day
and age she is perhaps still not qualified or capable of performing this
simple act of good citizenship on the same terms as men. It is a genuine
humiliation and degradation of her spirit.
14
Kenyon's brief epitomizes what I am calling women's politics of rec-
ognition: in demanding equal respect, women were demanding the
same duties as well as benefits that men had and insisted on complete
rather than token integration into the public as well as private institu-
tions of the nation.
The Warren Court did not see matters this way. At conference, the
Chief Justice presented a diluted version of Kenyon's arguments and
310. Brief for Appellant at 10-19, Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57 (1961) (1961 Term, No.
31).
311. See SUSAN M. HARTMANN, THE OTHER FEMINISTS: ACTIvISTS IN THE LIBERAL
ESTABLISHMENT 53-71 (1998) (noting that Kenyon, an ACLU board member for forty
years, was the only voice of feminism in the organization from 1930 until she was joined by
Harriet Pilpel in 1962 and Pauli Murray in 1965).
312. Brief of Amici Curiae Florida Civil Liberties Union and American Civil Liberties
Union at 8-12, Hoyt (1961 Term, No. 31).
313. Id. at 20.
314. Id. at 26.
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urged reversal on the ground that Florida's opt-in system generated
juries that were ridiculously unbalanced under the Ballard criteria.315
Justices Black and Douglas immediately agreed, but the remainder of
the Court went with Justices Frankfurter and Whittaker, who main-
tained that there was "no systematic exclusion" of women similar to
that found in Ballard or the Norris line of cases.316 Frankfurter smartly
assigned the case to Justice Harlan, the finest lawyer on the Court. His
opinion in Hoyt v. Florida317 was a masterly treatment of the largely
uncharted issue of how to handle sex-based classifications and of the
much-litigated issue (in the race cases) of discriminatory application of
a statutory standard. Even the dissenters in conference felt impelled to
join part of Harlan's opinion."' In this fashion, the Warren Court was
unanimous in denying women's incipient politics of recognition in
what turned out to be that Court's only important sex discrimination
case.
Hoyt cast into bold relief the fact that the Supreme Court had
never struck down a sex discrimination as unconstitutional.319 Ironi-
cally, the decision came just as the women's movement was taking
flight again. Responding to mounting feminist demands, President
Kennedy in 1961 established the President's Commission on the Status
of Women, which served as a consciousness-raising and idea-sharing
forum for feminist lawyers and thinkers from all around the country.32°
Pauli Murray, a civil rights lawyer working toward her J.S.D. at Yale
Law School, drafted a remarkable memorandum for the Commission.
The memorandum argued that the Equal Protection Clause could be
interpreted to question sex-based discrimination for the same reasons
the Court had deployed it against race-based discrimination: sex dis-
crimination (like race discrimination) rested upon a natural law under-
standing of "inherent differences" that had been deployed to support
disadvantages and social inferiority of women; the naturalized view of
sex differences rested upon unproven stereotypes or myths about
315. See Douglas Conference Notes for Hoyt v. Florida (Oct. 20, 1961), in Douglas
Papers, supra note 192, Container 1269.
316. See id. Justice Brennan was a "tentative" vote for affirmance along those grounds.
317. 368 U.S. 57 (1961).
318. See id. at 69 (Warren, C.J., and Black & Douglas, JJ., concurring in part).
319. Contrast Ballard, 329 U.S. 187 (1946), where the Court struck down a total exclu-
sion of women in a federal proceeding because it violated a federal statutory mandate, with
Fay, 332 U.S. 261 (1947) (later in the 1946 Term), where the Court upheld against equal
protection attack a substantial exclusion of women in a state proceeding, and Hoyt, 368 U.S.
57 (1961), where the Court continued to follow Fay even after most states had adopted in-
clusionary policies. But cf. White v. Crook, 251 F.Supp. 401 (M.D. Ala. 1966) (three-judge
court) (striking down Alabama's exclusion of all women from juries; distinguishing Hoyt as
involving unproven charges of de facto discrimination).
320. See HARRISON, ON ACCOUNT OF SEX, supra note 302, at 109-37.
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women that were usually an irrational basis for subordinating them;
like blacks, women needed to mobilize against pervasive state dis-
crimination through the formation of an organization like the
NAACP.3 1
Murray's arguments not only persuaded the President's
Commission that "[e]quality of rights under the law for all persons,
male or female, is so basic to democracy and its commitment to the ul-
timate value of the individual that it must be reflected in the funda-
mental law of the land, 3 22 but also helped persuade the ACLU to add
sex equality to its civil rights agenda.323 Moreover, Murray's memo-
randum served to bridge the concerns of various civil rights activists:
her Fourteenth Amendment strategy sought equality for women (de-
sired by liberal ERA feminists), but without sacrificing laws genuinely
remedying women's disadvantages in the workplace (desired by labor
feminists and ERA opponents). For good measure, Murray, an
African American who had been active in the civil rights movement,
sought to unite blacks and women in a common campaign against
prejudice and discrimination.324
Murray's arguments found their way into the congressional de-
bates over the addition of "sex discrimination" to the jobs title of the
Kennedy Administration's civil rights bill. Although the addition was
propounded by anti-civil rights (but pro-ERA) Representative
Howard Smith of Virginia, Murray and other feminists supported it
and ensured that it was preserved in the final statute.3 25 The EEOC,
321. Pauli Murray, A Proposal to Reexamine the Applicability of the Fourteenth
Amendment to State Laws and Practices Which Discriminate on the Basis of Sex Per Se (Dec.
1962), in President's Commission on the Status of Women Papers, Schlesinger Library [Rad-
cliffe Inst.], Box 8, Folder 62, discussed in HARRISON, ON ACCOUNT OF SEX, supra note 302,
at 126-34; Mary Becker, The Sixties Shift to Formal Equality and the Courts: An Argument
for Pragmatism and Politics, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 209, 222-31 (1998).
322. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON THE STATUS OF WOMEN, AMERICAN WOMEN 44-45
(1963).
323. Dorothy Kenyon in 1963 presented Murray's memo (whose arguments paralleled
those she had pressed in Hoyt) to the ACLU board, which was supportive. HARTMANN, su-
pra note 311, at 62-63. Murray joined the board in 1965, id. at 54, and she and Kenyon in
1966 urged the ACLU to go on record against legislation classifying on the basis of sex as
"inherently discriminatory and unconstitutional." Id. at 72. Although they attracted allies
within the ACLU (Norman Dorsen and Mel Wulf), they were not able to persuade the
board to support constitutional equality for women until 1970, from which followed the es-
tablishment of the Women's Rights Project. Id. at 80-83; see also Nadine Strossen, The
American Civil Liberties Union and Women's Rights, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1940, 1950-55
(1991) (describing the origins of the ACLU's role in women's rights litigation).
324. See Pauli Murray & Mary 0. Eastwood, Jane Crow and the Law: Sex Discrimina-
tion and Title VII, 34 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 232 (1965); Serena Mayeri, Note, "A Common
Fate of Discrimination": Race-Gender Analogies in Legal and Historical Perspective, 110
YALE L.J. 1045 (2001).
325. See HARRISON, ON ACCOUNT OF SEX, supra note 302, at 176-82; PAULI MURRAY,
THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF A BLACK ACTIVIST, FEMINIST, LAWYER, PRIEST, AND POET
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however, refused to make sex discrimination a priority in its enforce-
ment of the new law, a stance that drew strong protests. When officials
ignored their complaints at a 1966 conference on women's status,
Murray, Betty Friedan, and other feminists stormed out in protest and
founded the National Organization for Women ("NOW"). As Friedan
later recalled, "it only took a few of us to get together to ignite the
spark" that grassroots feminist consciousness raising had already cre-
ated, "and it spread like a nuclear chain reaction. 326 In its statement
of purpose, NOW went beyond the ambivalent agenda of the
President's Commission and demanded not just formal equality for
women, but also a dismantling of the separate spheres ideology.
Women should not only have all the (public) economic and social op-
portunities as men, but men should also share in the (private) respon-
sibilities of home and childrearing.327 In 1967, NOW set out an ambi-
tious national agenda, including serious enforcement of the Equal Pay
Act and Title VII by the EEOC and the courts; adoption of the ERA;
and repeal of abortion laws.32 As Cynthia Harrison has argued,
NOW's agenda reflected the first coherent feminist philosophy of the
century, one that combined an updated politics of protection with a
new politics of recognition: childbearing should be separated from
both sexual intimacy and from childrearing; both mothers and fathers
are responsible for family as well as work.329
Like the NAACP, NOW established a Legal Defense and
Education Fund to litigate issues of women's equality. In 1971, the
ACLU established its Women's Rights Project, headed by Professor
Ruth Bader Ginsburg. Representing a new generation of litigators,
Ginsburg followed Kenyon and Murray in pressing the Court to rule
that women have all the same legal rights and duties as men.33° These
354-58 (1987); Jo Freeman, How "Sex" Got into Title VII Persistent Opportunism as a
Maker of Public Policy, 9 LAW & INEQUALITY 163, 163-84 (1991).
326. JUDITH HOLE & ELLEN LEVINE, REBIRTH OF FEMINISM 81 (1971) (quoting Betty
Friedan, N.O.W. - How It Began, WOMEN SPEAKING, Apr. 1967, at 4). See generally
CAROLINE BIRD, BORN FEMALE: THE HIGH COST OF KEEPING WOMEN DOWN 209 (rev.
ed. 1970); Jo Ann Freeman, The Origins of the Women's Liberation Movement, 78 AM. J.
Soc. 792 (1973).
327. NOW, Statement of Purpose, reprinted in UP FROM THE PEDESTAL: SELECTED
WRITINGS IN THE HISTORY OF AMERICAN FEMINISM 363-69 (Aileen S. Kraditor ed., 1968).
328. HARRISON, ON ACCOUNT OF SEX, supra note 302, at 201-05. At the same time
NOW was pressing this national agenda, it was encouraging local "consciousness raising"
groups among women and activism at the local level. See SARA EVANS, PERSONAL
POLITICS: THE ROOTS OF WOMEN'S LIBERATION IN THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT AND
THE NEW LEFT (1979).
329. HARRISON, ON ACCOUNT OF SEX, supra note 302, at 217.
330. That their voice became the voice of women before the Court does not mean that
all women agreed with their philosophy; both traditionalist and radical female perspectives
were generally not heard by the Court until the 1980s. Compare F. CAROLYN GRAGLIA,
THE HOUSEWIFE AS PARIAH: CONTEMPORARY FEMINISM'S WAR ON THE FAMILY (1997)
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lawyers filed constitutional challenges to statutory sex discriminations,
and state and federal judges found many of the challenged policies un-
constitutional - notwithstanding Hoyt. The leading case was White v.
Crook, where Dorothy Kenyon and Pauli Murray's ACLU brief
helped persuade a three-judge federal court to hold invalid Alabama's
exclusion of both people of color and women from criminal juries.33'
For examples at the state level, the New Jersey and California
Supreme Courts struck down state exclusions of women from bar-
tending, essentially refusing to follow Goesaert.332 Several state courts
overruled the common law presumption that only husbands could
bring loss of consortium claims in tort, on the ground that this was a
blatant sex discrimination.333 Federal judges struck down state laws ex-
cluding women from state universities,334 from living off campus at
state colleges,335 and from juries,336 as well as state laws treating women
differently from men for purposes of sentencing after conviction of a
crime.337
The first case to reach the U.S. Supreme Court was an ACLU
challenge to an Idaho statute which preferred male relatives over fe-
male ones for purposes of appointment to administer estates of intes-
tate decedents. Sally Reed's counsel on appeal - Kenyon, Murray,
Wulf, and Ginsburg - urged the Court to renounce the constitutional
philosophy of Muller, Goesaert, and Hoyt.338 "[A] new appreciation of
women's place has been generated in the United States." Feminists
"of both sexes" had pressed for women's "full membership" in the
benefits and duties of constitutional citizenship. "But the distance to
equal opportunity for women - in the face of the pervasive social,
(discussing exclusion of traditionalist women from feminist thinking), with IMELDA
WHELEHAN, MODERN FEMINIST THOUGHT 69-79 (1995) (discussing exclusion of radical
feminists from legal reformist efforts).
331. 251 F. Supp. 401 (M.D. Ala. 1966) (three-judge court) (not appealed).
332. Sail'er Inn, Inc. v. Kirby, 485 P.2d 529 (Cal. 1971); Paterson Tavern & Grill Owners
Ass'n v. Borough of Hawthorne, 270 A.2d 628 (N.J. 1970); Gallagher v. City of Bayonne, 245
A.2d 373 (N.J. 1968); see also Seidenberg v. McSorleys' Old Ale House, 317 F. Supp. 593
(S.D.N.Y. 1970) (exclusion of female patrons unconstitutional).
333. Deems v. Western Md. Ry. Co., 231 A.2d 514 (Md. 1967); Montgomery v. Stephen,
101 N.W.2d 227 (Mich. 1960); Millington v. Southeastern Elevator Co., 239 N.E.2d 897 (N.Y.
1968); Durham v. Gabriel, 241 N.E.2d 401 (Ohio 1968); Clem v. Brown, 207 N.E.2d 398
(Ohio 1965).
334. Kirstein v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 309 F. Supp. 184 (E.D. Va. 1970)
(three-judge court).
335. Mollere v. Southeastern La. College, 304 F. Supp. 826 (E.D. La. 1969).
336. Abbott v. Mines, 411 F.2d 353 (6th Cir. 1969); White v. Crook, 251 F.Supp. 401
(M.D. Ala. 1966) (three-judge court).
337. United States ex rel. Robinson v. York, 281 F. Supp. 8 (D. Conn. 1968); accord Lib-
erti v. York, 246 A.2d 106 (Conn. 1968); Commonwealth v. Daniel, 243 A.2d 400 (Pa. 1969).
338. Brief for Appellant at 41-53, Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971) (No. 70-4).
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cultural, and legal roots of sex-based discrimination - remains con-
siderable. In the absence of a firm constitutional foundation for equal
treatment of men and women by the law, women seeking to be judged
on their individual merits will continue to encounter law-sanctioned
obstacles."339 Accordingly, the ACLU lawyers maintained that sex was
a suspect classification for the same reasons race was: both were natu-
ral traits that the dominant culture has treated as a badge of inferiority
and stigmatized legally, based upon inaccurate stereotypes about the
group defined by the trait.34
At the urging of Professor Herma Hill Kay, the California
Supreme Court had just accepted such an argument in Sail'er Inn, Inc.
v. Kirby.34' But the U.S. Supreme Court was not prepared to go that
far in 1971, nor did the case require it to do so. As Chief Justice
Burger said in opening the short conference discussion, the statute was
a "carry over from [an] ancient English statute" and "can't stand" be-
cause it was an unreasonable discrimination, as the ACLU had also
argued. 42 Burger's opinion for a unanimous Court in Reed v. Reed343
rested upon the statute's arbitrariness and therefore left the ACLU's
other arguments unaddressed. In Forbush v. Wallace,344 the Court sug-
gested it was still applying ordinary review to sex-based classifications,
as it summarily affirmed a lower court decision upholding state rules
requiring women to adopt their husbands' surnames when they mar-
ried.
Soon after Reed and Forbush, Congress voted for the proposed
ERA and sent it to the states for ratification. This was an important
normative moment, for not only did feminists unite behind the pro-
posal, but huge bipartisan majorities in Congress agreed that "Equal-
ity of rights under the law shall not be denied or abridged by the
United States or any State because of sex." '345 Meanwhile, Fourteenth
339. Id. at 10.
340. Id. at 14-41; accord, Joint Brief of Amici Curiae American Veterans Comm., Inc.,
NOW Legal Defense & Education Fund, Inc. at 10-12, Reed (No. 70-4); Brief of the City of
New York at 8-17, Reed (No. 70-4).
341. 485 P.2d 529, 538-43 (Cal. 1971) (striking down statute barring women from being
bartenders in licensed establishments, inconsistent with Equal Protection Clause (as well as
title VII and state constitution)).
342. Douglas Conference Notes for Reed (Oct. 22, 1971), in Douglas Papers, supra note
192, Container 1525.
343. 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
344. 405 U.S. 970 (1971), affg mem;, 341 F. Supp. 217 (M.D. Ala. 1970) (three-judge
court).
345. See generally MARY FRANCES BERRY, WHY ERA FAILED: POLITICS, WOMEN'S
RIGHTS AND THE AMENDING PROCESS OF THE CONSTITUTION (1986); JANE J.
MANSBRIDGE, WHY WE LOST THE ERA (1986); RIGHTS OF PASSAGE: THE PAST AND
FUTURE OF THE ERA (Joan Hoff Wilson ed., 1986).
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Amendment litigation for sex equality continued apace. In 1973, the
Supreme Court heard an appeal brought by the Southern Poverty Law
Center in Fronteiro v.Richardson.346 The issue was whether the armed
forces could deny female service personnel fringe benefits for their
spouses absent a showing that the spouses were in fact "dependent"
on them, a showing male service personnel did not have to make.
Joseph Levin and Morris Dees' brief on appeal argued that the Court
should apply strict scrutiny to the statutory sex discrimination;
Ginsburg and Wulf filed an amicus brief making the same arguments
for strict scrutiny they had made in Reed.347 Although Chief Justice
Burger made an impassioned effort to dismiss this challenge as a
"tempest in a teapot," the Brethren voted to reverse on the authority
of Reed.348
Justice Brennan's initial draft opinion followed Reed but invited
his colleagues to consider the question whether sex is a suspect classi-
fication, as the Frontieros and the ACLU were urging.349 Justices
Douglas, White, and Marshall immediately urged him to do so,350
while the other Justices held off. Brennan circulated a new opinion
which accepted the suspect classification argument along the lines sug-
gested by the ACLU. The opinion argued that, given the nation's
"long and unfortunate history of sex discrimination," the immutability
of sex as a trait, and the wide normative agreement that sex is usually
irrelevant to proper public policy, sex is enough like race to justify its
being treated as a "suspect classification" triggering "strict judicial
scrutiny."35 Brennan's opinion only attracted the votes of four
Justices, however. Chief Justice Burger and Justices Powell, Stewart,
and Blackmun were reluctant to adopt the suspect classification ap-
proach so long as the ERA was pending, and they ended up concur-
ring in the judgment, depriving Brennan of his needed fifth vote to
make a Court.352
346. 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
347. Brief for the Appellants at 28-37, Frontiero (No. 71-1694); Brief of American Civil
Liberties Union Amicus Curiae at 24-44, Frontiero (No. 71-1694). By 1971, it was well-
established that equal protection guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment were "reverse-
incorporated" into the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause.
348. Douglas Conference Notes for Frontiero, in Douglas Papers, supra note 192,
Container 1577. Only the Chief Justice and Justice Rehnquist favored upholding the policy.
349. See William J. Brennan, Jr., Memorandum to the Conference, re No. 71-1694 -
Frontiero v. Laird (Feb. 14, 1973), in Brennan Papers, supra note 129, Box I: 299, Folder 11
(also including a draft of the opinion).
350. See id. (emended with a handwritten note from Justice Douglas saying that he pre-
ferred the new approach); Memorandum from Byron R. White to William J. Brennan, Jr.
(Feb. 15, 1973), in Brennan Papers, supra note 1.29, Box I: 299, Folder 11.
351. Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 682-88.
352. See id. at 697 (Powell, J., joined by Burger, C.J., and Blackmun, J., concurring in
the judgment) (explicitly reserving the suspect classification question in light of the pending
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Nonetheless, Frontiero sent a powerful signal. Soon after losing the
case, Solicitor General Erwin Griswold announced that the Equal
Protection Clause "does not tolerate discrimination on the basis of
sex." '353 As Professor Ginsburg read the case, "persons similarly situ-
ated, whether male or female, must be accorded even-handed treat-
ment by the law." Legislative classifications, she concluded, "may not
be premised on sex-role stereotypes or unalterable sex characteristics
that bear no necessary relationship to an individual's need, ability or
life situation." '354 Ginsburg's campaign, essentially, was to interpret the
Equal Protection Clause to entrench a feminist understanding of the
ERA, which was in the midst of fierce ratification battles in state leg-
islatures that savvy observers felt was being lost. To accomplish this,
she continued to bring cases to, or support cases before, the Supreme
Court challenging sex discriminations that reflected archaic stereo-
types.
355
The Burger Court did not always agree with the ACLU. For ex-
ample, the Justices upheld sex-based classifications when they ap-
peared remedial, such as the Florida law allowing widows but not wid-
owers a small property tax exemption, upheld in Kahn v. Shevin.
356
(Recall that many feminists themselves, such as Kenyon and Murray,
believed that genuinely remedial legislation ought to pass equal pro-
tection scrutiny.) As the ACLU advocated, the Court struck down
classifications that appeared to hold women back because of archaic
stereotypes, such as the law allowing a spouse to stop paying child
support for daughters at an earlier age than for sons, invalidated in
Stanton v. Stanton.357 In Taylor v. Lousiana,358 the Court overruled
ERA); id. at 691 (Stewart, J., concurring in the judgment, without a statement of reasons).
Justice Rehnquist dissented. Id. at 691.
353. Memorandum of Amicus Curiae United States at 8, Cohen v. Chesterfield County
Sch. Bd., 411 U.S. 947 (1973) (No. 72-1129) and Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. La Fleur, 414 U.S.
632 (1974) (No. 72-777).
354. Brief for Appellants at 11, Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351 (1974) (No. 73-78) (Gins-
burg et al. representing the appellant).
355. Interestingly, the plaintiffs she represented or befriended were Joseph as well as
Sharron Frontiero, Mel Kahn, Stephen Charles Wiesenfeld, Will Webster, and William Her-
bert Orr - men harmed by sex discriminations. The strategy, controversial among feminists,
was to show male judges that everybody - including people like them - was harmed by sex
discrimination.
356. 416 U.S. 351 (1974) (Douglas, J.) (women are more likely to need the tax break);
see also Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313 (1977) (upholding gendered social security provi-
sion, which the Court read as advantaging female wage earners and their families, as a way
of redressing society's longstanding disparate treatment of women); Schlesinger v. Ballard,
419 U.S. 498 (1975) (upholding a longer period for female officers to attain promotion for an
"up or out" policy in the armed forces, because of greater difficulties women faced in com-
piling a record for promotion). In all three cases, the Court rejected the ACLU's arguments.
357. 421 U.S. 7 (1975); see also Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975) (Bren-
nan, J.) (invalidating gendered social security provision, which the Court read as discrimi-
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Hoyt, on the ground that an opt-in system for women to serve on ju-
ries violates the Sixth Amendment and due process requirement that
juries be cross-sections of the community.
The Women's Rights Project called on the Court to overrule
Goesaert in Craig v. Boren.3 59 That case involved a state law barring
the sale of two percent beer to eighteen-year-old males and
twenty-one-year-old females, assertedly on the ground that the former
were more likely to become inebriated and therefore a safety hazard
than the latter. No longer making its pitch for strict scrutiny, the
ACLU's amicus brief read the Supreme Court precedents for the still-
strong proposition that the judiciary should strike down statutes re-
flecting "traditional attitudes and prejudices about the expected be-
havior and roles of the two sexes in our society," for these are "part of
the myriad signals and messages that daily underscore the notion of
men as society's active members, women as men's quiescent compan-
ions, members of the 'other' second sex."36 The Court was open to
this statement of women's politics of recognition. Justice Brennan
garnered six Justices to require that sex-based classifications "must
serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially
related to achievement of those objectives." '361 Specifically, neither
"administrative... convenience" nor "overbroad and archaic gener-
alizations" regarding men and women's different capacities or roles
could justify sex-based classifications.362
Handed down in 1976, when it was likely the ERA would not be
adopted, Craig seemed to satisfy liberal feminists' version of women's
politics of recognition; the dissenting Justices certainly thought SO.
3 63
Notwithstanding the ambiguous level of scrutiny, the Craig formula-
nating against female wage earners), followed in Califano v. Westcott, 443 U.S. 76 (1979);
Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199 (1977).
358. 419 U.S. 522 (1975), discussed in Section II.A.l.c.
359. 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
360. [ACLU] Brief Amicus Curiae at 22, Craig (No. 75-628) (citing SIMONE DE
BEAUVOIR, SECOND SEX (1949)).
361. Craig, 429 U.S. at 197 (Brennan, J., for the Court, including Justices White, Mar-
shall, Blackmun, Powell, and Stevens). Justice Stewart concurred only in the judgment, id. at
214; Chief Justice Burger, id. at 215, and Justice Rehnquist dissented, id. at 217.
362. Id. at 198 (opinion of the Court) (quotation omitted).
363. See id. at 221 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Memorandum from Warren E. Burger
(who also dissented) to William J. Brennan, Jr. (Nov. 15, 1976), in Brennan Papers, supra
note 129, Box I: 411, Folder 2 (testily admonishing Brennan that he might have joined a
Reed-like opinion, but that "you read into Reed v. Reed what is not there. Every gender dis-
tinction does not need the strict scrutiny test applicable to a criminal case."). Commentators
agreed with the dissenters' assessment that "even if the ERA should fail to be ratified, be-
fore long the Court seems certain to reach the same conclusion under the equal protection
clause." Kenneth L. Karst, The Supreme Court, 1976 Term - Foreword: Equal Citizenship
Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1, 54 (1977).
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tion - and its application in that case, where there was both a plausi-
ble safety justification and an arguable Twenty-First Amendment
boost for state alcohol regulation - had teeth enough to clear out
most sex discriminations from state codes. Even armed with Frontiero
and Craig, however, liberal feminism's constitutionalized politics of
recognition ran into a formidable doctrinal roadblock: the reluctance
of the Justices to scrutinize classifications that strongly affected
women but were not openly gendered. At the very same time that the
Burger Court was subjecting sex-based classifications to heightened
scrutiny, it was subjecting laws having disparate impact on race-based
classes to ordinary scrutiny in Hackney, Rodriguez, and Washington v.
Davis. There was no reason to expect the Justices to follow a different
approach with regard to sex-based classes, with or without the ERA.
The most important issue for feminists was whether the state could
discriminate on the basis of pregnancy. Representing women whose
pregnancies were excluded from a state disability program in Geduldig
v. Aiello,364 Wendy Webster Williams maintained that "the individual
who receives a benefit or suffers a detriment because of a physical
characteristic unique to one sex benefits or suffers because he or she
belongs to one or the other sex" - which surely is sex discrimination,
because men are treated differently.365 Moreover, men were treated
more favorably than women, and for exactly the reasons rejected in
Reed and Frontiero (and later in Craig): men were privileged and
women were denigrated in the public and workplace sphere because
of women's unique ability to bear children and the concomitant spe-
cial responsibility for rearing them in the domestic sphere.366 Indeed,
"[t]his last prejudice - that women are not serious and permanent
members of the workforce and that lurking somewhere in each
woman's life is a man fully able to support her - underlies and rein-
forces discrimination against women in all realms of their lives." '367
Williams' powerful presentation was supported by amicus briefs from
the ACLU and the EEOC.
But the nine men on the Court were not persuaded. The discussion
in conference revealed little comprehension of Williams' arguments.
Most of the Justices agreed with their Chief's complaint that the preg-
364. 417 U.S. 484 (1974).
365. Brief for Appellees at 31, Geduldig (No. 73-640).
366. "Those who would make these unique physical differences a touchstone for unscru-
tinized differential treatment offer nothing other than the modern version of the historical
rationales which were for so long the source of women's second class citizenship under the
law." Id. at 36.
367. Id. at 39-40 (footnote numbers omitted); see id. at 42-45 (relying on the similar in-
terpretation of the ERA forwarded by Professor Thomas Emerson and his Yale law students
in Barbara A. Brown et al., The Equal Rights Amendment: A Constitutional Basis for Equal
Rights for Women, 80 YALE L.J. 871, 930 (1971)).
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nancy exclusion involves "a different kind of risk than illness covered
by [the] Act. [P]rostate problem is covered - as is hysterectomy -
different from pregnancy. '368 Based upon this reasoning, the Court
ruled that the pregnancy exclusion was not a sex-based classification369
and upheld the statutory scheme. During the same Term, the Court
invalidated school board rules barring pregnant women from con-
tinuing their jobs as teachers, but the opinion by Justice Stewart (also
the author of Geduldig) reasoned that the per se rule arbitrarily bur-
dened the women's parenthood and family rights and so was unconsti-
tutional under the Due Process Clause.37° In 1976, the Supreme Court
followed Geduldig to interpret the sex discrimination bar in Title VII
to be inapplicable to pregnancy-based discrimination.371 Wendy
Williams again argued for the losing side - but it was her vision of sex
discrimination that triumphed when she and Susan Deller Ross per-
suaded Congress to override the Court with the Pregnancy
Discrimination Act of 1978 ("PDA").372 "[R]eaffirm[ing] that sex dis-
crimination includes discrimination based on pregnancy, and specifi-
cally defin[ing] standards which require that pregnant workers be
treated the same as other employees on the basis of their ability or in-
ability to work,"3"3 the PDA provided a legal (even if not a constitu-
tional) basis for liberal feminists' ongoing campaign to assure women
conditions of employment that would allow them to have productive
careers.
374
368. Douglas Conference Notes for Geduldig (Mar. 29, 1974), in Douglas Papers, supra
note 192, Container 1630 (O.T. 1973, Argued Cases, 73-640); see Brennan Conference Notes
for Geduldig, in Brennan Papers, supra note 129, Box I: 311, Folder 4 (Burger argued that
the "exclusion is not sex based but upon distinction between pregnancy and other ail-
ments").
369. Geduldig, 417 U.S. at 496-97 n.20.
370. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974). The LaFleur conference
presaged the Geduldig one, for Burger, Stewart, and Blackmun all went out of their way to
emphasize that the "differentiation is not sex related," because it related only to pregnancy.
Brennan Conference Notes for LaFleur, in Brennan Papers, supra note 129, Box 1: 310 (No.
72-777) (quote is from Blackmun). Powell viewed the case in equal protection terms, but
only required the board to show a rational basis. Id.
371. Gilbert v. Gen. Elec. Co., 429 U.S. 125 (1976).
372. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2000) (defining "because of sex" or "on the basis of sex" in
Title VII to include pregnancy).
373. H. REP. No. 95-948, at 3 (1978); see also SUZANNE UTrARO SAMUELS, FETAL
RIGHTS, WOMEN'S RIGHTS: GENDER EQUALITY IN THE WORKPLACE (1995).
374. Chastened by Congress's immediate and angry override of Geduldig and Gilbert,
the Supreme Court not only applied the PDA expansively to protect women's workplace
rights, e.g., United Auto Workers v. Johnson Controls Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 211 (1991) (reject-
ing employer policy protecting potentially pregnant women against jobs posing hazards to
fetuses), but also applied its preemptive force conservatively when confronted with state
rules expanding women's workplace opportunities. California Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v.
Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 292 (1987) (holding that the PDA does not preempt a state law re-
quiring employers to grant leaves for pregnant women).
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As the pregnancy cases reflect, feminists' politics of recognition in-
sisted on heightened scrutiny of rules that had an inevitable impact on
women. And, generally, the U.S. Supreme Court rejected their stance,
just as it had rejected similar arguments made by people of color. The
leading case was Personnel Administrator v. Feeney.375 Helen Feeney
found it virtually impossible to advance in the civil service because of
the operation of the state's strong preference for veterans. She chal-
lenged the preference for its significant adverse impact upon women's
opportunities in a state where 98% of the veterans were men. Phyllis
Segal's NOW amicus brief supporting her claim argued that the pref-
erence "inevitably discriminates deeply and pervasively against
women as a result of a congeries of laws, regulations and practices
which define as overwhelmingly male the class of individuals who
qualify as veterans."37' Invoking Washington v. Davis, the state re-
sponded that the classification itself (veterans) was benign and there
was no evidence whatsoever of any intent to discriminate against
women.377 With little internal dissent, the Supreme Court agreed.
Justice Stewart's opinion for the Court was an important clarification
of the burden of proving intent under Washington v. Davis: challeng-
ers to a state employment policy must show that the challenged policy
was not only adopted in spite of its disparate impact on women (or ra-
cial minorities), but because of that impact.378
3. The Politics of Remediation and the New Politics of Preservation,
1976-Present
Traditionally, most opposition to equality for women was driven
by open commitments to a natural law view in which sex and gender
differences were viewed as profound and women's proper role was to
bear and rear children and govern the domestic sphere.379 As women
375. 442 U.S. 256 (1979).
376. Brief of Amici Curiae National Organization for Women, NOW Legal Defense and
Education Fund, Inc. et al. at 12-13, Feeney (No. 78-233).
377. Brief for Appellants at 30-57, Feeney (No. 78-233); accord 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-11
(veterans' preferences exempted from Title VII); Brief of Amicus Curiae United States,
Feeney (No. 78-233) (agreeing with the state).
378. Feeney, 442 U.S. at 278-80. For an excellent analysis of Feeney as a different "in-
tent" standard than that in Washington v. Davis and Arlington Heights, see Sheila Foster,
Intent and Incoherence, 72 TUL. L. REV. 1065 (1998).
379. Examples of such natural law discourse include Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464
(1948) (allowing women to tend bar only if employed by their fathers or husbands); Muller
v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908) (upholding maximum hours law to protect only women);
Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. 130 (1873) (Bradley, J., concurring in the judgment) (excluding
women from the practice of law); PHYLLIS SCHLAFLY, THE POWER OF THE POSITIVE
WOMAN 54, 159-63 (1977) (normative book by the leading opponent of the ERA); Siegel,
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increasingly objected to their subordinate status and moved public
opinion toward the idea that sex is a tolerable variation as far as most
public policies were concerned, pragmatic arguments came to the fore.
Although natural law continued to be the basis for supporting tradi-
tional gender roles and separate spheres, preservationist rhetoric
gradually shifted to include or emphasize the bad consequences of
"radical" change, including harms to the privacy of the marital rela-
tionship and the harmony of the family, the psychic costs to women as
well as men if traditional mores were upset, and the possibilities of
violence and disorder."' As in the race cases, the shift in rhetoric was
accelerated by the Supreme Court's sex discrimination jurisprudence.
Because traditionalist arguments for the status quo came perilously
close to the kinds of "archaic" notions about sex differences that were
automatically lethal in cases like Craig and Frontiero, these precedents
pressed preservationists strongly toward pragmatic rather than natural
law arguments, at least in public. Like the politics of racial preserva-
tion, the politics of sex and gender role preservation in the 1970s and
1980s was dominated by this kind of cost-benefit moderation, with at
least one important exception. Pragmatists as well as traditionalists
paid attention to women's "real differences" from men, particularly
those related to pregnancy and women's responsibilities to the unborn
as well as the children they (still) reared.3"' Indeed, feminists them-
selves split on the issue. A new generation of difference feminists
urged the necessity of state rules empowering and compensating
women for their traditionally undervalued caretaking roles.
382
Like the liberal feminists they were opposing, both pragmatic and
natural law preservationists invoked the Constitution. They main-
tained that sex-neutral and abortion-protective rules imposed by
judges in Washington, D.C. were at war with (1) the values of local-
She the People, supra note 237 (discussing arguments against female suffrage and ratification
of the Nineteenth Amendment).
380. See generally Reva B. Siegel, The Modernization of Marital Status Law: Adjudicat-
ing Wives' Rights to Earnings, 1860-1930, 82 GEo. L.J. 2127 (1994); Reva B. Siegel, "The
Rule of Love": Wife Beating as Prerogative and Privacy, 105 YALE L.J. 2117, 2119-20 (1996)
(arguing in two different contexts that when traditional male privileges came under fire,
their justifications were "modernized" and thereby strengthened).
381. Thus, women (the supposed beneficiaries of the politics of recognition) have been
well-represented in the pro-life and anti-ERA politics of preservation. Women opposing the
liberal feminist agenda hold different views than the liberals regarding gender roles, sexual-
ity, and parenting. Generally, they view women's greatest fulfillment in their roles as wives
and mothers. See LUKER, supra note 290, at 158-91 (pro-life women); MANSBRIDGE, supra
note 345, at 98-117 (1986) (anti-ERA women).
382. Although difference feminism is typically set "against" liberal feminism, that is
simplistic. Both liberals like Wendy Williams and Ruth Ginsburg and difference feminists
like Chris Littleton agreed with Pauli Murray and Celia Kenyon that neither the ERA nor
the equal protection clause should be construed to invalidate legislation genuinely remedial
to women's traditional disadvantages, especially in the workplace.
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ism, where the family and the state were the primary situs for rules
relating to gender-normative roles in bearing and raising children,
without interference from the national government; (2) the constitu-
tional separation of powers, whereby the popularly elected legislature
is both the most legitimate and the most institutionally competent
state organ to handle complex, delicate moral and family issues; and
(3) fundamental liberties, particularly the rights of fetuses and parents.
These arguments were prominent in the campaign to defeat the ERA.
Phyllis Schlafly and other opponents argued that the ERA was a bad
idea because it would undermine the family and deprive states of their
ability to legislate morality (including sexual abstinence and compul-
sory heterosexuality), would empower unaccountable federal judges
to impose their own elite views on an unconsenting populace, and
would deprive wives and parents of fundamental rights needed for the
preservation of families.
383
The arguments that sunk the ERA also instructed the Supreme
Court regarding the extent to which it should apply the Equal
Protection Clause to liberate women from archaic stereotypes. 4
Among Mrs. Schlafly's most popular charges against the ERA were
that it would empower the Supreme Court to subject women to the
draft and military service, to invalidate gendered laws protecting
women, and to require states to recognize same-sex marriages and
other "homosexual rights." '385 Americans supported sex segregation in
military service, many special protections for women, and marriage
limited to different-sex couples. While the ERA lingered, the Supreme
Court reaffirmed all of the foregoing sex discriminations, substantially
following the constitutional logic of Mrs. Schlafly and her allies. Be-
tween 1972 and 1975, the Court brushed aside sex discrimination (and
other) arguments for same-sex marriage and sodomy law nullification
without even asking for briefs on the merits.386 The Court addressed
383. See MANSBRIDGE, supra note 345; DONALD G. MATHEWS & JANE SHERRON DE
HART, SEX, GENDER, AND THE POLITICS OF THE ERA: A STATE AND THE NATION (1990)
(case study of the ERA's defeat in North Carolina); id. at 35-53 (arguments against ERA by
Senator Ervin [D-N.C.] during its debate in Senate, 1971-72).
384. Recall that four concurring Justices declined to join Justice Brennan's opinion in
Frontiero because these arguments were being seriously debated in connection with the
ERA. See supra note 352.
385. See Phylis Schlafly, What's Wrong with "Equal Rights" for Women?, 5 PHYLLIS
SCHLAFLY REP. NO. 7, Feb. 1972, reprinted in WOMEN'S RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES: A
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 291 (Winston E. Langley & Vivian C. Fox eds., 1994) (women
would be subject to the draft and would lose custody of their children); Phyllis Schlafly,
Memo on the Equal Rights Amendment 2000, at http://www.eagleforum.org/
era/ERA99.shtml (last visited Aug. 20, 2002) (federally funded abortions and rights for
"homosexuals," including marriage).
386. See Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney for Richmond, 425 U.S. 901 (1976) (summa-
rily affirming state consensual sodomy law); Baker v. Nelson, 409 U.S. 810 (1972) (dismissing
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the other two issues in 1981, just before the period for ERA ratifica-
tion expired for good (1982).
As Feeney and Frontiero illustrated, the United States armed
forces operated under a cornucopia of sex-discriminatory rules, the
centerpiece of which was the exclusion of women from combat roles.
Women's marginal role in the military was, from the perspective of
most feminists, a textbook example of the way in which sexist public
law reinforced women's status as second-class citizens.387 Traditional-
ists viewed women's exclusion as necessary, lest the military be femi-
nized and weakened.38 Such a justification was insufficient under
Craig or even Reed. The modernized (pragmatic) justification for ex-
clusions was that unit cohesion would break down if women joined in
combat.389 For this and other reasons, the 1980 reactivation of the draft
required only men to register. A three-judge court ruled that the sex
discrimination violated the Craig standard. Although the ACLU was
joined on appeal by NOW, the League of Women Voters, and a num-
ber of other feminist organizations, and a generation of the nation's
finest constitutional lawyers (like Wendy Williams and Larry Tribe)
defended the lower court judgment, their arguments fell on deaf (or
deferential) judicial ears. Justice Rehnquist's opinion in Rostker v.
Goldberg" emphasized that the Constitution commits military policy
to the political branches, that the judiciary has very little competence
to evaluate their policy choices, and that Congress had in this case en-
gaged in careful factfinding and deliberation to which the Court must
defer. Moreover, "the decision to exempt women from registration
was not the ' "accidental by-product of a traditional way of thinking
about females."' '9 Instead, the decision was a corollary of the
proposition that women were barred from combat roles, a bar not
challenged by the plaintiffs.392 Writing for three dissenters, Justice
appeal of rejected challenge to state bar to same-sex marriages); see also supra Section I.C.2
(discussing Baker and Doe).
387. Kenneth L. Karst, The Pursuit of Manhood and the Desegregation of the Armed
Forces, 38 UCLA L. REV. 499 (1991); see also Lori Kornblum, Women Warriors in a Men's
World: The Combat Exclusion, 2 L. & INEQUALITY 351 (1984); Wendy Webster Williams,
The Equality Crisis: Some Reflections on Culture, Courts, and Feminism, 7 WOMEN'S RIGHTS
L. REP. 175, 182-85 (1982).
388. See BRIAN MITCHELL, WEAK LINK: THE FEMINIZATION OF THE AMERICAN
MILITARY (1989).
389. See generally FEMALE SOLDIERS - COMBATANTS OR NONCOMBATANTS?
HISTORICAL AND CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVES (Nancy Loring Goldman ed., 1982)
[hereinafter FEMALE SOLDIERS]. Note especially Mady Weschler Segal, The Argument for
Female Combatants, in FEMALE SOLDIERS, supra.
390. Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 64-74 (1981).
391. Id. at 74 (quoting Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313, 320 (1977), in turn quoting
Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199, 223 (1977)).
2141August 2002]
HeinOnline  -- 100 Mich. L. Rev. 2141 2001-2002
Michigan Law Review
Marshall found more at stake in the challenge because women were
being excluded from "a fundamental civic obligation." '393
The Court was also tolerant of sex-based classifications protecting
women against male predation. Although states in the 1970s redrafted
their penal codes to be largely sex-neutral, California continued to
make it a felony for a male (of any age) to have sexual intercourse
with a female under the age of eighteen. In Michael M. v. Superior
Court,394 plaintiffs and their amici challenged the statute as a classic
sex discrimination based upon traditional gender stereotypes, where
the vulnerable girl needs to be protected against predatory boys and
men, but boys can take care of themselves. 95 California and the
United States, which entered the case as an amicus, defended the stat-
ute as appropriately focusing regulatory attention on the main prob-
lem, the need to protect girls against predation and unwanted preg-
nancies.396 The statutory rape law was a prophylactic measure to
protect minor women who were in fact vulnerable to sexual assault. Its
sex discrimination was permissible, because women rarely assaulted
boys; it was necessary to the operation of this policy, because girls
would be reluctant to report violations if they themselves could be
prosecuted. Five Justices accepted this justification.3 97 Dissenting
Justices and feminist critics of the decision disputed both elements of
the Court's logic: the historical policy of the gendered statute was
rooted in archaic stereotypes of vulnerable girls and predatory boys,
and a humane anti-predation policy that recognizes girls' as well as
boys' sexual agency can criminalize sex between adults and underage
persons of either sex.398
Although the Supreme Court proved receptive to preservationist
arguments in the areas of greatest social anxiety about sex equality -
392. Because the goal of registration was to prepare for combat mobilization, it was a
reasonable decision to register only those who could engage in combat, men. Id. at 76-83.
393. Id. at 86 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Marshall demonstrated that the Court attributed
a more rational policy to Congress than could be supported from the record and that the ex-
perts to whom greatest deference was owed (the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the President) had
supported the registration of women. Id. at 88-113.
394. 450 U.S. 464 (1981).
395. See Brief of Amici Curiae ACLU and the ACLU of Northern California, Michael
M. (No. 79-1344).
396. Brief of Amicus Curiae United States at 13-24, Michael M. (No. 79-1344).
397. See Michael M., 450 U.S. at 470-76 (Rehnquist, J., for a plurality); id. at 478-80
(Stewart, J., concurring); id. at 481-87 (Blackmun, J., concurring in the judgment).
398. See id. at 493-95 (Brennan, J., dissenting); Kristin Bumiller, Rape as a Legal Sym-
bol: An Essay on Sexual Violence and Racism, 42 U. MIAMI L. REV. 75 (1987); Frances Ol-
sen, Statutory Rape: A Feminist Critique of Rights Analysis, 63 TEXAS L. REV. 387 (1987);
Williams, supra note 387, at 181-82; see also Catharine A. MacKinnon, Reflections on Sex
Equality Under Law, 100 YALE L.J. 1281, 1305 (1991) (criticizing both majority and dissent-
ing Justices).
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same-sex marriage, women in combat, and statutory rape - it did not
retreat from Craig's baseline, even after the Court shifted toward the
right after President Reagan's election in 1980. Indeed, Reagan's first
Supreme Court appointee was Sandra Day O'Connor, the first woman
to serve on the Court.39 9 In one of her earliest major opinions for the
Court, Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan,4°° Justice
O'Connor struck down a state law allowing only women to enroll at
the state nursing college. When a law adopts a sex-based classification,
the state has a "burden of showing an 'exceedingly persuasive justifi-
cation' for the classification," a burden that cannot be met by post-hoc
rationalizations by counsel or policies that ultimately rest upon gender
stereotypes.0 1 With Craig, Hogan remains the leading statement of the
Court's approach to statutory sex discriminations, and the Rehnquist
Court - often over the objection of its Chief - has been just as vig-
orous as the Burger Court was in carrying out the liberal feminist poli-
tics of recognition under cover of the Equal Protection Clause. No
longer can women be peremptorily struck from juries without explana-
tion4°2or excluded from state paramilitary colleges,4"3 for prominent
examples. In both cases, Justice O'Connor was in the majority, and the
opinion for the Court quoted and applied Hogan.4"
The foregoing sex discrimination cases reflect the Court's stance as
the twentieth century came to a close: consistent with the feminist
politics of recognition (and public opinion), most of the Justices have
insisted on formal equality and respect for women's co-equal role in
public as well as private life.4"5 On the other hand, and probably con-
sistent with public opinion, the Justices backed away when women's
equality was strongly inconsistent with third-party rights, the legiti-
macy and comparative competence of the judiciary (vis A vis the politi-
cal branches), and the Constitution's preference for local decision-
making as to matters of family life and public safety.
399. Although a reliable conservative on issues of federalism, separation of powers, and
the individual rights of racial and sexual minorities, Justice O'Connor also proved attentive,
in a way her Reagan Brethren were not, to feminist voices. E.g., Judith Olans Brown et al.,
The Rugged Feminism of Sandra Day O'Connor, 32 IND. L. REV. 1219 (1999); Sandra Day
O'Connor, Portia's Progress, 66 NYU L. REV. 1546, 1553 (1991).
400. 458 U.S. 718 (1982), also discussed in Section II.C.3 infra. Because the decision was
5-4, the replacement of Justice Stewart (a conservative in sex discrimination cases) with Jus-
tice O'Connor very probably changed the outcome of the case.
401. Id. at 724.
402. J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127 (1994).
403. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996).
404. Id. at 523-24;J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 136.
405. See ROSEN, THE WORLD SPLIT OPEN, supra note 299, at 338 (opinion polls have
found large majorities of Americans supportive of a "strong women's movement to push for
changes that benefit women").
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Although the foregoing constitutional clashes between women's
politics of recognition and traditionalists' politics of preservation were
important and meaningful, the most intense post-1976 clashes involved
the unique issue of abortion and issues of remediation. Abortion has
been an intense question because it is so important for each group and
their points of view are incommensurable: feminists understand choice
as essential to their equal citizenship, while traditionalists understand
life to be at stake. As with the civil rights movement, the other conten-
tious issues relate to women's politics of remediation. The women's
movement has sought and obtained statutes and administrative rules
protecting against private workplace discrimination and sexual har-
assment; requiring integration of public accommodations; insisting
that schools not only protect girls against sexual harassment, but also
devote equal resources to girls' athletic as well as educational pro-
grams; modernizing rape laws and criminalizing hate speech; and pro-
viding tort causes of action for gender-based violence. Remedial
measures such as these are costly and may cross fuzzy constitutional
lines relating to federalism, separation of powers, and individual rights
of free speech and association. Even as they were being routed as to
matters of women's equal rights to serve on juries and attend paramili-
tary colleges, preservationists have made successful court challenges to
feminist remedial measures suppressing misogynistic pornography,
regulating pro-life protests and persuasive activities outside abortion
clinics, and (most controversially) creating a federal cause of action for
gender-based violence.
a. The Post-Roe Abortion Cases. Pro-life traditionalists mobilized
as a normative social movement seeking to preserve not only human
life, but also a traditionalist ethic of family values and women's do-
mestic role.4" They maintained that Roe v. Wade was worse than the
ERA because it took the most moral of issues away from family and
state decisionmaking, represented the most arrogant example of judi-
cial legislation, and blatantly ignored the fundamental right to life of
the most vulnerable party to the matter, the unborn human child."7
Through organs such as the National Right to Life Committee (1973),
the movement sought to amend the Constitution to overrule Roe and,
failing that, to adopt new state laws regulating abortion in a variety of
ways. These laws, in turn, were challenged by pro-choice groups and
defended by state attorneys general and their pro-life amici. Three
kinds of abortion-regulatory laws illustrate how this ongoing culture
406. See DALLAS A. BLANCHARD, THE ANTI-ABORTION MOVEMENT AND THE RISE
OF THE RELIGIOUS RIGHT: FROM POLITE TO FIREY PROTEST 22-36 (1994) (providing an
institutional history of the pro-life movement); id. at 44-46 (providing essential ideology of
pro-lifers).
407. See id. at 37-50; Luker, supra note 290.
2144 [Vol. 100:2062
HeinOnline  -- 100 Mich. L. Rev. 2144 2001-2002
Identity-Based Social Movements
clash played itself out in constitutional law: parental and spousal noti-
fication and consent requirements, bars to public funding or assistance
for abortions, and informed consent rules seeking to persuade women
to think twice before they chose abortions.
In Planned Parenthood v. Danforth,"8 the first major post-Roe
case, Missouri Attorney General John Danforth pressed a pro-life
constitutional understanding in support of Missouri's law which re-
quired a minor to obtain her parents' consent and a wife to obtain her
husband's consent before an abortion could be performed. He was
supported by an amicus brief from the United States Catholic
Conference.4 9 Both argued that "the [constitutional] rights of parents
to the exercise of their authority is considered fundamental and only a
compelling interest by the state can overcome it."41 Similarly, both in-
voked the right to marry cases, including Griswold, for the proposition
that family decisions, including those relating to pregnancy, are joint
decisions in which the husband has a legally protected interest, just as
his wife does.41' These arguments had an audience on the Court:
Justices White, Rehnquist, and Stevens were persuaded by the argu-
ments for parental consent; White and Rehnquist went with spousal
consent as well."' But a majority of the Court insisted on the individu-
alistic framework suggested by Roe and supported by Planned Parent-
hood's detailed argument that, in practice, the state's consent rules
would give parents and husbands vetoes over a decision that was ulti-
mately personal to the mother.413
The foregoing pro-life constitutional arguments were pressed more
ardently in Bellotti v. Baird,4"4 which evaluated a Massachusetts law
requiring minors to notify their parents and obtain their consent be-
fore they could obtain abortions, with a judicial proceeding available if
408. 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
409. The National Catholic Bishops' Conference had in 1967 established a Committee
on Family Life, which was the main speaker for the pro-life viewpoint before Roe. The
Committee was the precursor to the National Right to Life Committee, formed in 1973.
Blanchard, supra note 406, at 50-53.
410. Brief of Amicus Curiae the United States Catholic Conference at 24, Planned Par-
enthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976) (No. 74-1151); see Brief for Appellees at 42-44,
Danforth (No. 74-1151).
411. Brief of Amicus Curiae the United States Catholic Conference at 32-39, Danforth
(No. 74-1151); Brief for Appellees at 38, Danforth (No. 74-1151).
412. See Danforth, 428 U.S. at 94 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Brennan Conference Notes
for Danforth (Nos. 74-1151, 74-1419), in Brennan Papers, supra note 129, Box I: 368, Folder
6.
413. Danforth, 428 U.S. at 68-72 (parental consent), id. at 72-75 (spousal consent); Brief
for Appellants and Cross-Appellees Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri, et al., at 72-90,
Danforth (Nos. 74-1151, 74-1419) (spousal consent), id. at 90-105 (parental consent).
414. 443 U.S. 627 (1979).
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either parent refused and the minor felt it was in her best interests.
Several amici argued that the constitutional protection for family in-
tegrity not only justified the parental consent requirement, but also
barred the state from overriding the parents' decision with the judicial
bypass. 15 Writing for a plurality of the Court, Justice Powell accepted
the traditionalists' point that the state has much more leeway in regu-
lating the sexual choices of minors because of "the peculiar vulner-
ability of children; their inability to make critical decisions in an in-
formed, mature manner; and the importance of the parental role in
child rearing." '416 Powell also adopted the amici's localist stance that
moral instruction and choice for minors lay first within the family, and
"beyond the competence of impersonal political institutions." '417 On
the other hand, he agreed with the challengers' claim that the statute
was overbroad: it required notification even when there was no chance
of productive dialogue and therefore was an "undue burden" on the
minor's right to choose an abortion." 8 In dictum, Justice Powell
suggested that states could require both parents to consent to the
procedure, so long as there was a judicial bypass available to the
minor in lieu of parental dialogue. 19 Because Powell spoke for
four Justices and a fifth (White) believed the Massachusetts law
was valid, Bellotti indicated that there was a Court that would uphold
subsequent parental consent and notification laws - as indeed there
was in subsequent cases, notwithstanding mounting evidence that even
notification-with-bypass requirements imposed traumatic burdens on
minor women. 2°
415. See Brief of Amici Curiae Catholic League for Religious and Civil Rights, et. al at
6-32, Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 627 (1979) (No. 78-329).
416. Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 634 (Powell, J., for a plurality joined by Burger, C.J., and
Stewart & Rehnquist, JJ.); id. at 637-39 (discussion relying on Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268
U.S. 510, 535 (1925) and other cases emphasized by the state and its amici).
417. Id. at 638. "Thus, 'it is cardinal with us that the custody, care and nurture of the
child reside first in the parents, whose primary function and freedom include prep for obliga-
tions the state can neither supply nor hinder." Id. (quoting Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S.
158,166 (1944)).
418. Id. at 646-50.
419. Id. at 649.
420. To trace the development of the doctrine, see H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398
(1981) (upholding parental notification-whenever-possible requirement); Planned Parent-
hood Ass'n v. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. 476 (1983) (upholding parental-consent law, with judicial
bypass as suggested in Bellotti); Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417 (1990) (upholding a
two-parent notification, with bypass, law against strong social science evidence and lower
court findings of fact that notification did not contribute to healthy dialogue about the im-
portant moral choice and instead contributed to trauma for the minors); Planned Parent-
hood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (joint opinion, delivering the judgment of the Court)
(upholding one-parent consent requirement, with judicial bypass, but striking down spousal
notification requirement). For an analysis of the social science evidence that the parental-
consent and notification requirements burden women and do not contribute to family com-
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The Supreme Court was also responsive to the arguments of prag-
matic preservationists that even if choosing an abortion was a tolerable
moral choice, such that the state could ordinarily not make it a crime,
abortion was not a benign or good moral choice, such that the state
must support or "promote" it. In Maher v. Roe,421 the Court ruled that
it is not unconstitutional for state medicaid programs to exclude abor-
tions even if they fund childbirths. Justice Powell's opinion for the
Court interpreted Roe-Danforth-Bellotti as protecting women against
"unduly burdensome interference with her freedom to decide whether
to terminate her pregnancy" - a freedom from state "compulsion"
that did not entitle women to have their abortions paid for by the
state.422 "There is a basic difference between direct state interference
with a protected activity and state encouragement of an alternative ac-
tivity consonant with legislative policy. '423 The state has wide latitude
not to "promote abortion" by funding it, and Powell's opinion con-
cluded with a statement that this is precisely the sort of policy issue
best left to the democratically elected legislators. 24
Maher encouraged pro-life activists to press for laws not only re-
quiring that abortions be performed only after doctors obtain the writ-
ten consent of their patients (a requirement upheld in Danforth),425
but also that the consent be "informed" by pro-life information the
doctors were required to provide. Akron, Ohio, for example, required
doctors to inform their patients about "the anatomical and physiologi-
cal characteristics of the particular unborn child," many possible com-
plications of abortion, and the "fact" that "the unborn child is a hu-
man life from the moment of conception." This was a powerful bit of
lobbying by the state, and an intrusion into the doctor-patient rela-
tionship, but one that was defended by the Reagan Administration,
which argued that Roe was not strongly implicated in regulations that
did not "unduly burden" the woman's ability to obtain an abortion
munication, see WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & NAN D. HUNTER, SEXUALITY, GENDER,
AND THE LAW 190-202 (1997) [hereinafter ESKRIDGE & HUNTER, SEXUALITY].
421. 432 U.S. 464 (1977). See also Maher's companion cases, Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438
(1977) (interpreting Social Security Act to allow states to participate in medicaid program
without funding abortions), and Poelker v. Doe, 432 U.S. 519 (1977) (per curiam) (municipal
hospital providing childbirth services was not constitutionally required to provide abortion
services). The Court followed and applied Maher to uphold a federal bar to spending federal
monies on abortions in Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980).
422. Maher, 432 U.S. at 473-74 (citing Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599-600 (1977)).
423. Id. at 475. Powell contrasted a law barring schools from teaching German, invali-
dated in Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923), with a policy of teaching Latin as the only
foreign language in the public schools, which the Court would uphold. Maher, 432 U.S. at
476-77.
424. Id. at 479-80; see id. at 481-82 (Burger, C.J., concurring) (same).
425. Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 67, 85 (1976).
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and that the Court should "accord heavy deference to the legislative
judgment" in determining whether this and other requirements consti-
tuted an "undue burden" on the pregnant patient.41 6 The Inc. Fund, in
an amicus brief, reminded the Court that deference to legislative
judgments had been the last line of segregationist constitutionalism -
and that Brown and other race cases had decisively rejected this kind
of argument.427 In any event, the required disclosures loaded up the in-
formed consent process too much for Justice Powell, who wrote for
the Court in striking down this ordinance in Akron v. Akron Center
for Reproductive Health.42 "By insisting upon recitation of a lengthy
and inflexible list of information, Akron unreasonably has placed 'ob-
stacles in the path of the doctor upon whom [the woman is] entitled to
rely for advice in connection with her decision.' "429
The Court followed Akron in Thornburgh v. American College of
Obstetricians and Gynecologists,43° which struck down a similarly
loaded informed consent statute. Justice Blackmun's opinion for the
Court was more forceful than that in Akron, however. "The States are
not free, under the guise of protecting maternal health or potential
life," state interests recognized as valid in Roe, "to intimidate women
into continuing pregnancies" or "to deter a woman from making a de-
cision that, with her physician, is hers to make."43' Thornburgh is sig-
nificant, for it represented an advance for the politics of preservation's
campaign to overrule Roe. Solicitor General Charles Fried filed an
amicus brief urging the Court to abandon Roe's "rigid" trimester
framework and to apply Maher's "undue burden" approach to evalu-
ate the informed consent provisions432 - and his brief drew general
426. Brief of Amicus Curiae the United States at 6-7, Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Repro-
ductive Health, 462 U.S. 416 (1983) (No. 81-746) (undue burden as the constitutional stan-
dard); id. at 8-10 (deference to legislators); cf id. at 5 n.1 (reserving the question whether the
government believed Roe was correctly decided).
427. Brief of Amicus Curiae NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc. at 5-12,
Akron (No. 81-746).
428. 462 U.S. 416, 442-49 (1983).
429. Id. at 445 (quoting Whalen, 429 U.S. at 604 n.33). Powell rejected the argument,
pressed in dissent by Justice O'Connor, that the unconstitutional advice could be severed
from other information that Akron properly required doctors to make available. Id. at 445-
46 n.37.
430. 476 U.S. 747 (1986).
431. Id. at 759.
432. See Brief of Amicus Curiae the United States at 17-18, Thornburgh v. American
College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747 (1986) (No. 84-495) (urging the
Court to abandon the Roe framework for analysis).
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support from four Justices, including Chief Justice Burger (who had
joined Roe and subsequent majority opinions).433
After President Reagan appointed Antonin Scalia and Anthony
Kennedy to the Court, only three of the seven Roe Justices remained
on the Court, and there was every reason to believe that Roe would be
narrowed or overruled.434 The life/choice culture clash broke open in
Webster v. Reproductive Health Services.435 Missouri required doctors
to perform viability tests near the end of the second trimester, a re-
quirement foreclosed by Roe as applied in Akron.436 The state asked
the Court to reconsider and overrule Roe v. Wade - a petition joined
by dozens of right-to-life amici and the Reagan Administration.437 The
Solicitor General argued that Roe created a fundamental right that
was not supported by constitutional text, intent, or tradition; deni-
grated the state's interest in potential human life without any legal or
moral basis; created an arbitrary trimester framework for implement-
ing its flawed premises; and, most important, engaged in this activism
in the teeth of popular demands for regulation. 38 "At the heart of the
abortion controversy lies a divisive conflict between a woman's inter-
est in procreative choice and the State's interest in protecting the life
of an unborn child and promoting respect for life generally. This is not
the kind of conflict that is amenable to judicial resolution." '439 Indeed,
judicial activism tangibly interfered with the proper operation of the
democratic process; by constitutionalizing the key issues, Roe deprived
legislators of the room to bargain and moderate the views of the vari-
ous groups.44°
433. Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 782-85 (Burger, C.J., dissenting); id. at 785-814 (White, J.,
joined by Rehnquist, J., dissenting); id. at 814 (O'Connor, J., joined by Rehnquist, J., dis-
senting).
434. See Walter Dellinger & Gene Sperling, Abortion and the Supreme Court: The Re-
treat from Roe v. Wade, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 83 (1989).
435. 492 U.S. 490 (1989).
436. Akron, 462 U.S. at 434-38.
437. Among the religious groups filing briefs to overrule Roe were the United States
Catholic Conference; the Southern Baptist Convention; the National Association of Evan-
gelicals; the Missouri Synod of the Lutheran Church; the Holy Orthodox Church. Other
amici represented Feminists for Life of America; the National Association of Pro-Life
Nurses; Women Exploited by Abortion; the Family Research Council; Right to Life Advo-
cates.
438. Brief for Amicus Curiae the United States at 11-20, Webster v. Reprod. Health
Servs., 492 U.S. 490 (1989) (No. 88-605).
439. Id. at 20.
440. Id. at 20-24; see also MARY ANN GLENDON, ABORTION AND DIVORCE IN
WESTERN LAW: AMERICAN FAILURES, EUROPEAN CHALLENGES (1987) (most western
countries have resolved these issues through legislation), discussed in Brief of Amicus Cu-
riae the United States at 23-24, Webster (No. 88-605).
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We do not know exactly how the Justices received these arguments
in conference, but ultimately the Court met the Reagan
Administration more than halfway. Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion
for three Justices did not question Roe's holding that a woman's
choice is a "liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause" but
seemed open to the Solicitor General's view that the liberty interest
did not require strict scrutiny; following the administration, his opin-
ion abandoned Roe's trimester framework, as it had been applied as
recently as Thornburgh.441 Declining to follow the administration's
lead so completely, Justice O'Connor concurred only in the result, ap-
plying Maher's "undue burden" analysis. 42 Justice Scalia also con-
curred only in the result. In his own distinctive language, he advanced
the Solicitor General's position: Roe should be completely over-
ruled.443
Roe seemed doomed after two more of its majority (Brennan and
Marshall) left the Court and were replaced by Justices Souter and
Thomas. Both the Solicitor General and the Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania, joined by dozens of amici, again urged the Court to
overrule Roe in Planned Parenthood v. Casey.44 Planned Parenthood
suggested that the state law could not be sustained without overruling
Roe but urged that the Court not do so.445 A large majority of
Americans believed that women do have liberty interests in their deci-
sions whether to choose to abort an unplanned pregnancy,446 and a
great deal of American law and family practice had evolved in reliance
on the rights recognized for a generation under Roe. The conservative
Court faced a dilemma, which its centrists - Justices O'Connor,
Kennedy, and Souter - resolved in a Solomonic way. Their joint
opinion, which also delivered the judgment of a fractured Court,
reaffirmed Roe's holding that the Due Process Clause guarantees a
"woman's [fundamental] right to terminate her pregnancy before
441. Webster, 492 U.S. at 517 (Rehnquist, C.J., joined by White & Kennedy, JJ.).
442. Id. at 530 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment). Contra Brief of Amicus Cu-
riae the United States at 22, Webster (No. 88-605) (rejecting the "undue burden" approach
as unmoored in the Constitution and therefore arbitrary); id. at 22 n.16 (if the Court adopts
an undue burden approach, the focus should be the "burden on procreational choice" and
not the "burden on abortion").
443. Webster, 492 U.S. at 537 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
444. 505 U.S. 833 (1992). For demands that the Court overrule Roe, see, for example,
Brief of Amicus Curiae the United States Supporting Respondents at 8-9, Casey (No. 91-
744); Brief for Respondents at 104-17, Casey (No. 91-744).
445. See Brief for Petitioners and Cross-Respondents at 17-34, Casey (No. 91-744).
446. See, e.g., ELIZABETH ADELL COOK ET AL., BETWEEN Two ABSOLUTES: PUBLIC
OPINION AND THE POLITICS OF ABORTION (1992); Noemie Emery, The Women Who Really
Want This President, THE SPECTATOR, Jan. 31, 1998, at 12 (61% of Americans support some
right to abortion).
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viability," while at the same time jettisoning the trimester framework,
"which we do not consider to be part of the essential holding of
Roe.""7
In place of the prior framework, the three controlling Justices
ruled that the appropriate test should be whether a state regulation
imposes an "undue burden" on the woman, namely, that it "has the
purpose or effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a
woman seeking abortion of a nonviable fetus." '448 The joint opinion
applied this test to allow the state requirements of parental consent
(with the Bellotti bypass) and the woman's written consent after she
had been given state-required information about the fetus and the
consequences of the abortion."9 Although the latter holding essen-
tially overruled Akron and Thornburgh, the joint opinion justified it in
feminist terms that tied women's politics of recognition to the state's
right to promote its own conception of the good.45° Reaffirming
Danforth, the joint opinion rejected the spousal notification require-
ment in terms of women's politics of recognition. No longer could the
Court presume, as it wrongly did in Hoyt and Bradwell, that a
woman's place is in the home, under the thumb of her husband and
consigned to bearing and raising children. The spousal notification
provision "embodies a view of marriage consonant with the common-
law status of married women but repugnant to our present under-
standing of marriage and of the nature of the rights secured by the
Constitution. Women do not lose their constitutionally protected lib-
erty when they marry. "451
As Justices Blackmun and Stevens argued in partial dissent, the
joint opinion was a conservative understanding of feminist politics, be-
cause it permitted a great deal of state regulation of women's choices
that do not burden men's choices.452 But the joint opinion was also a
far cry from the strict pro-life ideology, which received its classic judi-
cial articulation in Justice Scalia's seething dissent, joined by four
Justices. Echoing the view of the pro-life amici, Scalia denounced the
Court for finding a "liberty" to destroy "a human life," without any
447. Casey, 505 U.S. at 846, 873 (joint opinion).
448. Id. at 877. This was the test followed by Justice Powell in Maher, 432 U.S. at 473-74.
449. Casey, 505 U.S. at 882-83 (written consent and information requirements); id. at
899-900 (parental consent).
450. "Regulations which do no more than create a structural mechanism by which the
State, or the parent or guardian of a minor, may express profound respect for the life of the
unborn are permitted, if they are not a substantial obstacle to the woman's exercise of the
right to choose." Id. at 877.
451. Id. at 898.
452. Id. at 927-29 (Blackmun, J., dissenting in part); id. at 934-36 (Stevens, J., dissenting
in part).
2151August 20021
HeinOnline  -- 100 Mich. L. Rev. 2151 2001-2002
Michigan Law Review
principled legal basis for justifying that move.453 He insisted that this
profoundly moral matter is the classic example of an issue best left to
the democratically legitimate state legislative process, and that the
elitist usurpation of decisionmaking by the Court was illegitimate.4
Although most observers thought that Casey resolved the legal
status of Roe v. Wade, the pro-life/pro-choice constitutional debate has
continued and possibly escalated. The next wave of statutes reflecting
traditionalist objections to Roe focused on certain mechanisms for
late-term abortions, and these laws have produced emotional clashes
in all levels of government.455 The Supreme Court ruled in Stenberg v.
Carhart,456 that states could not ban all such mechanisms and could not
ban any that did not have a broad exception giving physicians discre-
tion to protect the health of the mother. Joined by four members of
the Court, Justice Thomas's dissenting opinion described procedures
allowed by the Court's decision in gruesome detail, analogizing them
to "infanticide." '457 Justice Scalia went further, describing the Court's
authorization for "killing a human child" as a decision whose infamy
would be equivalent to that of Dred Scott and Korematsu.455 Although
Justice O'Connor provided a roadmap for states to enact partial birth
abortion laws that would satisfy her (the critical fifth vote for the ma-
jority),459 there is little doubt that this new manifestation of the consti-
tutional politics of abortion will occupy the country and the courts for
some time to come.
b. The First Amendment Cases. The libertarian First Amendment,
protective of women's interests in the family planning context, was a
fulcrum for critique once feminists obtained state and federal legisla-
tion protecting their interests. Where feminists were most united and
public opinion agreed with their agenda, the Court has applied the
First Amendment cautiously. For example, many states and munici-
palities have barred "public accommodations" from discriminating on
the basis of sex, and some have applied these laws to private clubs
453. Id. at 982 (Scalia, J., dissenting in part).
454. Id. at 996.
455. See Hope Clinic v. Ryan, 195 F.3d 857, 881 (7th Cir. 1999) (Posner, C.J., dissenting)
(analyzing cynically the politics of partial birth abortion measures).
456. 530 U.S. 914 (2000), discussed in Section III.B.
457. Id. at 983-87 (Thomas, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and Scalia & Kennedy, JJ., dis-
senting) (noting that the procedure "so closely borders on infanticide that 30 States have
attempted to ban it," a characterization repeated at 1020); id. at 983-87 (describing in detail
the procedure, with the suggestion that this is surgical murder).
458. Id. at 953 (Scalia, J., dissenting). In a characteristically antic move, Scalia presented
himself as a modern Cato, as he ended two consecutive paragraphs, and his dissenting opin-
ion, with the refrain, "Casey must be overruled" (translatable as "Casey delenda est"). Id. at
955-56.
459. Id. at 947-51 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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such as the Jaycees and the Rotary Club, which were all-male by na-
tional rule.46° In Roberts v. United States Jaycees,461 the Court recog-
nized that the First Amendment protects the right of men to form
''expressive" associations but failed to see how admitting women
would undermine the expressive and associational interests of the
Jaycees.462 Moreover, the Court ruled that whatever injury the law im-
posed on men's rights of association was justified by the important
state antidiscrimination interest.
463
In other areas, where feminists were themselves divided and the
public less supportive, the Court has applied the First Amendment ag-
gressively. The Court, for example, summarily affirmed Judge Frank
Easterbrook's decision invalidating an Indianapolis law creating a tort
cause of action for women injured by sexually explicit pornography
that objectifies or degrades women.464 As Easterbrook's opinion em-
phasized, the ordinance regulated published materials that were not
obscene (as the Court had defined the term) based on their content,
the kind of regulation the First Amendment has traditionally rejected.
Professor Catharine MacKinnon and other feminists had supported
the ordinance as a measure needed for the protection of women
against violence, and Indianapolis pressed their views on appeal. The
ordinance regulated "speech" that is of the lowest value and results in
great harm to women; under the Court's child pornography and inde-
cent speech precedents, these demonstrated harms should have been
sufficient to justify the ordinance, they maintained. 465 Even under strict
scrutiny, the ordinance could be defended as needed to advance the
compelling state interest in "eradicating sex discrimination," as in
Roberts.466 The most powerful critics of these arguments have been
460. See, e.g., David E. Bernstein, Sex Discrimination Laws Versus Civil Liberties, 1999
U. CHI. LEGAL FORUM 133.
461. 468 U.S. 609 (1984).
462. Id. at 627; accord Bd. of Dirs. of Rotary Int'l v. Rotary Club, 481 U.S. 537 (1987)
(following Roberts). The Jaycees' brief probably did not help their cause much, as it was
largely circular: the Jaycees defined themselves as a "young men's" association, and so their
goals would axiomatically be impaired if "young women" were imposed upon them. See
Brief of Appellee at 11-16, Roberts (No. 83-724). Their expressive association claim would
have been stronger - but also probably less acceptable to their membership - if it had
been that "our association stands for the idea that 'business is for guys.' " Cf. Brennan Con-
ference Notes for Roberts, in Brennan Papers, supra note 129, Box I: 628, Folder 4 (Stevens:
"Male chauvinists can't have protections unless they admit they are.").
463. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 623.
464. Hudnut v. Am. Booksellers Ass'n, Inc., 475 U.S. 1001 (1986), summarily affg 771
F.2d 323 (7th Cir. 1985).
465. Jurisdictional Statement at 11-15, Hudnut (No. 85-1090) (relying on New York v.
Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982) (child pornography)); Young v. Am. Mini-Theatres, 427 U.S. 50
(1976) (plurality opinion) (sexually explicit speech is low-value) as well as Catharine MacK-
innon, Pornography, Civil Rights, and Speech, 20 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1 (1985)).
466. Jurisdictional Statement at 15-20, Hudnut (No. 85-1090).
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feminists, however.467 In the Indianapolis case, their only fans on the
Supreme Court were its most traditionalist Justices. 68
Hate speech codes have been even more controversial, because
traditionalists as well as liberal feminists are skeptical of them. De-
fenders such as Professor Mari Matsuda maintain that such codes are
constitutional because of their effect on third parties, especially people
of color, women, and lesbigay people: hate speech literally disables
them from participating in the political, social, and intellectual life of
the community. 69 Notwithstanding these powerful arguments, such
codes are of dubious constitutionality after the Court's decision in
R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul.4 ° The Court ruled that a hate crime law was
overbroad because it penalized a lot of protected speech because of its
expressive content, and indeed because of its viewpoint (denigration
of racial or sexual minorities or women). Most judges - and many
feminists - have understood this decision to be fatal to broadly writ-
ten state hate speech laws.
Contrast the EEOC's Title VII guidelines regulating sexual har-
assment in the workplace. 7' Like the anti-porn ordinance, these
guidelines are drawn from the work of Professor MacKinnon and
other early feminists.47' And their requirement that the employer not
tolerate a "hostile work environment" has been interpreted to restrict
speech as well as conduct that creates an environment hostile to
women. Although libertarians have been consistently critical of these
speech-restrictive rules, feminists and ordinary judges have disputed
their tension with First Amendment values.473 Even Justice Scalia's
opinion in R.A.V. was forced (by his colleagues no doubt) to concede
that "sexually derogatory 'fighting words,' among other words, may
produce a violation of Title VII's prohibition of sexual discrimination
467. See Lisa Duggan et al., False Promises: Feminist Anti-Pornography Legislation, 38
N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 133 (1993); Nicholas Wolfson, Eroticism, Obscenity, Pornography, and
Free Speech, 60 BROOK. L. REV. 1037 (1994).
468. Within the Court, Burger, Rehnquist, and O'Connor - the most traditionalist Jus-
tices in 1986 - would have noted probable jurisdiction and heard arguments in the case. The
other six Justices voted to affirm Easterbrook's opinion without briefing and argument. See
Hudnut, 475 U.S. 1001.
469. Mari J. Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering the Victim's Story,
87 MICH. L. REV. 2320 (1989).
470. 505 U.S. 377 (1992).
471. EEOC Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex, 29 C.F.R. 1604.11(a); see
Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986) (upholding these regulations).
472. CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN: A
CASE OF SEX DISCRIMINATION (1979).
473. Compare JEFFREY ROSEN, THE UNWANTED GAZE (2001); Eugene Volokh, Free-
dom of Speech and Workplace Harassment, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1791 (1992), with Miranda
Oshige McGowan, Certain Illusions About Speech: Why the Free Speech Critique of Hostile
Work Environment Harassment Is Wrong, CONST. COMM. (forthcoming 2002).
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in employment practices." '474 This consensus has eroded: some femi-
nists and judges are concerned that the breadth of the EEOC's guide-
lines or their too-aggressive implementation by employers are chilling
sexual expression in the workplace. 75
The most hotly contested area has involved pro-life activities. Frus-
trated by their mixed results from the legal system and the political
process, pro-life activists formed more aggressive groups, the Pro-Life
Action League (1980) and Operation Rescue (1986). These groups
have engaged in an escalating campaign to picket abortion clinics and
the homes of abortion doctors, to approach women entering clinics
and persuade them not to proceed with abortions, and (in some in-
stances) to assault abortion providers and damage the clinics.476 Pro-
choice activists objected that these activities intimidated both women
seeking abortions and providers.477 In 1986, NOW sued the Pro-Life
Action League for conspiring to interfere with its members' constitu-
tional rights; Operation Rescue was added as a defendant in 1989.
Abortion providers and their allies obtained injunctions all over the
country; the orders typically enjoined protesters from blocking access
to clinics, harassing women as they approached the clinics, and creat-
ing loud disturbances outside the clinics.478
Pro-life protesters objected that these injunctions violated their
First Amendment rights. In Madsen v. Women's Health Center,479
474. R.A.V., 505 U.S, at 389 (emphasis added). Note Scalia's slip of the pen: "sexual"
rather than "sex" discrimination. Id.
475. See, e.g., Saxe v. State College Area Sch. Dist., 240 F.3d 200 (3d Cir. 2001) (trim-
ming back application of school district's sexual harassment guidelines in light of First
Amendment values); Vicki Schultz, The Sanitized Workplace, 112 YALE L.J. (forthcoming
2002).
476. See RANDALL A. TERRY, OPERATION RESCUE (1988) (describing the philosophy
of the organization's founder); Blanchard, supra note 406, at 51-60; Faye Ginsburg, Rescuing
the Nation: Operation Rescue and the Rise of Anti-Abortion Militance, in ABORTION WARS:
A HALF CENTURY OF STRUGGLE, 1950-2000, at 227-50 (Rickie Solinger ed., 1998); Victoria
Johnson, The Strategic Determinants of a Countermovement: The Emergence and Impact of
Operation Rescue Blockades, in WAVES OF PROTEST: SOCIAL MOVEMENTS SINCE THE
SIXTIES 241,245-65 (Jo Freeman & Victoria Johnson eds., 1999).
477. See generally Abortion Clinic Violence: Oversight Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Civil & Constitutional Rights of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong. (1985-86);
Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act of 1993: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on
Labor and Human Resources, 103d Cong. (1993).
478. See Brief of Amici Curiae NOW Legal Defense and Education Fund et al., Madsen
v. Women's Health Ctr., 512 U.S. 753 (1994) (No. 93-880) (listing reported federal and state
cases issuing or upholding such injunctions).
479. 512 U.S. 753 (1994), followed and applied in Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network of
Western N.Y., 519 U.S. 357 (1997). An earlier case, Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474 (1988),
upheld an ordinance regulating residential picketing that had been aimed at pro-life protest-
ers. Accord Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic, 506 U.S. 263 (1993) (holding that
women have no § 1985 claim for relief against pro-life protesters conspiring to deny them
access to abortion).
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Operation Rescue and counsel Jay Sekulow argued that the injunc-
tions were prior restraints per se invalid under the First Amendment
and, if not prior restraints, were substantive (and not time, place, or
manner) restrictions on speech that were subject to strict scrutiny.4 "°
Other amici associated Operation Rescue's protest activities with
those of Susan B. Anthony, Martin Luther King, Jr., and early gay
rights activists - a tradition of "civil disobedience" justifying judicial
protection. 8' Feminists and the clinic responded that the injunctions
regulated conduct and likely violations of the law, not ideas, and
therefore constituted ordinary time, place, and manner restrictions,
traditionally subjected to rational basis inquiry.48
As it had in Casey, the Supreme Court chose a middle path to re-
solve the clash of norms. Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion for the
Court in Madsen ruled, with the clinic, that the injunction was neither
a prior restraint nor a content-based regulation of the protesters but
followed Operation Rescue in declining to characterize it as nothing
more than a time, place, or manner restriction. Because injunctions
"carry greater risks of censorship and discriminatory application" than
statutes do, Rehnquist ruled that they require more exacting scrutiny
than statutory time, place, and manner restrictions. "We must ask
instead whether the challenged provisions of the injunction burden
no more speech than is necessary to serve a significant government
interest." '483 Applying the standard, the Chief Justice upheld the
thirty-six-foot buffer zone in front of the clinic but invalidated other
features of the injunction that were too broad.484
c. The National Campaign Against Sexual Harassment and Assault.
Like civil rights activists, feminists have had strong incentives to na-
tionalize their rights campaign: national laws and precedents offer the
impressive enforcement resources of the federal government, can
trump sexist policies still followed in the most traditionalist states (es-
pecially in the South), and present better possibilities for policies that
actually redistribute power toward women.85 Nowhere has this been
480. See Brief of Amici Curiae Operation Rescue et al. at 4-15, Madsen (No. 93-880).
481. Brief of Amicus Curiae American Family Association at 4-11, Madsen (No. 93-
880).
482. Brief for Respondents at 21-28, Madsen (No. 93-880).
483. Madsen, 512 U.S. at 764-65.
484. The Court followed and elaborated Madsen in Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703
(2000) (discussed in Section IIIB) and Scheck v. Pro-Choice Network, 519 U.S. 357 (1997).
485. As to the last item, political scientists recognize that local governments are less
likely to redistribute resources or rights, because they fear flight from traditionally empow-
ered groups (especially rich people and corporations). At least in the 1960s, the flight prob-
lem was not so serious when regulation was national, and so redistributive legislation in the
twentieth century tended to flourish at the national rather than local level. See PAUL
PETERSON, THE PRICE OF FEDERALISM (1995).
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more important than in women's mobilization against gender-based
violence. Recall the previous discussion of the EEOC's rules against
sexual harassment in the workplace. Because of the civil rights move-
ment's complete victory in legitimating Title VII as a proper exercise
of congressional authority, this feminist effort did not encounter
strong objection that it was an intrusion into areas best regulated by
state and local governments. In contrast, feminist arguments that sex-
ual harassment is illegal in educational institutions covered by Title
IX, accepted by the Department of Education in 1998, have met with
strong federalism-based resistance. Federalist critics concede that the
federal government has broad discretion to set conditions on the funds
it distributes to state educational institutions but argue that Title IX
does not provide the states with adequate notice that their receipt of
federal money carries with it potentially costly liability for sexual har-
assment lawsuits.486 As the new millennium opened, Title IX has been
the subject of intense policy debates.
In contrast to sexual violence in the workplace, where national
regulation is well-established, and in schools, where national regula-
tion is justified by the receipt of federal funds, sexual violence in the
bedroom has traditionally been the province of state and local gov-
ernments. As scholars have shown, those governments have per-
formed their functions poorly (and by some accounts scandalously).
Even after states liberalized rape laws, women too often remain un-
protected against sexual assault, either by strangers or (especially)
boyfriends and spouses.487 Between 1990 and 1994, feminists and their
allies developed a detailed record in a series of congressional hearings
and reports, showing that women are pervasively subjected to violence
because of their sex, that this pervasive violence not only affects
women but also imposes enormous costs on the community and the
economy, and that state law enforcement has been and remains inade-
quate to handle this level of gender-based violence.48 Based on this
record, Congress enacted the Violence Against Women Act of 1994
486. Compare Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 654 (1999)
(Kennedy, J., dissenting) (making this argument as a basis for not rendering schools liable
for hostile environment harassment), with id. at 632 (O'Connor, J., for the Court) (allowing
a claim for relief, but defining it narrowly because of these federalism concerns).
487. There is an enormous literature on the prevalence of unremedied sexual assaults
against women in America, including DIANA E.H. RUSSELL, SEXUAL EXPLOITATION:
RAPE, CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE, AND WORKPLACE HARASSMENT (1984); Mary Koss et al.,
The Scope of Rape: Incidence and Prevalence of Sexual Aggression and Victimization in a
National Sample of Higher Education Students, 55 J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSYCHOL.
162 (1987). For a popular critique of these studies, see KATIE ROIPHE, THE MORNING
AFTER: SEX, FEAR, AND FEMINISM ON CAMPUS (1993).
488. The congressional evidence is assembled, with references, in United States v.
Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 628-36 (2000) (Souter, J., dissenting).
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("VAWA"), which, inter alia, created a private claim for relief for
"crimes of violence motivated by gender. '489
Although Congress justified its authority to enact VAWA upon
the Commerce Clause and Fourteenth Amendment precedents that
had sustained the Civil Rights Act ("CRA") and the Voting Rights
Act ("VRA"), 490 VAWA was different from the earlier laws. Unlike
the VRA, which applied only to state and local governments, VAWA
created a claim for relief against private violators; unlike the CRA,
which applied to employers and public accommodations engaged in
economic activities, VAWA reached defendants engaged in private
noneconomic activity (sexual violence, usually in private places). To
the extent the Court viewed the Commerce Clause as justifying fed-
eral regulation only of economic activity and the Fourteenth
Amendment as justifying federal regulation only of state activity,
VAWA was in constitutional trouble - and, not surprisingly, it
reached the U.S. Supreme Court pretty quickly, as United States v.
Morrison.491
In my view, the mountains of briefs in the case mechanically
worked the precedents, which could have justified either result.492 In
lawyerly fashion, VAWA defenders emphasized the desperate need
for national enforcement of widely accepted norms against sexual as-
sault,493 while critics argued that any theory supporting VAWA could
be used to justify any exercise of congressional power, thereby elimi-
nating federalism as a limit on Congress.494 An issue that received re-
markably short shrift was the longstanding feminist charge that the
ideas of traditional state sovereignty over domestic relations (relevant
to the Commerce Clause power) and the state action doctrine (rele-
489. Violence Against Women Act, § 40302, 108 Stat. 1941-42, codified at 42 U.S.C.
§ 13981 (2002).
490. The precedents are discussed in Section II.E.2.
491. 529 U.S. 598 (2000), discussed in Section II.E.2.
492. That is, briefs supporting VAWA argued that the civil rights precedents supported
federal lawmaking over any activity affecting commerce, Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S.
294 (1965), or undermining equal access to state justice, United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745
(1966). Briefs attacking VAWA argued that newer federalism precedents did not allow
Congress to regulate noneconomic activity under the Commerce Clause, United States v.
Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 559-60 (1995), or to regulate purely private activity under the Four-
teenth Amendment, City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997) (reaffirming The Civil
Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883)).
493. See Brief of Petitioner at 6-18, 26-32, 42-45, Morrison v. United States, 529 U.S. 598
(2000) (Nos. 99-5, 99-29); Brief of Amici Curiae States of Arizona [and 35 other states and
Puerto Rico] in Support of Petitioner's Brief on the Merits at 5-9, 15-21, Morrison (Nos. 99-
5, 99-29); Brief of Amici Curiae Law Professors in Support of Petitioners at 7-12, 18-23,
Morrison (Nos. 99-5, 99-29).
494. See Brief of Amicus Curiae Eagle Forum Education & Legal Defense Fund in
Support of Respondents, Morrison (Nos. 99-5, 99-29).
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vant to the Fourteenth Amendment power) mimicked the separate
spheres construct that has long retarded women's equality. That is, the
traditional relegation of women to the domestic sphere finds parallels
in the presumption against national regulation of domestic relations or
of private discriminations and violence. The spaces where women are
most centrally located and most vulnerable are those least constitu-
tionally susceptible to national regulation that is much more effica-
cious. In contrast, the public spheres of commerce and state action -
where men have been and remain dominant - are spaces where the
Court has authorized Congress to act, partly in response to cases
brought by the male-dominated civil rights movement.
Although one may doubt the Justices would have been receptive to
this kind of theoretical argument, it does help us understand the con-
sequences of the Court's 5-4 ruling striking down the law. Rejecting
the feminist position taken by thirty-six states, Chief Justice
Rehnquist's opinion for the Morrison Court strictly followed the ar-
guments laid out in the briefs for the defendants and the amicus brief
for Phyllis Schlafly's Eagle Forum. This was an important defeat for
women's politics of recognition as well as remediation: not only will
sexual assault laws continue to be greatly underenforced, but the sepa-
rate spheres idea got an unexpected boost from the Court, which spe-
cifically targeted "family law" as an arena limited to state regulation.495
Conversely, Morrison is an important victory for the politics of preser-
vation's effort to localize antidiscrimination law. A consequence is
that feminist efforts to redistribute resources to protect women will
continue to be thwarted by obstacles inherent to local governance.
C. Gay Rights Movement
Unlike the civil rights and women's rights movements, which had
rich conceptual and political antecedents in the nineteenth century,
the gay rights movement was entirely a creature of the twentieth cen-
tury. Although states criminalized sodomy and municipalities made
cross-dressing a minor crime before 1900, "homosexual sodomy" and
"homosexuality" were not objects of state regulation until the early
twentieth century.496 But once the state focused on "homosexuals and
495. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 615-16 (noting that a danger of accepting Congress's under-
standing of the Commerce Clause is that it could "be applied equally as well to family law
and other areas of traditional state regulation").
496. For this regulatory shift, see ESKRIDGE, GAYLAW, supra note 14, at 17-56; LILLIAN
FADERMAN, ODD GIRLS AND TWILIGHT LOVERS: A HISTORY OF LESBIAN LIFE IN
TWENTIETH CENTURY AMERICA (1991); ANGUS MCLAREN, THE TRIALS OF
MASCULINITY: POLICING SEXUAL BOUNDARIES, 1870-1930 (1997); and Estelle Freedman,
"Uncontrolled Desires": The Response to the Sexual Psychopath, 1920-1960, 74 J. AM. HIST.
83 (1987).
2159August 20021
HeinOnline  -- 100 Mich. L. Rev. 2159 2001-2002
Michigan Law Review
sex perverts," it did so with a vengeance. At the height of America's
anti-homosexual terror, the half-generation after World War II, the
state not only hunted and jailed "homosexuals" for cross-dressing and
having sex with one another, but kicked them out of the civil service,
closed their bars and hangouts, seized novels and journals about their
"perversion," censored movies that mentioned the crime that dared
not speak its name, deported them, and locked them in hospitals
where they were electroshocked, castrated, and otherwise tortured. 97
Before the anti-homosexual Kulturkampf, there was little homo-
phile politics of any sort - there were frightened individuals seeking
to avoid disclosure, tiny subcultural communities concentrated in the
larger cities, and isolated institutions such as bars and publishers who
catered to a lesbigay clientele. State persecution stimulated a nascent
politics of protection after 1945, as "homosexuals" and their subcul-
tural institutions not only started to resist their persecution, but did so
through organizations and lawyers that asserted their rights in court.
Both the persecution and the resistance encouraged a larger number
of gay people to "come out of the closet" in the 1960s, a process that
spawned a tiny but influential politics of recognition, modeled on the
civil rights experience and claiming that homosexuality is a benign
variation, rather than the malignant one portrayed by the law. Be-
cause openly lesbigay people have been a minuscule (and later small)
minority of the American population, and an intensely hated minority
to this day, they have relied on lawyers to assert their interests more
than women and perhaps even people of color have in the last genera-
tion. Unlike the civil rights and women's movements, moreover, the
gay rights movement has been far from successful in its politics of rec-
ognition: not only do many state and even national laws and policies
disadvantage lesbigays as a practical matter, many openly disrespect
Americans because of their minority sexual orientation.498 On the
other hand, in municipalities and an increasing number of gay-friendly
states, a lesbigay politics of remediation has been successful in ob-
taining state protection for sexual and gender minorities.
The slow and to this day uncertain progress of a progay politics of
recognition and remediation owes much to the average person's asso-
ciation of lesbigay people with sodomy and other sexual activities. Ac-
497. On the postwar anti-homosexual persecution, see ALLAN BERUBE, COMING OUT
UNDER FIRE: THE HISTORY OF GAY MEN AND WOMEN IN WORLD WAR Two (1990);
JOHN D'EMILIO, SEXUAL POLITICS, SEXUAL COMMUNITIES: THE MAKING OF A
HOMOSEXUAL MINORITY IN THE UNITED STATES, 1940-1970 (1983); ESKRIDGE, GAYLAW,
supra note 14, at 57-80; JONATHAN NED KATZ, GAY AMERICAN HISTORY (1976) (repro-
ducing many primary documents); and George Chauncey, Jr., The Postwar Sex Crime Panic,
in TRUE STORIES FROM THE AMERICAN PAST 160 (William Graebner ed., 1993).
498. Antigay laws and policies as of 1998 are collected (with references) in ESKRIDGE,
GAYLAW, supra note 14, at 139-41, 362-71 (app. B3).
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cordingly, lesbigay people's political and constitutional struggles have
tended to be more like the politics of abortion than the politics of
equal rights for women and people of color. Like the (intimately re-
lated) pro-life countermovement, the traditional family values
("TFV") countermovement focuses on the asserted immorality of spe-
cific conduct (consensual sodomy) to deny individuals rights and,
when this argument runs out, falls back on "no promotion" arguments:
even if the state cannot criminalize consensual same-sex intimacy, it
can adopt numerous measures to discourage or signal its disapproval
of such controversial activities. Ongoing clashes between gay rights
and family values form one of the cutting edges of American constitu-
tional law at the dawn of the new millennium.
1. The Politics of Protection, 1946-69
"Homosexuals" and cross-dressers were legally defenseless but
were mostly left alone by the law before World War II. The two phe-
nomena were interrelated: so long as they were left alone, these
Americans were not even an identity-based "minority group." This
changed with the postwar anti-homosexual terror, for it landed many
lesbigay people in prison, outed them and others, and triggered a
moderate "homophile" politics seeking constitutional protection of
private gay spaces.499 That politics relied on the libertarian features of
the Due Process Clause and the First Amendment, at the very point
when the civil rights and free press movements were giving these con-
stitutional provisions real bite. For a dramatic example, the earliest
public triumph of the Mattachine Society of Los Angeles, the first sub-
stantial homophile group, was a campaign against police entrapment
of one of their members through aggressive sting operations.5" In this
and other campaigns, the Mattachine Society, and its sister the
Daughters of Bilitis, conceded gay people's condition as tragic but
claimed basic civil liberties.
Unlike the early civil rights and women's movements, the homo-
phile movement relied most successfully on the First Amendment.
State censorship of "degenerate" or "perverted" books, plays, and
movies was particularly common, because traditionalists were
squeamish about any favorable or even neutral public discussion of
"sexual deviation," while lesbigay people were thirsty for information
about sexual variation and saw their despised status as one based on
499. On the early homophile politics, see D'EMILIO, supra note 497; STUART TIMMONS,
THE TROUBLE WITH HARRY HAY (1990). See also ERIC MARCUS, MAKING HISTORY: THE
STRUGGLE FOR GAY AND LESBIAN EQUAL RIGHTS 32-36, 40-41, 50-53, 62-63, 111-13 (1992)
(providing various first-person accounts by early homophile leaders).
500. See Dale Jennings, To Be Accused Is to Be Guilty, ONE, INC., Jan. 1953, at 11-12
(providing first-hand account).
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society's misinformation. 1 State and lower federal courts had some-
times ruled against censorship of gay-friendly or gay-neutral materials
before World War II. For example, New York's state courts over-
turned local censorship of Sholom Asch's lesbian-themed God of
Vengeance, gay writer Andrd Gide's autobiography, and Radclyffe
Hall's lesbian classic, Well of Loneliness. 2 In retrospect, these few
protected works were pretty tame discussions of sexual variation; the
authorities wished to censor them because they spoke of homosexual-
ity as a natural rather than sinful phenomenon, a benign or at worst
tolerable sexual variation. After the war, more provocative literary
depictions of sexual variants tested the limits of the First Amendment.
Most lesbigay-depicting novels either passed unnoticed by the censors
or were suppressed without much fuss, but in the 1950s aggressive cen-
sors confronted more in-your-face gay works such as Allen Ginsburg's
homoerotic poem "Howl" and Herman Womack's male physique
magazines, both of which were suppressed by state authorities and
then liberated by the courts.0 3
These legal questions first reached the Supreme Court in the most
innocuous setting imaginable. The U.S. Post Office seized the October
1954 issue of One, Inc., the earliest homophile informational maga-
zine.5" The Post Office claimed that the magazine's brief, generalized
depiction of a potential lesbian romance ("Sappho Remembered"), a
dirty poem, and an advertisement for a German magazine were ob-
scene; the Ninth Circuit agreed, on the ground that vulnerable minds
could be corrupted by these materials.5" One appealed to the Supreme
501. For accounts of the battle by gay people to express themselves and society to shut
them up in various fora, see ROGER AUSTEN, PLAYING THE GAME: THE HOMOSEXUAL
NOVEL IN AMERICA (1977); KAIER CURTIN, "WE CAN ALWAYS CALL THEM
BULGARIANS": THE EMERGENCE OF LESBIAN AND GAY MEN ON THE AMERICAN STAGE
(1987); and RODGER STREITMATTER, UNSPEAKABLE: THE RISE OF A GAY AND LESBIAN
PRESS IN AMERICA (1995). On the legal struggle, see ESKRIDGE, GAYLAW, supra note 14, at
32-34, 46-49, 76-78, 95-96, 116-23. See also id. at 80-82 (suggesting chilling parallels between
Nazi suppression of homosexual expression and similar suppressive measures in America
after the war against the Nazis).
502. For the stories of these works' censorship and state court action, see ESKRIDGE,
GAYLAW, supra note 14, at 33, 47-48; Nancy J. Knauer, Homosexuality as Contagion: From
The Well of Loneliness to the Boy Scouts, 29 HOFSTRA L. REV. 401, 430-54 (2000) (offering
detailed analytical account of Well's obscenity trials in both the U.S. and U.K.). Most gay-
themed works either passed without censorial notice or, if discovered, were successfully cen-
sored before World War 11, however. See ESKRIDGE, GAYLAW, supra note 14, at 46-49
(providing examples).
503. Womack's work is treated below; Ginsburg's in Section II.F.2.
504. For two slightly different accounts of this episode, compare STREITMATTER, supra
note 501, at 32, with MARCUS, supra note 499, at 52-53 (providing first-person account years
after the events).
505. One, Inc. v. Olesen, 241 F.2d 772 (9th Cir. 1957), rev'd, 355 U.S. 371 (1958) (per
curiam).
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Court, on the ground that "[w]orks which attempt to elucidate, explain
or grapple with thorny and fundamental human problems should be
extended great latitude of expression, since they often, in the last
analysis, serve humanity's ends." Apologetically, Eric Julber's brief
submitted that the magazine never included lewd sexual references
nor even any "advocacy of homosexuality as a way of life"; it just prof-
fered discussion of the issues associated with "that particular neurosis,
or complexion.
506
Right after Julber filed his brief, the Court decided Roth v. United
States, 7 which held that the state could not censor a publication as
"obscene" unless, considered as a whole, its predominant appeal is to
the audience's prurient interest and its presentation exceeds custom-
ary limits. Was a lesbian romance inherently prurient in ways that
straight ones were not? As one law clerk put it,
The [appeals] court seems to feel that homosexuality is disgusting and
therefore allusions to homosexual practices are disgusting and ob-
scene.... I think One is no more descriptive of sexual practices than
dozens of magazines. The fact that the practices differ from those of the
"normal" person should not make the magazine obscene.0 8
We do not know exactly how the Justices viewed the case, but they
voted with no recorded dissent to reverse the Ninth Circuit's decision
and to direct that judgment be awarded to the homophile publication
on the basis of Roth. °9
The Post Office's campaign also included male physique maga-
zines, which government psychiatrists believed had a prurient appeal
to male homosexuals. In Manual Enterprises, Inc. v. Day,"0 Herman
Womack challenged the government's targeting several of his maga-
zines (MANual, Grecian Guild Pictorial) under Roth. Stanley Dietz's
506. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 8, One, Inc. v. Olesen, 355 U.S. 371 (1958) (1957
Term, No. 290).
507. 354 U.S. 476 (1957), discussed in Section II.F.2.
508. Law Clerks' Memoranda for One, Inc. (1957 Term), in Burton Papers, supra note
249, Container 298 (No. 290). Another law clerk professed himself "torn between the desire
to cut down on this sort of administrative censorship and the revulsion the magazine gives
me." However, he opined that "in the long run it is better to let the American people make
the choice than a postmaster." Office Memos for One, Inc. (Aug. 26, 1957), in Douglas Pa-
pers, supra note 192, Container 1187.
509. One, Inc. v. Olesen, 355 U.S. 371 (1958) (per curiam) (reversing on the basis of
Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957)). According to Justice Douglas' docket book, six
Justices voted to take the case on January 3, 1958, with four Justices (Frankfurter, Douglas,
Harlan, and Whittaker) reversing summarily, rather than remanding for the lower court to
reconsider in light of Roth. (There is no notation for how three Justices voted.) A week later,
Justice Clark, who voted against certiorari the week before, voted with the Frankfurter
group to reverse outright. See Docket Book for One, Inc. (Jan. 13, 1958), in Douglas Papers,
supra note 192, Container 1184.
510. 370 U.S. 478 (1962), described and analyzed by JOYCE MURDOCH & DEB PRICE,
COURTING JUSTICE: GAY MEN AND LESBIANS V. THE SUPREME COURT 65-88 (2001).
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brief for Womack charged the Post Office with "nothing more than an
attempt to enforce the prejudices of the predominant social and eco-
nomic majority over a minority group." If the state could censor im-
ages based on their prurient appeal alone, then the Post Office could
seize suggestive pin-up photographs of Marilyn Monroe, Dietz ar-
gued.511 Solicitor General Archibald Cox's brief responded that the
state could censor any kind of scantily-clad pin-ups and, in any event,
that homophile pin-ups are more dangerous to society because "ho-
mosexuals are more easily stimulated to overt sexual activities than
are normal persons with heterosexual outlooks. Finally, it seems
scarcely open to question that society has a legitimate interest," ex-
pressed in state sodomy laws, "in preventing overt homosexual activi-
ties while refusing to condemn comparable activities when indulged in
on a heterosexual basis." '512 Dietz's oral argument in Manual
Enterprises was the Justices' first face-to-face encounter with constitu-
tional issues raised by sexual minorities. There is no evidence that
anyone on the Court learned anything from the encounter. Justice
Harlan's plurality opinion reversed the censorship because the pic-
tures were not inherently "prurient" according to contemporary stan-
dards of decency513 but gratuitously described the magazines as "dis-
mally unpleasant, uncouth, and tawdry" and their readers as
"unfortunate persons." '514 Justice Clark's dissenting opinion lamented
that the Post Office was now required to be "the world's largest dis-
seminator of smut." '515 The Supreme Court in the 1960s and 1970s re-
peatedly addressed state and local censorship of publications depicting
homosexual intimacy more directly. The Court sometimes protected
gay erotica against censorship, but often treated gay erotica more
harshly than straight. 16
Lesbigay people could invoke the speech and press protections of
the First Amendment to protect discussion about homosexuality, in-
511. Brief for Appellant at 23 (quotation in text), 27-28, Manual Enterprises (1961
Term, No. 123).
512. Brief for the Respondent at 44-45, Manual Enterprises (1961 Term, No. 123); see id.
at 27 (making similar argument that "pornographic material directed to sexual deviates is
more likely to induce overt sexual activity than such material directed to the normal sexual
impulses").
513. Manual Enterprises, 370 U.S. 478 (Harlan, J., joined by Stewart, J.). Four Justices
concurred in the result. Id. at 495 (Black, J., concurring in the result); id. at 495-519
(Brennan, J., joined by Warren, C.J., and Douglas, J., concurring in the judgment) (rejecting
the Post Office's authority to censor).
514. Id. at 490 (opinion by Harlan, J.).
515. Id. at 519 (Clark, J., dissenting). "The magazines have no social, educational, or
entertainment qualities but are designed solely as sex stimulants for homosexuals." Id. at
526.
516. See infra Section II.F.2.
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cluding autobiographical discussion.57 They could also invoke the as-
sembly provision to protect their ability to gather together. Indeed,
the NAACP's right of association cases made it unlikely that the state
would directly prosecute homophile organizations. Most of the litiga-
tion arose in the context of state efforts to revoke liquor licenses from
bars catering to lesbian or gay clientele. Unlike individual gay people,
the bars had resources to resist such efforts, and sometimes state
courts would intervene. The California Supreme Court in Stoumen v.
Reilly51 ruled that regulators could not deny licenses to bars simply
because of "patronage... by homosexuals... without proof of the
commission of illegal or immoral acts on the premises." ' Because the
constitutional basis for this ruling was unclear, the legislature adopted
a law barring licenses to establishments that were reputed to be resorts
for "sexual perverts.""52 In Vallerga v. Department of Alcoholic
Beverage Control,521 the California Supreme Court invalidated this law
as a violation of gay people's constitutional right to association, just as
Mitchell and Juliet Lowenthal had argued in their amicus brief filed on
behalf of the ACLU. As Vallerga suggests, ACLU-affiliated attorneys
sometimes represented lesbigay defendants in the 1950s and early
1960s, even though the national ACLU was on record in favor of sod-
omy laws.
The Due Process Clause had a lot less bite for the homophile poli-
tics of protection than it had for people of color, because almost all the
"homosexuals" arrested by police dragnets and stings were either re-
leased immediately or plea bargained to a mild punishment without a
constitutional peep.522 The biggest value of due process was prophylac-
tic: homophile groups made gay people aware of their procedural
rights, especially their right to remain silent and to retain counsel
(later provided free by the state).523 Once an accused "homosexual"
517. See, e.g., People ex rel. Savery v. Gotham Book Mart, Inc., 285 N.Y.S 563 (NYC
Magis. Ct. 1936) (protecting Andr6 Gide's autobiography against censorship).
518. 234 P.2d 969 (Cal. 1951).
519. Id. at 971; see William N. Eskridge, Jr., Privacy Jurisprudence and the Apartheid of
the Closet, 1946-1961, 24 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 703, 752-53 (1997) (discussing the California
gay bar cases).
520. Law of 1955, CAL. Bus. & PROF'L CODE ANN., § 24200(e) (repealed 1963) (West
1997).
521. 347 P.2d 909 (Cal. 1959).
522. See, e.g., Charles K. Robinson, The Raid, ONE, INC., July 1960, at 26 (state judge
complaining that homosexual defendants pleaded guilty to charges even the prosecution was
willing to drop). It must be noted that most of the lesbigay defendants rounded up by the
police faced relatively mild punishments (a short time in jail), in contrast to the death sen-
tences often meted out to men of color.
523. See Your Rights in Case of Arrest, ONE, INC., Jan. 1954, at 14 (publishing handy list
of constitutional rights of criminal defendants, and advice to lesbigays harassed or arrested
by the police).
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lawyered up, he or she could usually escape jail time and even any
kind of conviction. When defendants were brave enough to contest
charges of consensual sodomy or solicitation in court, there were often
winning due process defenses: the police entrapped the defendant or
obtained evidence illegally; there was not sufficient evidence to sustain
a conviction; or the substantive statute was too vague to provide ade-
quate notice to defendants that their conduct was criminal.124 The
vagueness argument, of course, could inure to the benefit of all gay
people, and not just the defendant in the particular case. State courts
were particularly hard on cross-dressing and, to a lesser extent, va-
grancy and solicitation laws."' Several courts invalidated or narrowly
construed their crime against nature laws.526
Unlike the First Amendment, the Due Process Clause offered no
protection for gay people in the U.S. Supreme Court, however. The
Court's first struggle with such issues involved the immigration law's
exclusion of aliens "afflicted with psychopathic personality." The ad-
ministering agencies interpreted that language to exclude all "homo-
sexuals and sex perverts," and sought to deport George Fleuti, a
sodomite. His counsel introduced psychiatric evidence that sexual
variation was not sufficient to justify a diagnosis of "psychopathy."
Demonstrating that the term did not even have an accepted meaning
among psychiatrists, the Ninth Circuit in Fleuti v. Rosenberg527 ruled
that the statutory language was too imprecise to justify exclusion or
deportation of gay people as a group. On appeal, the Supreme Court
was deeply split, with four Justices finding the statute unconstitution-
ally vague, but five unpersuaded. The decisive vote in conference
came from newly appointed Justice Arthur Goldberg, who believed
that Fleuti's arrests for sex in public places rendered him "a psycho-
path in the conventional sense." '528 Goldberg was assigned the opinion
for the Court, but on further deliberation changed his mind. He pro-
posed that the Ninth Circuit's refusal of deportation be affirmed on a
narrow statutory ground; the four Justices formerly in the minority
joined his opinion, with one important change of language. 29 So Fleuti
524. See ESKRIDGE, GAYLAW supra note 14, at 84-90 (discussing these challenges).
525. See id. at 109-11 (surveying state court opinions striking down these laws).
526. See Harris v. State, 457 P.2d 638 (Alaska 1969); Franklin v. State, 257 So.2d 21 (Fla.
1971); Commonwealth v. Balthazar, 318 N.E.2d 478 (Mass. 1974).
527. 302 F.2d 652, 657-58 (9th Cir. 1962), affd on other grounds, 374 U.S. 449 (1963),
also discussed in Section II.A.3. See generally MURDOCH & PRICE, supra note 510, at 85-101
(giving more background on Fleuti).
528. Conference Notes for Fleuti v. Rosenberg (Apr. 17, 1962), in Douglas Papers, supra
note 192, Container 1281.
529. Fleuti v. Rosenberg, 374 U.S. 449 (1963). At the urging of Justice Brennan, Justice
Goldberg changed this sentence, "Congress unquestionably has the power to exclude homo-
sexuals and other undesirables from this country," to omit "homosexuals and other." See
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was able to stay in the United States, but the immigration authorities
continued their campaign against others.
Responding to the Ninth Circuit opinion, Congress amended the
law to exclude people "afflicted with... sexual deviation" as well.
When the "psychopathic personality" issue returned to the Supreme
Court in Boutilier v. INS, 30 the Justices were less divided: even though
the bisexual Canadian was deported under the old psychopathic per-
sonality exclusion (before the new amendment took effect), at least
two of the Justices gave up on their vagueness objection in light of
Congress's subsequent clarification. 3' The majority opinion, by Justice
Clark (the solo dissenter in Manual), lumped all homosexuals and the
apparently bisexual Boutilier into the statutory category of "psycho-
paths." The most sympathy lesbigay people could find from the Court
was Justice Douglas's lament, in his draft dissent, that "homosexuals"
are "just as much the victims of their constitutions as we are of ours,
and we can only step in when their conduct becomes subversive of so-
ciety, or when they request help so as to enable them to reach a more
mature level.
5 32
The Court was also unreceptive to vagueness challenges to laws
criminalizing "lewd conduct" '533 or the "crime against nature." Al-
though the crime against nature might mean almost anything (or
nothing), the Court ultimately ruled, in a perfunctory per curiam
opinion, that the term had acquired sufficient clarity through long-
standing judicial construction and popular understanding to pass the
vagueness test." A potentially stronger challenge to such laws lay in
the right of privacy recognized in Griswold and Roe. The American
Law Institute ("ALl") in 1955 had taken the position that sodomy be-
Letter from William J. Brennan, Jr., to Justice Goldberg re: Fleuti (June 6, 1963), in Brennan
Papers, supra note 129, Box I: 91, Folder 5. Said Brennan: "[I] think it may be, at least medi-
cally, a matter of doubt whether homosexuals also necessarily fall into the category of unde-
sirable aliens." Id.
530. 387 U.S. 118 (1967); see William N. Eskridge, Jr., Gadamer/Statutory Interpretation,
90 COLUM. L. REV. 609 (1990) (putting forth a detailed examination of the statutory inter-
pretation arguments in Boutilier).
531. According to Justice Douglas' notes, Justice Black, who had found the psycho-
pathic personality term too vague in Fleuti, found it clear enough the next time around to say
that "psychopathic personality means sexual deviate," the term added in 1965. Douglas Con-
ference Notes for Boutilier (Mar. 17, 1967), in Douglas Papers, supra note 192, Container
1391. Chief Justice Warren continued to believe that "a homo immigrant might not be psy-
chotic," id., but he ultimately joined the majority opinion upholding Boutilier's deportation.
532. Draft Dissenting Opinion for Boutilier at 2 (Mar. 17, 1967), in Douglas Papers, su-
pra note 192, Container 1391. The language quoted in text was deleted in the published dis-
sent.
533. See Talley v. California, 390 U.S. 1031 (1968) (denying certiorari to gay couples'
challenge to a "lewd conduct" arrest for kissing one another in the Black Cat Bar).
534. Wainwright v. Stone, 414 U.S. 21 (1973) (per curiam), followed in Rose v. Locke,
423 U.S. 48 (1975).
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tween consenting adults should be decriminalized as a matter of pri-
vate liberty rather than public concern.535 After Griswold, the ACLU
took the position that the right of privacy required states to follow the
ALl. After Roe, the ACLU brought a class action challenging
Virginia's sodomy law as a violation of the right of privacy and the
First Amendment rights of association, thought, and expression. 36 The
Supreme Court in 1976 summarily (without full briefing and oral ar-
gument) affirmed the lower court decision upholding the law.537
Not only could the state constitutionally imprison someone for en-
gaging in oral or anal sex with a consenting adult, but for the most part
the courts allowed the state to exclude lesbigay people from civil
service employment. For a dramatic example, the Civil Service
Commission ("CSC") dismissed Dr. Franklin Kameny, a Harvard-
trained astronomer, for failing to report that he had been arrested in
1956 for allegedly soliciting sex from an undercover police officer.538
That Kameny lost his job over a minor incident suggesting his homo-
sexuality was nothing new in the period after World War I1.539 What
was unusual was Kameny's response: he sued the federal government
to get his job back. His attorney, Byron Scott, maintained that the
government's action was arbitrary and therefore a violation of the
Due Process Clause. The federal courts summarily dismissed this
complaint. Kameny filed a pro se petition for writ of certiorari with
the U.S. Supreme Court on January 27, 1961. Like his attorney in the
courts below, Kameny made standard due process arguments: the
government's decision to fire him and bar him from further employ-
ment was not sufficiently supported by the facts of his case, did not
follow the proper procedures, and operated under a substantively un-
supportable rule barring federal employment of people who commit
"immoral conduct.""54 Not only was the "immoral conduct" bar vague,
535. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 207.5 comments (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955).
536. See Jurisdictional Statement at 7-11, Brief of American Civil Liberties Union, Doe
v. Commonwealth's Attorney, 425 U.S. 901 (1976) (No. 75-896) (asserting Supreme Court's
jurisdiction to review three-judge court's refusal to invalidate sodomy law).
537. Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney, 425 U.S. 901 (1976) (per curiam), affg mem.,
403 F. Supp. 1199 (E.D. Va. 1975) (three-judge court); see Consolidated Petition for Re-
hearing, Doe (No. 75-896) and Enslin v. North Carolina, 425 U.S. 985 (1976) (No. 75-897).
538. In return for a guilty plea to a charge of lewd conduct, the court sentenced Kameny
to probation. After he completed the probation, the court granted his motion to withdraw
the guilty plea and substitute a note of dismissal. Kameny therefore felt justified in not dis-
closing the expunged arrest. See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 6-9, Kameny v. Brucker,
365 U.S. 843 (1961) (1960 Term, No. 676); Brief for the Respondents in Opposition at 3-4 &
n.4, Kameny (1960 Term, No. 676).
539. See Note, Government-Created Employment Disabilities of the Homosexual, 82
HARV. L. REV. 1738 (1969).
540. See Brief for Petititoner at 24-26, Kameny (1960 Term, No. 676) (quoting 5 C.F.R. §
2.106(a)(3) (CSC regulation)).
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but it imposed an "odious conformity" upon federal employees, incon-
sistent with the First Amendment. 41 This petition was the first time
the Supreme Court had seen a challenge to state exclusions of gay
people from the civil service. The Court denied the petition, without
either internal or written dissent. 42
2. The Birth of a Politics of Recognition, 1961-81
Futile as it was, Kameny's petition to the Supreme Court was a
landmark in the politics as well as constitutional discourse of gay peo-
ple. Kameny also argued that the federal government's broad exclu-
sion from employment "makes of the homosexual a second-rate citi-
zen, by discriminating against him without reasonable cause. 5 43 There
was, for example, no scientific basis for the belief that "homosexuals"
were psychopathic. "The average homosexual is as well-adjusted in
personality as the average heterosexual. 5 44 Because such persons are
capable of excellent government service, excluding them is presump-
tively irrational. The federal government should be doing precisely the
opposite: " 'One role of government is to stimulate changes in atti-
tude.' In fields of anti-Negro, Anti-Semitic, anti-Catholic, and other
prejudice, the government has indeed recognized, and is playing fully
and admirably its role as a leader of changes in attitude. 5 45 The CSC's
exclusion, Kameny argued, "constitute[s] a discrimination no less ille-
gal and no less odious than discrimination based upon religious or ra-
cial grounds. "546
The ideas in Kameny's brief were revolutionary and important.
The brief was an announcement that the objects of the postwar anti-
homosexual Kulturkampf were insisting on equal citizenship and not
just an easing of persecution. It was the beginning of a serious politics
of recognition and even remediation for lesbigay people, and this
rapidly eclipsed the apologetic homophile politics of protection of the
541. Id. at 27; see id. at 28-29. For an updated version of Kameny's argument, see David
Cole & William N. Eskridge, Jr., From Hand-Holding to Sodomy: First Amendment Protec-
tion of Homosexual (Expressive) Conduct, 29 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 319 (1994).
542. Kameny, 365 U.S. 843. The docket sheet kept by Justice Brennan revealed no Jus-
tice willing to hear Kameny's case.
543. Brief for Petitioner at 32, Kameny (1960 Term, No. 676). For the historical context
of Kameny's revolutionary brief, see David K. Johnson, "Homosexual Citizens": Washing-
ton's Gay Community Confronts the Civil Service, WASH. HIST., Fall-Winter 1994-1995, at
52. An important normative precursor to the egalitarian arguments was DONALD WEBSTER
CORY, THE HOMOSEXUAL IN AMERICA: A SUBJECTIVE APPROACH (1951).
544. Brief for Petitioner at 37, Kameny (1960 Term, No. 676).
545. Id. at 49-50.
546. Id. at 56; see id. at 59 (calling exclusionary policy "a stench in the nostrils of decent
people, an offense against morality").
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1950s. After filing his petition, Kameny founded the Mattachine Soci-
ety of Washington, D.C. ("MSW"), which expressed this philosophy in
a letter to Attorney General Robert Kennedy:
We feel that, for the 15,000,000 American homosexuals, we are in much
the same position as the NAACP is in for the Negro, except for the mi-
nor difference that the Negro is fighting official prejudice and discrimina-
tion at the state and local level, whereas we are fighting official prejudice
and discriminatory policy and practice, as ill-founded, as unreasonable,
as unrealistic, and as harmful to society and to the nation, at the Federal
level. Both are fighting personal prejudice at all levels. For these reasons,
and because we are trying to improve the position of a large group of
citizens presently relegated to second-class citizenship in many respects,
we should have, if anything, the assistance of the Federal government,
and not its opposition.547
Other groups, such as San Francisco's Society for Individual Rights
and New York's Mattachine Society, took similar positions. In
February 1966, the First National Planning Conference of Homophile
Organizations resolved: "Homosexual American citizens should have
precise equality with all other citizens before the law and are entitled
to social and economic equality of opportunity.""54 By the late 1960s,
Kameny's slogan "Gay is Good" had become the rallying cry for gay
activists.
Kameny's pro se brief was the first time a litigant before the Court
had challenged the compulsory heterosexuality requirement for fed-
eral employment or other benefits. It was the first brief before the
Supreme Court to argue that homosexuality was a benign variation,
that "homosexuals" were a minority group like Jews and African
Americans, that anti-homosexual discrimination was fundamentally
based on prejudice rather than a neutral policy, and that the equal
protection component of the Fifth Amendment barred discrimination
on the basis of sexual variation. Lawyers representing lesbigays picked
up on some of Kameny's ideas. For example, in Manual Enterprises,
Stanley Dietz challenged the Kennedy Administration's view that gay
erotica should be treated differently from straight: "Our Constitution
does not state that only heterosexuals may receive and read the litera-
ture of their choice and homosexuals must read the same literature or
547. Letter from Franklin E. Kameny, President, The Mattachine Society of
Washington, D.C., to Robert F. Kennedy, Attorney General 1 (June 28, 1962) (on file with
the FBI, FOIA File HQ 100-403320 (Mattachine Society) § 6, Serial No. 88); see also News
Release, Mattachine Society of Washington, D.C. (Aug. 28, 1962) (on file with the FBI,
FOIA File HQ 100-403320 (Mattachine Society) § 6, Serial No. 90X) (insisting on the same
constitutional rights for "the homosexual minority - a minority in no way different, as such,
from other of our national minority groups ... ").
548. U.S. Homophile Movement Gains National Strength, THE LADDER, Apr. 1966, at 4
(quoting the conference's resolutions).
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be denied the right to view a magazine which interests them. To inter-
pret our Constitution... in the manner that the Post Office
Department has done, reduces a large segment of our society to sec-
ond class citizenship." '549 To the Solicitor General's suggestion that les-
bigay people are sick, Dietz responded that, according to modern sci-
ence, homosexuality is neither a disease nor a mental defect, "nor is
homosexuality as such intrinsically evil."55 The same kind of argu-
ments were made by the attorneys for George Fleuti and Clive
Michael Boutilier, gay and bisexual men whom the Kennedy-Johnson
Administration sought to deport as statutory psychopaths. Based on
newer and more reliable medical research, counsel maintained that
lesbigay people generally were no more mentally defective than
straight people. The Ninth Circuit's opinion in Fleuti was the rare de-
cision that recognized some part of this new rhetoric of recognition.
Kameny and Boutilier lost their cases, and Manual Enterprises and
Fleuti won theirs only on legal technicalities.
Likewise, MSW sponsored challenges to the federal civil service
exclusion through the 1960s, and sometimes its attorneys were success-
ful - but always under cover of the procedural and nonarbitrariness
features of the Due Process Clause." 1 Chief Judge David Bazelon of
the D.C. Circuit ruled in Norton v. Macy552 that it was a violation of
due process guarantees for the CSC to bar gay people from employ-
ment without a demonstrated "nexus" between their sexual orienta-
tion or activities and the legitimate requirements of their jobs.
Authored by a judge with deep understanding of the medical litera-
ture debunking anti-homosexual stereotypes, Norton was a break-
through precedent, in part because it was handed down simultane-
ously with the Stonewall riots, after which thousands of lesbigay
people streamed out of their closets and protested their various state
exclusions. 3
549. Brief of Appellant at 23, Manual Enters. v. Day, 370 U.S. 478 (1962) (1961 Term,
No. 123).
550. Id.
551. For the few successful challenges, see Dew v. Halaby, 317 F.2d 582 (D.C. Cir.
1963), cert. granted, 376 U.S. 904 (1964) (after certoriari granted, government agreed to rein-
state married civil servant who had committed "homosexual acts" in his youth); and Scott v.
Macy, 349 F.2d 182 (D.C. Cir. 1965), 402 F.2d 644 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (overturning CSC's dis-
charge of gay man). Outside of the D.C. Circuit, such challenges generally failed in the late
1960s. See, e.g., Anonymous v. Macy, 398 F.2d 317 (5th Cir. 1969); Taylor v. United States
Civil Serv. Comm'n, 374 F.2d 466 (9th Cir. 1967).
552. 417 F.2d 1161 (D.C. Cir. 1969); see Rhonda R. Rivera, Our Straight-Laced Judges:
The Legal Position of Homosexual Persons in the United States, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 799 (1979)
[hereinafter Rivera, Our Straight-Laced Judges] (discussing Norton and its aftermath).
553. The Stonewall riots were June 26-28, 1969; Norton was handed down July 1, 1969.
Until a month before he issued Norton, Bazelon served on a task force studying homosexu-
2171August 2002]
HeinOnline  -- 100 Mich. L. Rev. 2171 2001-2002
Michigan Law Review
Within a year of Stonewall, the ACLU's Norman Dorsen and
Charles Lister revived Kameny's equal protection arguments in a peti-
tion for the Supreme Court to review the civil service exclusion. They
maintained that gay people are good citizens, homosexuality is an ac-
ceptable variation from the norm, and antigay employment discrimi-
nation is "odious," unjust and, for all of these reasons, contrary to the
equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment." 4 Although the
Supreme Court continued to ignore these arguments, they were start-
ing to have bite with more lower courts. Decisions by federal judges in
the District of Columbia and California, where lesbigays were politi-
cally mobilized, ruled civil service discriminations unconstitutional,
and the CSC formally abandoned its policy in 1973-74."'5 The Supreme
Court even granted certiorari for a petition by a cross-dressing gay
man who had (before the CSC policy shift) been discharged by the
EEOC for "flaunting" his sexual orientation." 6
Many municipalities and states followed the CSC's lead, but other
government employers, including the federal armed forces, continued
to exclude and discharge gay people because of their sexual orienta-
tion. Gone were the days when outed "homosexuals" passively ac-
cepted their fates, however; a substantial number of those discharged
brought lawsuits as openly lesbigay persons. Most of the lawsuits were
unsuccessful in the 1970s but some judges were willing to overturn'
discharges because they were not accompanied by any statement of
reasons558 or because there was no nexus between the agreed-upon
ality for the National Institute of Mental Health. Rivera, Our Straight-Laced Judges, supra
note 552, at 1036 n.107.
554. Brief for Petitioners at 6-9, Schlegel v. United States, 397 U.S. 1039 (1970) (1969
Term, No. 1257), denying cert. to 416 F.2d 1372 (Ct. Cl. 1969); Brief for Petitioner at 5,
Adams v. Laird, 397 U.S. 1039 (1970), denying cert. to 420 F.2d 230 (D.C. Cir. 1969), (1969
Term, No. 1258).
555. For an account of the cases and of the decline and fall of CSC's exclusion, see
William N. Eskridge, Jr., Challenging the Apartheid of the Closet: Establishing Conditions for
Lesbian and Gay Intimacy, Nomos, and Citizenship, 1961-1981, 25 HOFSTRA L. REV. 817,
911-18 (1997) [hereinafter Eskridge, Establishing Conditions]. Executive Order No. 13,087,
63 Fed. Reg. 30,097 (May 28, 1998), prohibited employment discrimination on the basis of
sexual orientation by the federal government outside the armed forces.
556. Singer v. United States Civil Serv. Comm'n, 429 U.S. 1034 (1977), granting cert. to
530 F.2d 247 (9th Cir. 1976); see Rhonda R. Rivera, QueerLaw: Sexual Orientation Law in
the Mid-Eighties (Pt. 1), 10 U. DAYTON L. REV. 459, 485 (1985) (federal government rein-
stated Singer after certiorari was granted, and so the case was never heard by the Court).
557. See, e.g., McConnell v. Anderson, 451 F.2d 193 (8th Cit. 1971), rev'g 316 F. Supp.
809 (D. Minn. 1970); see Rivera, Our Straight-Laced Judges, supra note 552, at 1043-47 (sur-
veying the state employment cases), id. at 1078-92 (surveying cases where public school
teachers were discharged on grounds of homosexuality).
558. See, e.g., Matlovich v. Sec'y of the Air Force, 591 F.2d 852, 860 (D.C. Cir. 1976); see
MIKE HIPPLER, MATLOVICH: THE GOOD SOLDIER (1989).
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reasons for discharge and legitimate job requirements. 9 By the late
1970s, counsel for those discharged were no longer willing to rest their
cases on due process arguments alone, however. Like Kameny, they
maintained that it was a violation of equal protection for gay people to
be treated any differently from straight people. Their arguments met
with a variety of thoughtful responses, especially in the military exclu-
sion cases. In the leading case, Belier v. Middendorf,5" Judge Anthony
Kennedy upheld the armed forces bar largely because of the judici-
ary's long tradition of near-absolute deference to military judgments;
because the Navy's reasons were defensibly pragmatic concerns with
unit cohesion, the chain of command, and recruitment, its exclusionary
policy was constitutionally permissible.56 a The opinion, however, ex-
plicitly recognized that discriminatory treatment of gay people in
other institutional contexts could represent valid privacy and equal
protection claims.562
In a civil employment case, the California Supreme Court gave a
stronger endorsement to gay people's politics of recognition, but un-
der free speech auspices. In Gay Law Students Association v. Pacific
Telephone & Telegraph Co.,563 the court ruled that harassment or dis-
charge of openly gay employees violated a statutory bar to discrimina-
tion on the basis of "political activities or affiliations." Because "the
struggle of the homosexual community for equal rights, particularly in
the field of employment, must be recognized as a political activity,"
and because "com[ing] out of the closet" and "acknowledg[ing] their
sexual preferences" were essential to that politics as understood by
gay people, efforts to discourage or penalize such employees and press
them back into their closets was within the bar to political activity dis-
crimination."6
I start with the employment cases because they dramatically illus-
trate the new kinds of constitutional arguments, but lesbigay people's
new politics of recognition also triggered important public discourses
in connection with lesbian and gay associations, criminal law and en-
forcement, and family law. If lesbigay groups and organizations could
be counted on a few hands in 1961, they numbered in the hundreds
within a few years of Stonewall. The NAACP cases insulated these as-
sociations from direct state persecution or harassment, but state insti-
559. See, e.g., Bd. of Educ. v. Jack M., 566 P.2d 602 (Cal. 1977); Morrison v. State Bd. of
Educ., 461 P.2d 375 (Cal. 1969).
560. 632 F.2d 788 (9th Cir. 1980) (reversing Saal v. Middendorf, 427 F. Supp. 192 (N.D.
Cal. 1977) and abrogating Martinez v. Brown, 449 F. Supp. 207 (N.D. Cal. 1978)).
561. See id. at 810-12.
562. See id. at 809-10 (right of privacy in some contexts); id. at 812 (equal protection).
563. 595 P.2d 592 (Cal. 1979).
564. Id. at 610.
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tutions were reluctant to provide any kind of sanction to them. 6 After
the 1960s, this was no longer tolerable in jurisdictions where lesbigay
people were politically mobilized. For example, the Lambda Legal
Defense and Education Fund, Inc. was formed "to promote the avail-
ability of legal services to homosexuals by encouraging and attracting
homosexuals into the legal profession; to disseminate to homosexuals
general information concerning their rights and obligations; and to
render technical assistance to any legal services corporation or agency
in regard to legal issues affecting homosexuals." New York's
Appellate Division balked at approving Lambda as an authorized le-
gal group, and Lambda's first legal victory came when the Court of
Appeals vacated the original decision and the Division grudgingly ap-
proved its application. 66 Other lesbian and gay groups also sued, usu-
ally with success, to require state officials to register them on equal
terms with other associations. 67 After several years of resistance, the
Internal Revenue Service in 1977 agreed to recognize tax exemptions
for gay groups formed for educational or charitable purposes.
68
Many right of association cases arising from the new politics of
recognition involved public universities. The leading case was Gay
Students Organization v. Bonner.69 The University of New Hampshire
recognized the Gay Students Organization ("GSO") but sought to
limit GSO's social and political activism that stirred enormous public-
ity and political trouble for the administration. Judge Coffin's opinion
ruled that the university as a public forum could not discriminate
against gay people's politics of recognition, which included social
events and plays as well as more conventional educational activities. 7
565. E.g., Eskridge, Establishing Conditions, supra note 555, at 876-77 (congressional
investigation into D.C. registration of MSW as a "charitable organization). The NAACP
cases are discussed in Sections I.A.3 and II.F.1.
566. See In re Thom, 301 N.E.2d 542, 543 (N.Y. 1973), on remand 350 N.Y.S.2d 1 (App.
Div. 1973). The Court of Appeals' opinion quoted Lambda's statement of purpose. 301 N.E.
2d at 543. The court chose to strike part of the statement of purpose on remand, deeming it
to fall outside the scope of the law authorizing legal assistance corporations. 350 N.Y.S.2d 2.
567. Compare GAA v. Lomenzo, 293 N.E.2d 255 (N.Y. 1973) (requiring state officials to
register gay rights group), with Grant v. Brown, 313 N.E.2d 847 (Ohio 1974) (allowing state
officials to refuse registration, on "no promo homo" grounds).
568. IRS Reverses Policy on Tax Exemptions, ADVOCATE, Oct. 5, 1977, at 11 (IRS an-
nouncement); Rev. Rul. 78-305, 1978-2 C.B. 172 (formal rule).
569. 509 F.2d 652 (1st Cir. 1974); cf. Rivera, Our Straight-Laced Judges, supra note 552,
at 1144 (describing an unreported 1971 California Superior Court decision, Associated Stu-
dents of Sacramento State College v. Butz, Civ. No. 200795, which required a state college to
recognize a gay student group on the ground that the First Amendment bars public forums
from discriminating on the basis of the content of the speech or association of petitioners).
570. On the other hand, the judge conceded the university ample room for regulation of
"overt sexual behavior, short of criminal activity, which may offend the community's sense
of propriety." Bonner, 509 F.2d at 663.
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Judges all over the country followed Bonner to require fair access by
gay student groups to state collegiate public forums.571
After a substantial number of lesbigay people came out of their
closets, the operation of the criminal justice system in big cities
changed, almost overnight, with regard to gay and bisexual men in
particular. Most changes were effectuated through the political proc-
ess, as police departments were pressured into reducing resources de-
voted to victimless crime enforcement and as legislatures were per-
suaded to repeal their consensual sodomy laws.572 But constitutional
law also played an important role, and a different role than it played
before the 1960s. During the earlier period of the politics of protec-
tion, gay people relied on after-the-fact retail arguments (if they dared
resist at all): this particular arrest was tainted with entrapment, denial
of counsel, a coerced confession, and so forth. Once gay people mobi-
lized, and gained institutional allies such as the ACLU (in the 1960s)
and Lambda (1970s), they made sweeping wholesale arguments: the
jurisdiction's cross-dressing, sexual solicitation, lewd conduct, or sod-
omy law cannot be applied to any such defendants because it is uncon-
stitutional. The reasons these statutes were said to be unconstitutional
included not just the traditional due process problem of vagueness and
lack of notice, but also newer problems raised by the right to privacy
(Griswold), the First Amendment (Stanley), and even the Equal
Protection Clause (Kameny).
For one important example, when North Carolina entrapped
Eugene Enslin into a violation of its consensual sodomy law, the
ACLU took up his defense. As foundation for its argument at trial
that the statute was unconstitutional, ACLU attorney Marilyn Haft
presented evidence that the conduct criminalized (oral and anal sex) is
performed by and gives great pleasure to a majority of Americans,
without any harm to them or to third parties, and that the people most
stigmatized by the statute, gay people, are psychologically normal,
non-predatory citizens." 3 The ACLU appealed Enslin's conviction all
the way to the Supreme Court, where it was joined by Lambda and the
National Gay Task Force. No one argued that the law was unclear, nor
571. See, e.g., Gay Lib v. Univ. of Missouri, 558 F.2d 848 (8th Cir. 1977); Gay Alliance of
Students v. Matthews, 544 F.2d 162 (4th Cir. 1976). For a recent example, see Gay Lesbian
Bisexual Alliance v. Pryor, 110 F.3d 1543 (11th Cir. 1997).
572. See Eskridge, Establishing Conditions, supra note 555, at 836-42 (gay political pres-
sure leading to milder police practices in various cities); id. at 842-63 (gay political pressure
and litigation leading to repeal, invalidation, or narrow construction of sodomy, lewdness,
and cross-dressing laws); Steven A. Rosen, Police Harassment of Homosexual Women and
Men in New York City 1960-1980, 12 COLUM. HUM. RTs. L. REV. 159 (1980-81) (providing a
detailed account of milder application of criminal laws against gay people in New York
City).
573. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 6-9, Enslin v. North Carolina, 425 U.S. 903
(1976) (No. 75-897) (describing defendant's case at trial).
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did the petitions merely plead for the state to leave gay people alone.
Instead, the petitioners maintained that sodomy laws were the legal
authorization for an array of public and private practices punishing
lesbigay people unfairly - employment discrimination, police har-
assment, exclusion from the armed services, loss of children, and the
closet itself."4 As Lambda put it, "just as the elimination of legal seg-
regation and miscegenation laws [was] a necessary first step to the
elimination of race prejudice, so the elimination of the sodomy laws is
the essential first step to the elimination of unwarranted prejudice
against gay people." '575 Although the Justices declined to address
Haft's arguments, they had receptive audiences in other judiciaries.
New York's Court of Appeals invalidated that state's consensual sod-
omy law for these kinds of reasons in People v. Onofre.576 Indeed, the
state judiciaries of New York, California, New Jersey, Ohio, and
Massachusetts narrowly construed or invalidated laws in those juris-
dictions that had been deployed by the police to terrorize lesbigay and
transgendered people.577
The most radical manifestation of lesbigay people's politics of rec-
ognition was in the arena of family law. Not only were lesbians and
gay men insisting on their rights to come out of their closets in the
workplace and in public culture, but they asserted their moral and
constitutional rights to have the state recognize and protect their
families. The most sensational cases were the same-sex marriage ones,
and the first of those was Baker v. Nelson.57 After the Minnesota
Attorney General and Supreme Court denied a male couple's right to
a marriage license, Michael Wetherbee of the local ACLU chapter
filed an appeal with the U.S. Supreme Court. "At first, the question
and the proposed relationship may well appear bizarre - especially to
heterosexuals," but that first impulse "provides us with some measure
574. Id. at 11-17; Brief of Amicus Curiae Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund,
Inc. at 7-12, Enslin (No. 75-897). The ACLU and Lambda made similar arguments in their
briefs seeking rehearing of the Court's refusal to grant review, and there they were joined by
the Brief of Amicus Curiae National Gay Task Force in Support of Petition for Rehearing,
Enslin (No. 75-897).
575. Brief of Amicus Curiae Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund, Inc. at 11-12,
Enslin (No. 75-897).
576. 415 N.E.2d 936 (N.Y. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 987 (1981).
577. See, e.g., Pryor v. Mun. Court, 599 P.2d 636 (Cal. 1979) (narrowly construing "vag-
lewd" law used to entrap gay men) (discussed in greater detail in Section II.A.3); People v.
Uplinger, 447 N.E.2d 62 (N.Y. 1983) (invalidating on privacy grounds the state law barring
loitering for the purpose of solicitation of "deviate sexual intercourse"); City of Columbus v.
Rogers, 324 N.E.2d 563 (Ohio 1975) (invalidating on vagueness grounds a municipal cross-
dressing ordinance). For a detailed discussion of cases from a variety of jurisdictions, see
Eskridge, Establishing Conditions, supra note 555, at 842-52 (privacy challenges) and 852-63
(vagueness challenges).
578. 191 N.W.2d 185 (Minn. 1971), appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 810 (1972).
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of the continuing impact on our society of prejudice against non-
heterosexuals." Indeed, Wetherbee maintained, "the relationship con-
templated is neither grotesque nor uncommon." '579 He set forth a brief
case for the descriptive proposition that sexual variation is benign and
homosexuality normal. Prescriptively, he argued that marriage bars
should be subjected to heightened scrutiny for any of three reasons.
First, such bars deny lesbian and gay couples their fundamental right
to marry that had been recognized in Griswold (for straight couples)
and Loving (different-race couples).5 8 Second, the marriage bar also
denies such couples the important property and economic rights that
accompany spousehood as a matter of law.58' Third, the state's dis-
crimination was one "based on gender." '582 Whatever the basis for
heightened scrutiny, the state marriage bar could not be sufficiently
justified. The state's argument that marriage had always been
different-sex (the reason accepted by the courts below) begged the
normative question, and the state's association of marriage with chil-
dren did not justify treating childless gay couples differently from
childless straight ones, as the statute did. By a unanimous vote, the
Supreme Court dismissed the appeal in Baker, but all the key argu-
ments for invalidating same-sex marriage bars were suggested in that
case.
583
At the same time same-sex couples were going to court seeking
marriage licenses from the state, lesbigays formerly married to persons
of the opposite sex were being dragged into court by their former
spouses seeking to deprive them of all contact with their children.
Lesbian and gay parents who chose to fight for their children, as many
did, turned to studies showing that their orientation had no bearing on
their ability to be good parents. Lesbigay parents and their lawyers ul-
timately revolutionized custody law, as most states abandoned per se
rules against lesbigay custody of their own children and adopted the
579. Jurisdictional Statement at 8-9, Baker v. Nelson, 409 U.S. 810 (1972) (No. 71-1027).
580. See id. at 11.
581. See id. at 11-12.
582. See id. at 16-18. The brief did not flesh out this argument, as the Court had just
handed down its first sex discrimination decision, Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971), but it
appears that the argument was inspired by the miscegenation analogy: just as the bar to dif-
ferent-race marriage was treated as race discrimination in Loving, so the bar to same-sex
marriage should be treated as sex discrimination. This precise argument was made and re-
jected in Singer v. Hara, 522 P.2d 1187 (Wash. App.), reh'g denied, 84 Wash.2d 1008 (1974)
(interpreting the state ERA as not requiring state recognition of same-sex marriages).
583. 409 U.S. 810 (1972); see Docket Sheet for Baker, in Brennan Papers, supra note
129, Box 1:281, Folder 1 (revealing that all nine Justices voted to dismiss the appeal). For
discussion of the other same-sex marriage cases of the 1970s and 1980s, see WILLIAM N.
ESKRIDGE, JR., THE CASE FOR SAME-SEX MARRIAGE 52-57 (1996); cf. id. at 232-33 nn.23-
24, 248-49 n.18 (listing the attorney general and judicial decisions).
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best interests of the child standard. 84 Nonetheless, most openly gay or
lesbian parents lost their legal battles in the 1970s. Even when they
were successful in retaining custody or visitation rights, courts often
imposed burdens and conditions on them that would never have been
contemplated for straight parents.85
A striking feature of the foregoing discussion of gay people's poli-
tics of recognition in this formative period is that the Burger Court as
a group were unwilling to listen or respond to any of it. In every case
presented for its review between 1969 and 1986, the Court either de-
nied certiorari (as in Enslin), granted review without reaching the
merits,8 6 or affirmed an antigay decision without briefing or argument
(as in Baker). Sometimes these avoidances provoked dissents. In Doe
v. Commonwealth's Attorney,587 the Court summarily affirmed a lower
court decision upholding Virginia's consensual sodomy law against
privacy, equal protection, and First Amendment attack. Justices
Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens dissented on the ground that the im-
portant privacy issues should have been briefed and argued.588 The
Court denied certiorari in Ratchford v. Gay Lib,589 thereby leaving in
effect a lower court decision requiring a state university to recognize
and fund a gay rights group. Justice Rehnquist wrote a passionate dis-
sent, arguing that the lower court was requiring the state to tolerate
moral contagion. He rejected the claim that the students were merely
engaged in political and educational activities and insisted that "the
question is more akin to whether those suffering from measles [i.e.,
homosexuality] have a constitutional right, in violation of quarantine
regulations [i.e., the state sodomy law], to associate together and with
others [i.e., vulnerable youth] who do not presently have measles.,
59 °
Finally, the Court denied review to Rowland v. Mad River Local
School District,591 which had upheld the discharge of a bisexual high
584. Excellent reviews of this litigation are found in Nan D. Hunter & Nancy Polikoff,
Custody Rights of Lesbian Mothers: Legal Theory and Litigation Strategy, 25 BuFF. L. REV.
691 (1976); and Rivera, Our Straight-Laced Judges, supra note 552, at 1102-23.
585. See, e.g., Schuster v. Schuster, 585 P.2d 130 (Wash. 1978) (en banc).
586. People v. Uplinger, 447 N.E.2d 62 (N.Y. 1983), cert. dismissed as improvidently
granted, 467 U.S. 246 (1984). The decision followed and applied the Court of Appeals' prior
decision in Onofre.
587. 425 U.S. 901 (1976), summarily affg 403 F.Supp. 1199 (E.D. Va. 1975) (three-judge
court). The Court's order in Doe was issued the same day the Court denied certiorari in En-
slin.
588. Id. (Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens, JJ. would have noted probable jurisdiction).
589. 434 U.S. 1080 (1978) denying cert. to Gay Lib v. University of Missouri, 558 F.2d
848 (8th Cir. 1977).
590. Id. at 1084 (Rehnquist, J., joined by Blackmun, J., dissenting from the denial of cer-
toriari).
591. 730 F.2d 444 (6th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1009 (1985).
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school guidance counselor against First Amendment and equal protec-
tion attack. Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall, vigorously
dissented and laid out substantive reasons for reversing the lower
court. The dissenters maintained that sexual orientation - like sex,
illegitimacy, and race - ought to be a suspect classification, because
the group stigmatized by the classification has been the object of hos-
tile state action reflecting prejudice rather than rationality and be-
cause that group has been relatively powerless in the political proc-
ess.5 92 Brennan's statement was the most complete analysis, at the
Supreme Court level, of the level of scrutiny owed to sexual orienta-
tion classifications. (Note some parallels to Brennan's plurality opin-
ion in Frontiero.) Even if sexual orientation were not a suspect classi-
fication per se, Brennan argued that the state bore a high burden of
justification when it denies a minority group public rights, including
employment opportunities, because of either their private choices and
conduct or their "nondisruptive expression of homosexual prefer-
ence."
593
3. The Ongoing Politics of Recognition and Remediation and the
Politics of Preservation, 1981-Present
Even the limited success of gay people's politics of recognition in
the late 1970s alarmed traditionalists and called forth a politics of
preservation. What I call the "traditional family values" ("TFV")
movement emerged as a well-organized countermovement between
1976 and 1981.194 It has flourished since then, even as more Americans
have come out as lesbian or gay or bisexual and as litigating organiza-
tions have pursued gay rights systematically. Like the anti-civil rights
592. Rowland, 470 U.S. at 1014 (Brennan, J., dissenting from the denial of certiorari);
see also MURDOCH & PRICE, supra note 510, at 241-51 (giving a moving account of Bren-
nan's gay rights dissent).
593. Rowland, 470 U.S. at 1015-16 (Brennan, J., dissenting from the denial of certiorari).
594. Key moments in the emergence of the TFV countermovement were the debate
over sodomy reform and same-sex marriage in California in 1976-77; Anita Bryant's "Save
the Children" campaign to override Dade County's antidiscrimination law in 1977, and sub-
sequent successful initiatives revoking progay laws in St. Paul, Witchita, and other cities in
1978 and 1979; California's unsuccessful Briggs Initiative in 1978, whose proponents sought
to bar from public schoolteaching any person who "advocated" homosexuality in any way;
and the Moral Majority's successful campaign to persuade Congress to override the District
of Columbia's attempted sodomy law repeal in 1981. See generally CHRISTOPHER BULL &
JOHN GALLAGHER, PERFECT ENEMIES: THE RELIGIOUS RIGHT, THE GAY MOVEMENT,
AND THE POLITICS OF THE 1990S (1996); DIDI HERMAN, THE ANTIGAY AGENDA:
ORTHODOX VISION AND THE CHRISTIAN RIGHT (1997).
595. Lambda and the ACLU (which formally established a Lesbian & Gay Rights Proj-
ect headed by Nan Hunter) remained the leading litigation groups. They have been joined
by Gay and Lesbian Advocates and Defenders in Boston and other regional litigation
groups.
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and pro-life countermovements with which it was linked, the TFV
countermovement has had natural law and pragmatic faces. Natural
law traditionalists maintain that sexual variation is malignant, for re-
ligious ("abomination") or medical (AIDS) or mental heath (psycho-
pathic) reasons.596 Therefore, it would be a catastrophe for the state to
provide any "special rights" to gay people or not to criminalize sod-
omy. Pragmatic traditionalists, in contrast, concede that there is some
tolerable variation in sexuality. They are willing to abandon sodomy
laws, for practical reasons, and focus on positive projects that would
be threatened by too many "special rights" for gay people.597 Thus, the
state should tolerate gay people but should not promote homosexual-
ity. The "no promo homo" arguments of the last several decades are
the rhetorical means by which TFV extremists and moderates can
work together and even attract ordinary Americans to their point of
view.598 Again like prior countermovements, TFV people from both
horizons espouse a shared constitutional philosophy of states' rights,
institutional deference, and individual liberties.
American law in the 1980s and 1990s was a battleground between
an increasingly vigorous lesbigay people's politics of recogni-
tion/remediation and an equally vigorous politics of preservation. The
consequent legal equilibrium varied significantly by state or region: in
gay-friendly states like California, New York, -and Vermont, lesbigay
people now enjoy normal personal and economic liberties and in-
creasing state protection against private violence and discrimination;
in noncommittal states like New Mexico and Pennsylvania, lesbigay
people are not much harassed or arrested, but neither are they af-
forded normal protections by the state against private violence and
discrimination; and in states in the South, lesbigay people are still
treated like presumptive criminals.5 9  The TFV strategy within states
has been to localize progay measures to the urban areas where lesbi-
gay people are concentrated; in the country at large, the strategy has
been to protect states like Mississippi and Texas from the constitu-
tionalization of policies followed in New York and California. TFV
596. See, e.g., ANITA BRYANT, THE ANITA BRYANT STORY: THE SURVIVAL OF OUR
NATION'S FAMILIES AND THE THREAT OF MILITANT HOMOSEXUALITY (1977) (religious
and moral); JOSEPH NICOLOSI, REPARATIVE THERAPY OF MALE HOMOSEXUALITY: A
NEW CLINICAL APPROACH (1991) (mental health).
597. See e.g., STEPHEN BRANSFORD, GAY POLITICS VS. COLORADO AND AMERICA:
THE INSIDE STORY OF AMENDMENT 2, 36-40 (1994) (supporters of Amendment 2 chose a
pragmatic over a natural law approach to that antigay initiative).
598. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., No Promo Homo: The Sedimentation of Antigay Dis-
course and the Channeling Effect of Judicial Review, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1327, 1338-46 (2000)
[hereinafter Eskridge, No Promo Homo].
599. For antigay laws, state-by-state, see ESKRIDGE, GAYLAW, supra note 14, app. B3 at
362-71.
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people have also had confidence that their position is one that ordi-
nary folks would prefer to that of elitist judges - so they prefer that
decisions be made by legislation and popular referenda rather than
through judicial review and constitutional discourse.6"
Since 1981, therefore, American politics of sexuality has been
caught up in this pas de deux between gay people's politics of recogni-
tion and TFV people's politics of preservation. Because both sides
have constitutionalized their discourse, the courts have been drawn
into the culture clash - including the once comically squeamish U.S.
Supreme Court. To the extent there has been a national consensus
about issues of sexuality it has been the edgy ambivalent tolerance of
"no promo homo": states are not allowed to hurt lesbigay people and
are required to provide them minimal protections of law, but are not
required to "promote" homosexuality in affirmative ways and indeed
are debarred from forcing private groups to accept lesbigay people if
they feel that acceptance is tantamount to "endorsing" homosexuality.
a. Sodomy Laws and the Military Exclusion. No issue has set the
gay rights movement apart from the civil rights and women's rights
movements more than the association of homosexual status with ho-
mosexual conduct. That many Americans claim to be disgusted by the
latter makes it harder for gay people to claim protection because of
the former."1 It is for this reason that lesbigay legal groups have since
the 1960s made sodomy law repeal or invalidation their central goal.
By 1986, when the Burger Court finally addressed the privacy argu-
ment against consensual sodomy laws in Bowers v. Hardwick,6°2 half
the states had repealed their laws, either judicially or (for most states)
legislatively. As Professor Larry Tribe realized, there was no Court
majority for a "gay rights" argument, and so his brief for the chal-
lenger pushed homosexuality into a legal closet and emphasized the
abuse of state power represented by the gendarmerie's charge into
Michael Hardwick's bedroom. No one else saw the case his way,
though. Homosexuality was front and center in the remainder of the
briefs. The American Psychological Association's brief presented the
benign sexual variation notion that the conduct criminalized in
600. For the most part, they have been right about that, as antigay initiatives have
shown an astounding success rate. See Barbara S. Gamble, Putting Civil Rights to a Popular
Vote, 41 AM. J. POL. Sci. 245, 251, 258 (1997). By my informal count, however, more than
half of the antigay referenda after 1997 have failed. See infra note 1535.
601. For insightful discussions of this phenomenon, see Anne B. Goldstein, Comment,
History, Homosexuality, and Political Values: Searching for the Hidden Determinants of
Bowers v. Hardwick, 97 YALE L.J. 1073 (1988) [hereinafter Goldstein, History, Homosexu-
ality]; Janet E. Halley, Reasoning About Sodomy: Act and Identity in and after Bowers v.
Hardwick, 79 VA. L. REV. 1721 (1993); Jed Rubenfeld, The Right of Privacy, 102 HARV. L.
REV. 737, 777-800 (1989); and Michael Sandel, Moral Argument and Liberal Toleration:
Abortion and Homosexuality, 77 CAL. L. REV. 521 (1989).
602. 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (discussed also in Section II.B).
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Georgia is in no way pathological and, indeed, is important to the psy-
chological health of individuals and to their intimate relationships,
whether homosexual or heterosexual. 603 The state responded that the
statute reflected the moral judgments of the people of Georgia, and
the Court could not legitimately interfere with those judgments unless
required by constitutional text or well-established precedent.
Justice White's perfunctory opinion for the Court agreed with the
state, concluding that it was illegitimate for the unelected Justices to
overturn the state legislature's moral judgment that sodomy is wrong,
without a firmer basis in constitutional text or tradition.6' Even within
that framework, however, White's obsessive focus on "homosexual
sodomy," notwithstanding the statute's inclusion of sodomy of all
kinds, exposed the Court to criticism that it was not treating gay peo-
ple impartially. 6° Four dissenting Justices not only questioned the
Court's analysis, but recognized the link between lesbigay people's
equal citizenship and a constitutional recognition of benign sexual
variation:
6°6
Only the most willful blindness could obscure the fact that sexual inti-
macy is "a sensitive key relationship of human existence, central to fam-
ily life, community welfare, and the development of human personality."
The fact that individuals define themselves in a significant way through
their intimate sexual relationships with others suggests, in a Nation as di-
verse as ours, that there may be many "right" ways of conducting those
relationships, and that much of the richness of a relationship will come
from the freedom an individual has to choose the form and nature of
these intensely personal bonds.
The dissenters also contrasted the Court's passivity in Hardwick with
its productive activism in Brown, Loving, and Roe, all of which have
603. See Brief of Amici Curiae American Psychological Association and American Pub-
lic Health Association in Support of Respondents, passim, Hardwick (No. 85-140); see also
Brief of Amicus Curiae for Lesbian Rights Project [and other feminist groups], passim,
Hardwick (No. 85-140) (similar argument, plus sodomy laws contribute to rampant discrimi-
nation against lesbigay people in particular). These kinds of briefs, routinely filed in gay
rights cases, are called "Homo 101 briefs" because they lay out the established scientific facts
of (gay) life to presumptively ignorant judges.
604. Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 194-95; see id. at 191-94 (asserting that the argument that
"homosexual sodomy" is protected by the nation's libertarian tradition is, "at best, face-
tious").
605. Compare id. at 190, 191, 192, 196 (limiting case to "homosexual sodomy"), and id.
at 196-97 (Burger, C.J., concurring) (similar), with id. at 199-200 (Blackmun, J., dissenting)
(arguing that it is morally arbitrary for the Court to insist that only "homosexual sodomy" is
at stake, when the statute covers all kinds of sodomy), and id. at 215-16 (Stevens, J., dissent-
ing) (noting that state legislature deliberately expanded its sodomy law to include all differ-
ent-sex sodomy).
606. Id. at 205 (Blackmun, J., joined by Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens, JJ., dissenting)
(quoting Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 63 (1973) and citing Kenneth Karst,
The Freedom ofIntimate Association, 89 YALE L.J. 624, 637 (1980)).
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been cogently criticized for expanding constitutional freedoms beyond
the boundaries suggested by constitutional text and original intent.6 7
The Court's 5-4 decision upholding Georgia's law brought upon
the Court the greatest criticism I have seen for a decision upholding
rather than striking down a law.60 Legal junkies continue to be fasci-
nated by new revelations about the many corrupt features of the case,
such as Attorney General Bowers' longtime adulterous (and allegedly
sodomitic) affair during the case.609 In a twisted way, Hardwick was (in
part) a boon to lesbigay rights as a social movement, for the Court's
openly antigay opinion not only reinforced lesbigays as a "marked"
minority group, but also rallied lesbigay attorneys out of their closets
in record numbers and attracted moderate allies. Movement lawyers
brought fresh challenges under state constitutions and have prevailed
in most of the cases.61° Social norms have decisively moved away from
the Supreme Court's assumptions: conservatives and traditionalists as
well as liberals and civil rights advocates have joined in a public con-
sensus that the state should not make consensual sodomy a crime. On
the other hand, there is no consensus for the proposition that sodomy
is unproblematic - and in one area of law, sodomy remains the key to
a strong antigay policy, the military exclusion.
Surprisingly, the stream of cases appealing the exclusion of lesbi-
gay people from the armed forces continued after Hardwick. Indeed,
the Ninth Circuit fiercely debated the issue in Watkins v. United States
Army.611 Judge William Norris' panel opinion ruled that the army's ex-
clusion of "homosexuals" (defined as people who "desire[] bodily con-
tact between persons of the same sex") was a status-based discrimina-
607. Id. at 210-11 n.5 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
608. Critiques from different points of view include ESKRIDGE, GAYLAW, supra note
14, ch. 4 (precedent and gaylegal history); CHARLES FRIED, ORDER AND LAW - ARGUING
THE REAGAN REVOLUTION 81-84 (1991) (precedent); RICHARD A. POSNER, SEX AND
REASON 341-50 (1991) (libertarian philosophy); Goldstein, History, Homosexuality, supra
note 601 (history); Sylvia Law, Homosexuality and the Social Meaning of Gender, 1988 WIS.
L. REV. 187 (feminist premises and history); and Frank I. Michelman, Law's Republic, 97
YALE L.J. 1493 (1987) (republican philosophy). There is no major law review article or legal
book defending Hardwick, a notable contrast to other controversial Supreme Court opin-
ions, such as Roe v. Wade or even Brown.
609. See MURDOCH & PRICE, supra note 510, at 493-94.
610. For decisions striking down consensual sodomy laws under state constitutions, see
Powell v. State, 510 S.E.2d 18 (Ga. 1998) (the Hardwick law); Commonwealth v. Wasson,
842 S.W.2d 487 (Ky. 1992); State v. Cogshell, 997 S.W.2d 534 (Mo. App. 1999); Gryczan v.
Montana, 942 P.2d 112 (Mont. 1997); and Campbell v. Sundquist, 926 S.W.2d 250 (Tenn.
App. 1996) (appeal denied). For opinions upholding a law against state constitutional chal-
lenge, see State v. Smith, 766 So.2d 501 (La. 2000), and Lawrence v. State, 41 S.W.3d 349
(Tex. 2001) (petition for certiorari pending).
611. 847 F.2d 1329 (9th Cir. 1988), vacated en banc, 875 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1989) (dis-
cussed in Section lI.C.1.f).
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tion subject to strict scrutiny.612 In dissent, Judge Stephen Reinhardt
read Hardwick to condone "anti-homosexual animus in the actions of
the government," and to allow the state to discriminate against that
class of people who are predisposed to commit criminalizable sod-
omy.613 There were analytical problems with both stances: as Norris
argued, Hardwick was concerned only with homosexual conduct and,
even in that sphere, did not reach equal protection issues - but be-
cause homosexual status is defined by the desire and the proclivity to
engage in proscribable conduct, Hardwick was not irrelevant to the
equal protection issue, Reinhardt's point.614 Ultimately, the Ninth
Circuit, en banc, vacated the Norris opinion and judgment but ruled
that the army was debarred on estoppel grounds from expelling Perry
Watkins.6 5
The 1993 debate over the president's proposed executive order
ending the bar to gays in the military echoed the Norris-Reinhardt de-
bate, with added twists. Critics of the lesbigay exclusion emphasized
the status denigration, reminiscent of the military's exclusion and later
segregation of blacks and women; like these other minorities, lesbigay
people would not enjoy the full status of citizens until they could
openly serve their country as soldiers.6 6 Supporters of the exclusion
were insulted by the parallel to discredited race and gender exclusions,
because the antigay policy was grounded upon conduct not status.
Unlike people of color, who were victims of prejudiced attitudes, gay
people (this argument went) were themselves responsible for lowering
morale and unit cohesion because of their disruptive behavior. 617 Al-
though this kind of preservationist argument has been rejected in most
other industrial countries, it prevailed in the United States in 1993.
The result was a statutory exclusion of anyone who either engaged in
"homosexual acts" or had a "propensity" to do so, 6 18 assertedly (but
612. Watkins, 847 F.2d at 1336.
613. Id. at 1355-58 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting). But see id. at 1339-42 (Norris, J., distin-
guishing Hardwick).
614. See Nan D. Hunter, Life After Hardwick, 27 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 531 (1992).
615. Watkins, 875 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1989) (en banc).
616. See Kenneth L. Karst, The Pursuit of Manhood and the Desegregation of the Armed
Forces, 38 UCLA L. REV. 499 (1991).
617. See, e.g., ESKRIDGE & HUNTER, SEXUALITY, supra note 420, at 388-400 (collecting
materials reflecting opposition to the president's proposal); JANET E. HALLEY, DON'T: A
READER'S GUIDE TO THE MILITARY'S ANTI-GAY POLICY (1999) (tracing the conduct-
status arguments through the legislative process).
618. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-160, §
571(a), 107 Stat. 1670 (1993) (codified at 10 U.S.C. § 654 (2000)). Technically, there are three
grounds for exclusion: the service member (1) has engaged in or attempted to engage in
"homosexual acts," unless there are findings (essentially) that they were an isolated occur-
rence unlikely to recur; (2) has stated that he or she is a "homosexual or bisexual," unless
the member can prove that he or she has no "propensity" to engage in "homosexual acts"; or
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